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Abstract 
 
KIRKLAND ALEXANDER FULK: Literature as Utopia: Spaces of Alterity in West 
German Postcolonial and Science-Fiction Literature after Sixty-Eight 
(Under the direction of Richard Langston)  
 
The dominant narrative surrounding West German literature of the seventies 
maintains that following the collapse of the student movement around 1968, the collective 
utopian aspirations of this generation gave way to the loss thereof in the new emphasis on 
private, political subjectivity in the following decade. Literature as Utopia challenges such 
commonplace accounts by examining spatial alterity in postcolonial and science fiction 
literature of the 1970s written by Nicolas Born, Hubert Fichte, Alexander Kluge, and the 
anonymous cult writer P.M. This study reassess the currency of utopia after 1968—both the 
“good place” and “no place”—by probing these authors’ works using post-Adornian 
aesthetic theories that emerged concurrently in West Germany in the seventies, namely those 
of Karl Heinz Bohrer, Hans Robert Jauß, Wolfgang Iser, Dieter Wellershoff, Oskar Negt and 
Alexander Kluge. In addition, my dissertation traffics in the larger intellectual history 
surrounding the 1970s by bringing my primary texts into dialogue with theorists outside of 
Germany such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Susan Sontag, Clifford Geertz, Henri 
Lefebvre, and others in order to assess the ways in which the literature of this period begins 
to respond to theory. In this dissertation, I argue that this post-revolutionary literature was 
particularly adept at opening textual spaces in which the idea of utopia could regain a 
foothold as a socio-critical force after its demise just a few years earlier. 
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Introduction 
 
After the Deluge:  
From a Politics of the Self to Spatial Alterity 
 
 
In the wake of the revolts that shook West Germany in the late 1960s, literature 
ostensibly shifted its focus from the realm of social politics and collective utopian aspirations 
to a new emphasis on private subjectivity and a politics of the self—or so the story goes.1 
While the decade following the collapse of the student movement is undoubtedly 
distinguished by the rise of “Neue Subjektivität” or “Neue Innerlichkeit,” there was more to 
this period than first meets the eye. This dissertation does not completely refute this 
commonly-held trajectory in literary history or the predominance of New Subjectivity in 
literary production. To be sure, New Subjectivity was not a wholehearted eschewal of the 
political, but rather a critical redefinition thereof that brought about new movements, such as 
the Greens and feminism.2 Rather, this dissertation adds another dimension to this narrative. 
                                                 
1 See for example, David Roberts, “From the 1960s to the 1970s: The Changing Contexts of German 
Literature,” in After the Death of Literature, Keith Bullivant, ed. (Oxford: Berg, 1989), pp. xi-xxiii, David 
Roberts, “Tendenzwenden: Die sechziger und siebziger Jahre in literaturhistorischer Perspektive,” Deutsche 
Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 56:2 (June 1982), pp. 290-313, Richard W. 
McCormick, Politics of the Self: Feminism and the Postmodern in West German Literature and Film 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991), Moray McGowan, “Neue Subjektivität,” in After the Death of Literature, 
pp.53-68, Leslie Adelson, “Subjectivity Reconsidered: Botho Strauss and Contemporary West German Prose,” 
New German Critique, No. 30 (Autumn 1983), pp. 3-59. 
2 See David Roberts, “Tendenzwenden: Die sechziger und siebziger Jahre in literaturhistorischer Perspektive,” 
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 56:2 (June 1982), pp. 290-313 
and Richard W. McCormick, Politics of the Self: Feminism and the Postmodern in West German Literature and 
Film Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991). 
2 
As so often happens, the dominance of such all-encompassing classifications as those above, 
which attempt to characterize an entire literary movement and decade, tend to leave much 
unaccounted for due to their haste to propose something new and novel. One of the critical 
elements overlooked by many scholars is the fate and continued predominance of utopia after 
sixty-eight. As subjectivity took firm hold of the literary stage in the 1970s, utopia appeared 
to have succumbed to the same fate as the student movement, namely, it too met its end. 
This dissertation seeks to uncover the utopian legacy of the 1960s buried under the 
ruins of the student movement left standing in the 1970s. I argue that utopia not only 
survived the tumultuous 1960s, but also began to take note of and challenge the premises that 
gave rise to it during this decade. Utopia did not, to be sure, survive unscathed, but changed 
as the world around it did, taking on a new critical tenor with regard to itself as well as the 
manner in which it is produced and deployed.3 The West German 1970s gave birth to a type 
of utopian literature that arose alongside, responded to, and in some instances foreshadowed 
new theoretical models that were reassessing the role and function of literature after the 
student movement. In this way, my project traffics in the intellectual history of an idea as it 
emerges in and is illuminated in the medium of literature. While this work challenges the 
caesura between these two decades it does not attempt to reestablish new borders and 
boundaries. Rather than rewriting the literatury history of the seventies, I query the fate of 
utopia after sixty-eight—itself an idea deeply ingrained in the West German cultural 
landscape—and its renaissance in literature and aesthetics. This is an exploration of the recto 
and verso of the idea of utopia that poses the failure of sixty-eight as the politicization of 
                                                 
3 This is in following with Ruth Levitas’s redefinition of utopia. As she states, “[…] a new definition of utopia 
is offered, which recognizes the common factor of the expression of desire.” This definition creates flexibility 
for utopian projects and allows their content, form, and function to change over time. Levitas, The Concept of 
Utopia. (New York: Syracuse UP, 1990), p. 8. 
3 
utopia and argues for the future and survival of utopia through its aestheticization. After 
sixty-eight, utopia regained a foothole literature, in particular, and aesthetics, in general. The 
following project investigates the medial specificity of utopia as a literary representation of 
spaces of alterity.   
This dissertation is founded on two seemingly simple premises regarding utopia. The 
first is that utopia is fundamentally concerned with spaces of alterity. That is, utopia is 
always an other space, a world beyond the borders and boundaries of one’s own. As Darko 
Suvin maintains, utopias are “this-worldly Other Worlds”; they are not transcendental but 
rather “located in this world.”4 The question then becomes, what were the utopias, the other 
worlds, of the 1960s that crossed the decadal boundary into the 1970s? As I argue at length in 
the following pages, the 1960s were a time heavily invested in other worlds. The so-called 
Third World was a topic of perennial concern and was generally viewed as a site of 
revolution against the continued colonialism and imperialism of the West. From Vietnam and 
Iran to Central and South America, the student movement sought to align their struggles 
through solidarity with foreign revolutionary movements abroad. Quinn Slobodian adroitly 
summarizes the situation of the student movement, the New Left, in the Federal Republic 
thusly: 
If West German social democracy had been bought off by consumer capitalism and 
East German communism was suffocating in authoritarian conformity, what was 
Left? Scrutinizing the claims of both Germanies to the label of democracy, New 
Leftists found both of them wanting. Children of the Cold War themselves, they 
questioned the received geopolitical categories and looked for options beyond the 
blocs. 
The space newly dubbed the Third World seemed like one source of political 
                                                 
4 Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction (New Haven: Yale UP, 1979), p. viii, 42.  
4 
alternatives.5  
Thus, where neither democracy nor communism, which divided the world into two 
competing camps after 1945, seemed to offer any real alternatives to a repressive and 
oppressive society, the students turned their gaze beyond the borders of their own country. A 
possible third way lay in the Third World, in countries that were themselves the contested 
zones of Cold War politics and where armed revolutions were already transpiring and 
threatening to topple the established order. The desires for revolutionary alternatives and 
possibilities in the 1960s were integrally linked to other worlds that loomed on the horizon 
like utopian islands. 
 The 1960s were also a time of increased contact with these others worlds. The influx 
of foreign students to the Federal Republic, primarily from Africa and Asia, brought with it 
new political ideas as well as first-hand accounts of militant struggles and encouraged 
cooperation between West German students and Third World emancipation movements.6 At 
the same time, however, this political, revolutionary exchange was also one-sided. While 
ideas and strategies were certainly traded across the geographical divide, far fewer students 
from West Germany made the trip abroad. Contact with these actual worlds was far more 
ideational than physical, from the standpoint of the West German students. This contact 
between other worlds in the 1960s resulted then in a flattening thereof in the name of 
revolutionary solidarity. As far as the West German students were concerned, they were all 
fighting for and struggling against the same thing irrespective of geographical, political, and 
cultural differences. Thus what was initially seen and prized as other, succumbed to a process 
                                                 
5 Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham: Duke UP, 2012), p. 
3. 
6 Ibid., p. 17ff.  
5 
of spatial leveling; these other worlds were merely extensions of the revolutionary desires of 
the student movement. 
If one were to follow the narrative outlined above, namely that the political 
investment in the sixties in realizing other worlds gave way to an emphasis on the self and 
subjectivity in the 1970s, then little room is left for this overwhelming concern with spaces 
beyond the borders of West Germany. Desires such as those of the 1960s, in general, and 
utopian desires, in particular, do not, however, die so easily. Rather than suggest that 
subjectivity eschews a concern with other worlds, I argue that the literature of the 1970s 
attempts to come to terms with the leveling of other worlds in the previous decade, to pull 
them apart, so to speak, in order to explore them as spaces of alterity fundamentally different 
from those of West Germany. This entails, on the one hand, a critique of the 1960s and, on 
the other hand, a recognition of literature’s role in the creation of these other worlds, the 
aestheticization of utopia. This is both an epistemological as well as representational problem 
that comes face to face with the contradiction that knowledge about other worlds always 
frames the ways in which they are written about. This brings me to my second premise about 
utopia. Utopia is a literary construction that is highly self-aware and self-reflexive 
concerning the worlds it creates.7 Utopian literature is founded on the contradiction and 
paradox that the text not only knowingly creates other worlds, but is conscious of itself as a 
textual space. It is, as Louis Marin states, a literary space of “limitless contradiction.”8 
Before turning to the methodological and structural outline of this project, I wish first to 
demonstrate by way of example my claims above regarding the transposition of the critique 
                                                 
7 Louis Marin, Utopics: The Semiological Play of Textual Spaces, trans. Robert A. Vollrath (New York: 
Humanity, 1984), p. 65. 
8 Ibid., p. 7. 
6 
of the other worlds after sixty-eight. 
 
The Other Worlds of the 1970s: Dieter Kühn’s Und der Sultan von Oman 
 
The year was 1973 In West Germany, the student movement had come to an end. Three years 
prior, the SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund) formally disbanded and by 1972 
the West German government had successfully passed the Radicals Ordinance, the 
occupational ban that kept former activists from attaining any position in the government.9 
The long march through the institutions not to mention the political goals of the student 
revolts were seemingly swept off the table. The movement was fractured into various camps, 
from the greens and feminism to left wing terrorism.10 Within the spaces of literature, Peter 
Schneider’s Lenz [1973] and Karin Struck’s Klassenliebe [1973] ushered in what came to be 
called “Neue Subjektivität.”11 Elsewhere in the world, war and revolution were still the order 
of the day. As the war in Vietnam was slowly nearing its end with signing of the Paris Peace 
Accords and the initial withdrawal of American troops, crisis and war loomed on another 
front, the Middle East. In October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed into Israeli-held 
territory beginning the three-week long Yom Kippur War. In response to the United States’ 
                                                 
9 David Roberts, “Tendenzwenden: Die sechziger und siebziger Jahre in literaturhistorischer Perspective,” p. 
295. 
10 Each of these political offshoots of the student movement had substantial literary counterparts that can be 
placed within the literary movement of “Neue Subjektivität.” Hans-Christoph Buch’s Das hervortreten des Ichs 
aus den Wörtern [1978] joined the anti-nuclear movement with the new emphasis on the self and subjectivity. 
Karin Struck’s Klassenliebe [1973] and Verena Stefan’s Häutungen [1975] brought feminism and the “personal 
is political” to the forefront in literature. The controversial autobiography of left-wing terrorist Michael 
“Bommi” Baumann, Wie alles anfing [1975], bridged terrorism and love, espousing the former in favor of the 
latter, and the autobiography of former student movement activist and radical Bernward Vesper, Die Reise 
[1977], added another private, personal dimension to student movement. 
11 McGowan, “Neue Subjektivität,” in After the Death of Literature, pp. 53-68, p. 53 
7 
support of Israel, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OAPEC, 
levied an oil embargo. Together with the stock-market crash in January 1973, the oil 
embargo fanned the flames of economic crisis. What began as a seemingly local event had 
global implications resulting in the largest world-wide economic collapse since the Great 
Depression. It was during this time, as David Harvey argues, that the modern world 
witnessed another “time-space compression,” whereby the speed with which events occur 
and information travels “so overcom[es] spatial barriers that the world sometimes seems to 
collapse inwards upon us.”12 Thus, while former student movement activists such as 
Schneider and Struck were turning to investigations of the self, geopolitical alignments and 
economic imperialism were creating a new set of global crises. This time-space compression 
was responsible for bridging divides as well as initiating economic catastrophes and war. 
These events form the background of Dieter Kühn’s novel Und der Sultan von Oman [1979]. 
Kühn’s novel centers on James O’Shaugnessy who works for the Public Relations 
Department of the fictional New York-based United Oil Corporation.13 At the height of the 
oil crisis, O’Shaugnessy embarks on a world-wide PR trip including Great Britain, West 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Kuwait. Together with his boss David G. “Lips” 
Matheson, O’Shaugnessy is charged with combatting conspiracy theories that United Oil and 
OAPEC are in cahoots to drive up oil prices. Though tasked with providing speaking points 
for Matheson and keeping the information fresh and up-to-date, O’Shaugnessy has plenty of 
                                                 
12 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1990), pp. 240, 284. Harvey argues that the first “time-space compression” occurred during the mid-
1840s during the time of the industrial revolution and was one of the central concerns of modernism.   
13 Dieter Kühn, Und der Sultan von Oman (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), from here on cited 
parenthetically as “SO.” Kühn republished this novel two times, once in 1982 in the shortened “Neuausgabe” 
and further abbreviated in 1998 in a collection of “Erzählungen.” Unless otherwise noted, I refer to the original 
novel from 1979. 
8 
time to fantasize. The core of his fantasies consists of a mixture of Middle Eastern lore, 
fairytale landscapes reminiscent of One Thousand and One Nights (Arabian Nights), and the 
revolutionary zeal of Lawrence of Arabia. Indeed, O’Shaugnessy sets his sights on the small 
Omanian province of Dhofar, the site of a growing independence movement, in which he 
hopes to take part. 
While the novel’s protagonist is American, Kühn’s novel tackles a decidedly German 
issue, namely the fate and legacy of the idea of utopia after sixty-eight. The internationalism 
of the student movement that sought solidarity with revolutions abroad is reflected through a 
representation of a globalized world, the results of the aforementioned time-space 
compression. Just as the arrival of students from Africa and Asia signaled both a cooperation 
between movements and a collapse of other worlds, so too did the influence of the U.S. 
protest movement and American students in West Germany. As Slobodian notes, the West 
German student movement’s relationship with the U.S. was characterized not only by 
“interactions […] between West German and U.S. activists,” but also criticism of the foreign 
policy of the United States: 
The United States was the dominant international presence in West Germany in the 
1960s, as it was in much of the world. The global scope of U.S. soft and hard power 
in the decade made it impossible to speak about the world without simultaneously 
speaking about “America,” to use the name that co-opted two continents. Its influence 
even overdetermined apparently Third World issues, as in the case of the Vietnam 
War, which was simultaneously about a postcolonial nation and about the United 
States.14 
                                                 
14 Slobodian, Foreign Front, p. 6. Paul Michael Lützeler echoes Slobodian’s assessment that the anti-
Americanism in West Germany in the 1960s was less about America per se as it was about global politics and 
imperialism. As he states: “Dieses politische Engagement ist in den USA oft mit Anti-Amerikanismus 
gleichgesetzt worden, was eine zwar verständliche, aber letztlich doch an der Sache vorbeigehende 
Interpretation ist. Vietnam sah man (zugegebenermaßen ohne Kenntnis der regionalen Hintergründe und 
Zusammenhänge) als Beispiel eines Dritte-Welt-Landes, das sich aus der Klammer neo-kolonialer Herrschaft 
befreien wollte.” Lützeler, Schriftsteller und “Dritte Welt:” Studien zum postkolonialen Blick (Tübingen: 
Stauffenburg, 1998), p. 27. 
9 
That Dieter Kühn chooses an American as the protagonist in his novel corresponds with this 
assessment of America’s role in the West German 1960s. To talk about America is at once to 
address military and economic imperialism, the Third World, Germany’s complicity with 
U.S. foreign policy as well as revolt and revolution. Dieter Kühn’s novel thus reflects on a 
critical juncture in the post-1968 history of West Germany, namely the rise of “Neue 
Subjektivität,” new wars and economic crises brought on by the “time-space compression” 
and collapse of other worlds, and the revolutionary internationalism characteristic of the 
student movement.  
O’Shaugnessy’s interest in and knowledge of the Middle East and particularly Oman 
stems from a wide range of sources. His New York apartment is a cluttered mess of books, 
newspaper articles, notes, charts, graphs, and maps. His personal space has effectively 
become an information hub where he surrounds himself with pertinent data concerning his 
job: 
Die Liege umgeben von gestapelten Zeitungen, Zeitschriften: rosarot die Financial 
Times, dickleibig Fortune und Times, New Yorker […]. Aus Zeitungen, Zeitschriften 
ausgeschnittene, angepinnte Foto-Reproduktionen […]. Zwei Wände verdeckt von 
Regalen: Bücher gereiht und geschichtet, Schnellhefter, Einschlagmappen, 
hektographierte, xerokopierte Schriften. Vor allem aus waagrecht liegenden Bücher 
hängen fingerbreite Zettel, an den Kopfenden Stichworte, Kennworte mit Bleistift, 
Kugelschreiber, Filzstift; keine Zahlen, keine Chiffren, denn O’Shaugnessy führt 
keinen Katalog. (SO, 8-9) 
This description of his apartment, which consists of little more than a series of short notes 
and lists of objects, reveals the second-hand construction of O’Shaugnessy’s knowledge and 
interest in the Middle East. From his New York apartment, he has fabricated a personal space 
for himself that is a completely medialized representation of an other world.15 That is to say, 
                                                 
15 In his analysis of Kühn’s novel, Paul Michael Lützeler defines the process of medialzation as such: “Die 
Forschung zur Medialisierung beschreibt und analysiert den Prozess, wie die Medien ins Zentrum sozialer 
Prozesse rücken, wie Kenntnisse über wirtschaftliche und politische Zusammenhänge von der Präsentation 
10 
all O’Shaugnessy knows about the Middle East comes from these pieces of data that literally 
line the walls and cover the floor of his apartment and not from any direct experience. His 
apartment becomes a space of knowledge about the Middle East, all the details and 
intricacies collapsed into one living quarter that he fashions as a virtual, medialized, 
epistemological representation of this other world. For him, the Middle East is little more 
than an intricate latticework of facts and figures that transports itself and fits easily into his 
small abode mirroring the time-space compression of other worlds through the speed with 
which information travels and is consumed. At the same time, and most important for the 
stakes of this dissertation, it reveals the implicit contradiction in which the text itself is 
engaged. Kühn’s novel, as Lützeler notes, “[spielt] mit offenen Karten.”16 That is, it is aware 
that it, too, is taking part in the creation of the other world that it simultaneously seeks to 
represent. 
O’Shaugnessy’s curiosity with the Middle East is, to be sure, the result of his 
occupation. As an employee of an oil company, it is his job to familiarize himself with the 
other countries where oil is to be found. To a large extent, this necessitates a familiarity with 
maps. In Vienna, the first stop on his world-wide PR tour, O’Shaugnessy stumbles across a 
map store and purchases a geological map of Kuwait: 
Montag morgen, das Frisch gebohnerte Geschäft, die Verkäufer kramen sich zurecht; 
die Karte wird nicht aus dem Schaufenster geholt, offenbar noch weitere Exemplare 
auf Lager, es wird auch eine politische Karte von Kuwait angeboten, nein, nur die 
geologische Karte mit den roten Linien der Ölpipelines, den blauen der 
Grundwasserpipelines, Sand mittelfein bis grobkörnig, Waadi-Segmente, auch sind 
Straßen, Flugplätze, Städte markiert. (SO, 26)  
                                                                                                                                                       
durch die Medien abhängen.” Lützeler, Bürgerkrieg Global (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2009), p. 175. 
16 See Lützeler, Bürgerkrieg Global, pp. 174-5, 182, as well as Walter Olma, “’Und der Sultan von Oman’: 
John Coltrane, das Morgenland und andere Subversionspotentiale,” in Dieter Kühn, Werner Klüppelholz und 
Helmut Scheuer, eds. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), pp. 128-143, pp. 131-132. 
11 
He is not interested in the political maps, but rather those which show in detail the lay of the 
land down to the type of sand and the infrastructure. Moreover, he wants to know the 
location of the oil pipelines. For O’Shaugnessy, these pipelines divide up the Middle East 
irrespective of sovereign political borders: “‘Wenn das Öl erst mal entdeck ist, sieht man es 
nie wieder.’ Sprengen eines ‘Christbaums’, einer Pipeline: dann erst würde Rohöl Realität für 
die Augen, Realität für die Nase, Realität für Tastorgane – einen Zeigefinger hineinstippen 
(SO, 103). The flow of oil and essentially capital not only transcends the established political 
borders of Middle Eastern countries, but redraws them in the form of pipelines represented 
on a map. The pipelines and the corresponding cartographic markers carve up the map of the 
Middle East; they are the only thing that makes it real for O’Shaugnessy. 
 On the one hand, this division of geopolitical space solely regarding the interests of 
capital and the West echoes Edward Said’s analysis in Orientalism [1978]: 
It is quite common to hear high officials in Washington and elsewhere speak of 
changing the map of the Middle East, as if ancient societies and myriad peoples can 
be shaken up like so many peanuts in a jar. But this has often happened with the 
“Orient,” that semi-mythical construct which since Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 
the late eighteenth century has been made and re-made countless times by power 
acting through an expedient form of knowledge to assert that this is the Orient's 
nature, and we must deal with it accordingly.17  
Published only a year before Kühn’s novel, Said’s description of the redrawing of the map of 
the Middle East guided by knowledge and a pursuit of capital is mirrored precisely in Und 
der Sultan von Oman. In this way, Kühn’s novel not only responds to and knows of theory, 
here the rise of postcolonialism, but engages in it through literature as well. On the other 
hand, O’Shaugnessy’s emphasis on the reality of the map and the pipeline also erases the 
physical reality of these other worlds, which are reduced to cartographical representations. 
                                                 
17 Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. xlv. 
12 
O’Shaugnessy’s surprise at his first sight of Bedouins is indicative of the predominance of 
this cartographic reality: “[…] ein Nomadenzelt! Jawohl, ein Nomadenzelt, weit ab von der 
Straße, originalgetreu in der Wüste” (SO, 209). The road which leads through the desert is, 
indeed, on the map, but the Bedouins are not. The only reality O’Shaugnessy is aware of 
comes from the map and anything outside thereof elicits amazement. Kühn’s description of 
the reality of maps precedes what Jean Baudrillard two years later describes as the emergence 
of the simulacrum. Baudrillard describes the process of simulation by recounting a fable by 
Jorge Luis Borges in which the “cartographers of the Empire draw up a map so detailed that 
it ends up covering the territory exactly” such that “the decline of the Empire witnesses the 
fraying of this map.”18 While the map simulated the space of the Empire, Baudrillard argues 
that this is no longer the case: 
Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the 
generation by models of a real without origin: a hyperreal. The territory no longer 
precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the 
territory—procession of simulacra—that engenders the territory.19 
In Und der Sultan von Oman, the map that precedes any real territory reflects 
O’Shaugnessy’s cartographic knowledge devoid of any experience with preexisting reality. 
Accordingly, any contact with the real territory seems astoundingly imaginary. Kühn’s novel 
thus not only reflects the time-space compression of other worlds, but is representative of a 
spatial turn in West German literature of the 1970s, in which the time of modernity is no 
longer the central concern. Instead it is space, in general, and, in this case, geopolitical and 
                                                 
18 Baudrillard, Simulation and Simulacrum, Sheila Faria Glaser, trans. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), p. 1. 
19 Ibid. 
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cartographic other spaces that drive the narrative.20 
 This shift in interest from time to space does not mean, however, that time is of no 
importance. Indeed, the 1970s witnessed a compression of both time and space, as Harvey 
has argued in his seminar analysis. Und der Sultan von Oman is testament to this as well. 
While geopolitical space is collapsed into the simulacrum of the map through the neo-
colonial conquests of capital, time is a raw material as well in O’Shaugnessy’s world: 
Er lernt verstehen, weshalb sich so viele Experten und Fachbücher mit dem Zeit-
Management von Spitzenkräften beschäftigen. Da wird Zeit definiert als besonderer 
Rohstoff, der weder im Vorgriff genutzt, noch für die Zukunft gelagert werden kann; 
da wird gemahnt zur effektiven und nicht bloß effizienten Nutzung von Zeit; da 
werden Zeitmessungen nun auch bei Spitzenmanagern durchgeführt […]. Und: es 
werden besondere Zeit-Feinde aufgelistet – das Telefon, das Erledigen von Post, 
Besprechungen mit langatmigen Egotrips und so weiter bis auf Ziffer zehn: Familie. 
(SO, 129) 
Time for O’Shaugnessy differs little from the world of information and oil. The only 
distinction is its inherent ephemerality, its inability to be stored for later use like oil. It is, 
therefore, necessary to make an effective and efficient use of time by not wasting this 
resource on menial tasks or spending time with family. The world of oil companies is 
predicated on the new contours of time-space compression. The pipelines not only reduce the 
geographical space of the Middle East, connecting it with Western exporters through a series 
of tubes that transcend and collapse borders, but also enables production, refinement, and 
shipping time to be drastically sped up, increasing the flow and time of capital. 
O’Shaugnessy is not, however, willingly subservient to the time-space compression 
                                                 
20 See for example Lützeler, Schriftsteller und “Dritte Welt:” Studien zum postkolonialen Blick (Tübingen: 
Stauffenburg, 1998), p. 20, 28; Ulla Biernat, Ich bin nicht der erste Fremde hier: Zur deutschsprachigen 
Reiseliteratur nach 1945 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004), pp. 73-75, p. 99; Arlene Teraoka, East, 
West, and Others: The Third World in Postwar German Literature (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1996), pp. 41-42; Doris Bachmann-Medick, Cultural Turns: Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften 
(Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2006), pp. 284ff. 
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dictated by capital and the oil company for which he works. He wants to revolt against it. We 
catch our first glimpse of this from one of the many notes littering his apartment on which is 
written “Lehre von der gemäßigten Geschwindigkeit” (SO, 10, author’s italics). The narrator 
later divulges the influence and meaning behind O’Shaugnessy’s fragment: 
James O’Shaugnessy hat einige Thesen von Ivan Illich übernommen und für den 
(ausschließlich) privaten Gebrauch modifiziert zur Lehre von der gemäßigten 
Geschwindigkeit. Hier ist beispielsweise der Überbau zu seiner Vorliebe für das 
Radfahren, an Wochenenden, und zur Anregung des Kreislaufs bei gutem Wetter 
auch an Werktagen, frühmorgens hinauf zu den Cloisters. Einen der Sätze von Illich 
kann er auswendig: “Produktive Sozialbeziehungen unter freien Menschen bleiben 
auf das Fahrradtempo beschränkt.” (SO, 165). 
Ivan Illich serves as the inspiration for O’Shaugnessy’s desire for a moderated tempo of life. 
Not to be confused with Tolstoy’s eponymous protagonist, Illich was an Austrian-American 
philosopher and theologian whose work in the 1970s centered on the energy crisis, the 
acceleration of time and the collapse of space, prefiguring Harvey’s analysis by two decades. 
As he argues in his 1973 essay “Convivial Reconstruction:” “Speed is one of the means by 
which an efficiency-oriented society is stratified” and one of the main causes for imperial 
expansion, “the pernicious spread of one country beyond its boundaries.”21 Further, Illich 
links this incessant acceleration to the energy crisis. “The energy crisis,” he argues, “cannot 
be overwhelmed by more energy input. It can only be dissolved, along with the illusion that 
well-being depends on the number of energy slaves a man has at his command.”22 These 
“energy slaves” are transportation systems, from cars and ships to and trains, which require 
increasingly more energy thereby perpetuating the crises they cause. In order to subvert this 
tendency and bring about what he calls a convivial society, Illich states: 
                                                 
21 Illich, “Convivial Reconstruction,” in Tools for Conviviality (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 10-45, p. 
38, 43. 
22 Illich, “The Energy Crisis,” in Energy and Equity (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 3-12, p. 10. 
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High speed is the critical factor which makes transportation socially destructive. A 
true choice among political systems and of desirable social relations is possible only 
where speed is restrained. Participatory democracy demands low energy technology, 
and free people must travel the road to productive social relations at the speed of a 
bicycle.23 
In short, Illich’s plan for a better, utopian society founded on conviviality demands a slow-
down in time and with it a stop to the economic imperialism that collapses other worlds. 
It is Illich’s proposed slow-down that is the foundation of O’Shaugnessy’s 
revolutionary, utopian vision of the Omani province of Dhofar and another instantiation of 
literature knowing about and responding to theory. During his free time, O’Shaugnessy 
dedicates himself to the construction of his Dhofar-Scenario: 
Sobald O’Shaugnessy Zeit dazu hat, eine halbe Stunde, eine viertel, breitet er seine 
Middle-East-Karte aus, eins zu drei Millionen. Und er schaut auf das Gebiet zwischen 
der Volksrepublik Jemen und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate: das Sultanat von 
Oman. […] Schraffiert hat O’Shaugnessy im Sultanat Oman die Süd-Provinz Dhofar: 
das Gebiet, in dem die Befreiungsarmee kämpft, bis hin zur “roten Linie.” Einen Pfeil 
hat James von der Volksrepublik Jemen hinüber nach Dhofar gezogen: Unterstützung 
der Partisanen. Aus dieser Konstellation entwickelt O’Shaugnessy sein Dhofar-
Szenarium. (SO, 38) 
Dhofar is both the site of a contemporary liberation movement and O’Shaugnessy’s utopian 
society based on a temporal awareness other than that of profit driven oil companies. 
Was O’Shaugnessy selbstverständlich nicht will: ein Beduinen-Reservat. Aber doch 
dies: ein Land, in dem man es nicht eilig hat; ein Land Ohne efficiency, dies vor 
allem; ein Land, das sich nicht die Zukunft zerstört, indem es seine Vergangenheit 
auslöscht. Ein Land also, das es nicht nötig hat, übermäßig viele Straßen zu bauen, 
ein Land, das Fernsehen einfach nicht braucht, weil die Phantasie noch nicht 
korrumpiert ist; ein Land, noch selbstbewußter in seiner geographischen 
Sonderposition! (SO, 134) 
O’Shaugnessy’s planned revolution is the springboard to a new “Modell Oman” in “der Zeit 
nach dem Öl” (SO, 229, author’s italics). Oman, in his conception, would become a land in 
which time is no longer subject to the temporal, efficient demands of capital, and one which 
                                                 
23 Illich, “The Energy Crisis,” p. 12. 
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does not destroy its unique past in order to participate in global, international business. 
Further, this slow-down in time would enable it to overcome the flattening, homogenizing 
force of the time-space compression globalization. 
 O’Shaugnessy’s worldview is, then, dominated not only by a medialized knowledge 
of the Middle East, based on hard facts and maps serving the interests of international capital, 
but also by a revolutionary, utopian desire to overturn this order. At the same time, however, 
this utopian desire to take part in the revolutions of other worlds displays a colonial 
contradiction. Kühn’s novel ends not with a grandiose conclusion of O’Shaugnessy’s PR trip 
or his “Dhofar-Szenarium,” but rather with a fairytale: “Die Stadt aus Stein” (SO, 231).24 As 
the title of the fairytale suggests, this is a petrified city; people, buildings, animals, and 
insects are all transfixed in a permanent, fossilized state. O’Shaugnessy wanders this stone 
city and finds the last flesh-and-blood occupant of the city, a “märchenhaft schöne[s] 
Mädchen” reading from a scroll (SO, 235). Readers would likely expect the typical fairytale 
ending whereby the hero or prince breaks the spell with the help of the girl and brings the 
city once again to life. But this is not a typical fairytale and James is not a typical hero. After 
touching the girl’s skin, James leaves the city of stone unchanged (SO, 235). This final scene 
is not only that of an anti-fairytale, as Lützeler correctly reads it, but it is also representative 
of the fate of the revolutionary, utopian aspirations of 1968.25 The Westerner is not the savior 
of other worlds, but the very precondition for their collapse. Rather than recognizing the 
inherent contradictions of his plan, that his knowledge of this other world takes part in its 
creation, O’Shaugnessy falsely reconciles them and in doing so petrifies the world he wishes 
                                                 
24 Paul Michael Lützeler traces Kühn’s possible inspiration for this fairytale to the 1975 German publication of 
the Azerbaijani fairytale collection Die versteinerte Stadt which contains a quite similar story to Kühn’s titled 
“Das Geheimnis der Stadt Benadisch” which Kühn possibly read. Lützeler, Bürgerkrieg Global, p. 181. 
25 Ibid. 
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to change. 
Kühn’s novel, however, accomplishes precisely the opposite. It lays all of its cards on 
the table, displaying the contradictory construction of other worlds and refusing to reconcile 
them. In this way, his work not only critiques the utopian interest in other worlds in the 
1960s, but creates out of these contradictions a literary space in which they can be exposed. 
Kühn’s novel therewith illustrates four pivotal points of my dissertation: 1) in the course of 
four chapters, I demonstrate the continued interest in other worlds as sites of revolutionary 
alternatives; 2) I show that the collapse of spaces and other worlds is, in part, predicated on a 
desire for knowledge about them, from the cartographic and economic to the revolutionary 
and fantastic; 3) I account for new political and aesthetic theories (Said and postcolonialism, 
Baudrillard and simulacra, Illich and Harvey and the effects of time-space compression) 
manifest in literary texts of the seventies and; 4) I show how the utopian in literary works is 
founded on contradiction and paradox concerning the other worlds that it seeks to represent. 
Und der Sultan von Oman illustrates all of these premises and provides us with an exemplar 
for an under-appreciated turning point in post-1968 West German literature. 1973 witnessed 
not only the rise of “Neue Subjektivität” but also a transposition and exploration of the 
utopias that seemingly flourished in the previous decade and that purportedly vanished with 
the demise of the student movement. 
 
After Adorno: Aesthetic Theory and The Return of Utopia in the Seventies 
 
 The seventies in West Germany were not only a time of increased literary production, 
but also a time of new aesthetic and literary theories. During this period, literature regained a 
critical, social force that was denied to it in the previous decade. In order to understand this 
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reevaluation of literature it is necessary to look both at the theories that shaped it in the 
sixties and at the newly-emerging theories of the seventies that paralleled the return of 
literature as a space of experimentation and discovery as well as utopia. In the 1960s, 
literature and literary theory was trapped between politicization and the death of literature as 
fiction, on the one hand, and its relegation to a realm of negativity, incommunicable to a 
mass audience, on the other. Hans Magnus Enzensberger was representative of the former 
position and Theodor Adorno the latter. As Hans Magnus Enzensberger proclaims in his 
1968 essay “Gemeinplätze, die Neuste Literatur betreffend,” “wenn [die intelligentesten 
Köpfe zwischen zwanzig und dreißig] lieber Faktographien benutzen als Schelmenromane; 
wenn sie darauf pfeifen, Belletristik zu machen und zu kaufen.”26 While not announcing the 
death of literature as is often ascribed to him, Enzensberger, as Alo Allkemper summarizes, 
“hatte […] der Literatur in der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft jede substantielle Bedeutung 
abgesprochen.”27 That is, Enzensberger did not announce the death knell of all literature, but 
rather a certain type of non- or apolitical fiction. For Enzensberger, it is only through a 
“politische Alphabetisierung” enacted through the documentary and the reportage that 
literature can still claim an operative function.28 Literature itself is thus not dead, but 
literature as art is no longer warranted: “Wer Literatur als Kunst macht, ist damit nicht 
widerlegt, er kann aber auch nicht mehr gerechtfertigt werden.”29 Such was Enzensberger’s 
                                                 
26 Enzensberger, “Gemeinplätze, die Neueste Literatur betreffend,” Kursbuch 15, ed. Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968), pp. 187-197, p. 189.  
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Utopie,” Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie (103:1), eds., Werner Besch, Hugo Moser, Hartmut Steinecke, and 
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28 Enzensberger, “Gemeinplätze, die Neueste Literatur betreffend,” p. 195.  
29 Ibid., p. 195.   
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proclaimed fate and future of literature in 1968, that reduced it to the gathering and recording 
of facts. The value of literature was to be based on its correct political positioning and 
rendered little more than a manual for political education. Literature was secondary to the 
primacy of political action that was to change society. 
 Adorno’s position was diametrically opposed to Enzensberger’s espousal of a 
politically committed literature. For Adorno, it is only literature’s distance from empirical 
reality that forms its opposition to and protest against it. The belief that literature, especially 
Enzensberger’s proposed committed literature in the service of political education, should 
correspond to reality is, in Adorno’s estimation, a sign of regression. As he outlines in his 
posthumously published Aesthetic Theory [1970]: 
any form of direct artistic commitment to ideological or educational values regresses 
behind enlightenment. Unaware of the reality of aesthetic images, the notion of 
commitment levels down the antithesis between art and reality by integrating it lock, 
stock and barrel in reality. Only those works of art are enlightened which manifest 
true consciousness while doggedly keeping their distance from empirical reality.30 
Literature’s oppositional character lies, then, in its refusal to be integrated into reality. Where 
Enzensberger demands a documentary literature that directly represents social conditions 
through which it gains a functional political and social force, for Adorno, this merely places 
it within the affirmative realm of the culture industry. “It combines,” he contends, “a slavish 
respect for empirical details and illusory photographic attachment to them with ideological 
manipulation based on the utilization of those elements. What is social about art is not its 
political stance, but its immanent dynamic in opposition to society.”31 In short, literature can 
only be negative, not surrendering to an immediate collapse of art and reality in the service of 
                                                 
30 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. C. Lenhardt (London: Routledge, 1972), p. 128. 
31 Ibid., p. 322. 
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politics. At the same time, however, the social, oppositional quality of literature attained 
through its negativity separates it from communication to a mass audience: “One decisive 
reason why art works, at least those that refuse to surrender to propaganda, are lacking in 
social impact is that they have to give up the use of those communicative means that would 
make them palatable to a larger public.”32 Thus, critical, negative literature must sacrifice its 
connection to a mass audience and, as Pauline Johnson states, “it is left to the philosopher-
critic to expose this transfiguring, subversive relation.”33 
 The two theories sketched above also greatly affected the relationship between 
literature and utopia. For Enzensberger, literature was ostracized as a realm of utopia. Not 
only did utopia as a fictional, non-existent world have no place in his factual, political 
documentary literature, but the possibility of a real existing utopia in the form of dramatic 
social change was to take place through political action induced by though ultimately 
external to literature. For Adorno, literature did contain a utopian element, though only in its 
depiction of “the absolute negativity of the world,” cordoned off from the larger public and 
relegated to the interpretive skills of the philosopher critic.34 Thus, as literary theory in the 
sixties oscillated between critical negativity and direct politicization, utopia was either 
expelled from literature altogether or made the sole province of literature necessarily 
divorced from and inaccessible to the public. In the following decade, however, all of this 
was challenged. Literature became at once the site of emancipatory potential that challenged 
the preconceptions and the accepted reality of its readers and the space of utopian possibility. 
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Before turning to the theoretical reevaluation of literature and utopia, we must first assess the 
changing relationship between audience and literature.   
 In the wake of sixties, new aesthetic theories came to the fore that were very much a 
product of this decade and attempted not only to fill the void left after Adorno’s death, but in 
many ways argue against the radical negativity he attributes to the realm of art and literature. 
Predominant among the aesthetic theories to really take hold around this time was reception, 
or reader-response theory as popularized by the Constance School, namely Wolfgang Iser 
and Hans Robert Jauß. Reception Theory begins already in 1967 with Jauß’s inaugural 
address at the University of Constance titled, “Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der 
Literaturwissenschaft,” which was published in 1969/70 with a collection of essays. The 
language in the title alone is testament to the radical nature of Jauß’s undertaking. Further, 
Robert Holub ties the emergence of Reception Theory to the larger societal upheaval of the 
1960s: 
In fact, the University of Constance, where both Iser and Jauß taught beginning in the 
late sixties, was founded at the time as an alternative to the rigid, restrictive system of 
higher education at most German universities. […] With student protests demanding a 
total restructuring and rethinking of institutional standards and the emergence of a 
generation of young scholars willing to undertake such sweeping reforms […] several 
alternative methods became popular. […] This was the intellectual climate into which 
reception theory was born, and when the birth occurred, it was not quietly announced 
in the appropriate section of the local newspaper, but brashly proclaimed on the front 
page in bold headlines.35 
While the radicalness and novelty of this literary/aesthetic theory was challenged by many 
abroad, including Paul de Man and Stanley Fish, in West Germany the announcement of this 
“provocative” method was explosive. In fact, as Holub notes: “Just a decade after Jauß’ 
address, Gunter Grimm was able to cite over four hundred entries in one section of a 
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bibliography.”36 Though (post)structuralism was able to find a slight toehold in Germany in 
the 1970s through such theorists as Manfred Frank and Peter Szondi, it was the Constance 
School and reception theory that largely dominated the theoretical/aesthetic discourse. 
Jauß, as Pauline Johnson argues, claimed to have developed an “account of art as an 
emancipatory force in modernity. According to Jauss [sic], Adorno’s inability to construct an 
account of the democratic, radicalizing impact of art comes from his typically Platonic 
preoccupation with the specific truth value of the aesthetic object and his neglect of the 
emancipatory possibilities embedded in a primary aesthetic experience.”37 While Iser was 
initially influenced by Adorno’s theory of aesthetic negativity, he too departed from 
Adorno’s model. “In the attempt to make literature politically relevant,” Winfried Fluck 
states regarding Iser’s work, “the student movement had initially revived critical theory and 
its project of a ‘negative aesthetics,’ but had eventually watered it down to a form of explicit 
political criticism that would leave only a choice between ‘affirmation’ or ‘negation’ as 
possible functions of literature.”38 In contrast to this affirmative negativity and to Jauß’s 
concept of aesthetic experience, Iser sought to resuscitate a concept of literary negativity that 
points to something that is absent and thereby “transform the search for distance from a 
figure of self-defense to a source of creative self-extension.”39 In this way, Iser’s and Jauß’s 
reception/reader response theories provided a new role for literature as a means of producing 
potentially emancipatory aesthetic experiences that does not have to abandon “every 
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commitment to the world,” to speak with Adorno.40 
 Reception theory, as the name aptly suggests, deals with reader or the audience in 
contrast to the author and the production of the work. Jauß clearly defines his approach in 
comparison to both Marxist and Russian formalist literary theory. His goal is, however, not 
too different from the latter, but his method is what sets them apart. Jauß seeks to bridge the 
gap between literature and history, as well as between historic and aesthetic awareness 
(Erkenntnis) without limiting his approach to either an aesthetic of production or 
representation (Produktions-und Darstellungsästhetik).41 Rather, he wants to include what he 
feels the others have left out or ignored: 
Leser, Zuhörer, und Zuschauer, kurzum: der Faktor des Publikums spielt in beiden 
Literaturtheorien eine äußerst beschränkte Rolle. Die orthodoxe Ästhetik des 
Marxismus behandelt den Leser - wenn überhaupt - nicht anders als den Autor: sie 
fragt nach seiner sozialen Stellung, oder sie sucht ihn in der Schichtung einer 
dargestellten Gesellschaft widerzuerkennen. Die formalistische Schule benötigt den 
Leser nur als wahrnehmendes Subjekt, das, den Anweisungen des Textes folgend, die 
Unterscheidung der Form oder die Aufdeckung des Verfahrens zu leisten hat. Sie 
mutet dem Leser das theoretische Verständnis des Philologen zu […].42 
The focus on the reader as promoted by Jauß is by no means merely a passive act on the part 
of the recipient nor does it limit literary theory to only the text and audience. Rather, 
reception theory posits the active role of the reader and constellates author, work, and history 
(the history of the work as well as the history of the reader and his knowledge of the canon): 
Das geschichtliche Leben des literarischen Werks ist ohne den aktiven Anteil seines 
Adressanten nicht denkbar. Denn erst durch seine Vermittlung tritt das Werk in den 
sich wandenden Erfahrungshorizont einer Kontinuität, in der sich die ständige 
Umsetzung von einfacher Aufnahme in kritisches Verstehen, von passiver in active 
Rezeption, von anerkannten ästhetischen Normen in neue, sie übersteigende 
Produktion vollzieht. […] Die ästhetische Implikation liegt darin, dass schon die 
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primäre Aufnahme eines Werkes durch den Leser eine Erprobung des ästhetischen 
Wertes im Vergleich mit schon gelesenen Werken einschließt.43 (169-170, my italics) 
This is not only a productive act, but entails involvement from the reader in the aesthetic act 
through investigating and probing the aesthetic landscape. What this amounts to is a sort of 
dialogue with the reader, which expands the horizon of experience as well the horizon of 
expectation. 
Reception theory, moreover, posits a socially productive act bolstered by the 
aforementioned aesthetically productive act. “Such an account of literary development 
would, according to Jauß, be completed by investigating one further aspect of the whole 
process, the effect that literary works may have on society, via their aesthetic form,” Margot 
Zutshi contends.44 This assumes, as Jauß admits, as certain untimely quality of the work. 
That is, the public for which the work is intended is not yet present, but anticipated by it: 
Die Soziologie der Literatur sieht ihren Gegenstand nicht dialektisch genug, wenn sie 
den Kreis von Schriftsteller, Werk und Publikum so einseitig determiniert. Die 
Determination ist umkehrbar: es gibt Werke, die im Augenblick ihres Erscheinens 
noch auf kein spezifisches Publikum zu beziehen sind, sondern den vertrauten 
Horizont literarischer Erwartungen so völlig durchbrechen, dass ein Publikum für sie 
erst allmählich heranbilden kann.45 
The work of literature is not locked within its hermetically sealed historical time, simply 
reflecting in a vulgar Marxist sense production relationships and societal conditions, but 
rather breaks out of this constraint and produces the audience for which it is intended. 
Reception Theory thus allocates an active role both to the reader and to the work in its 
relation to society and the ability to change the latter. 
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 Wolfgang Iser, perhaps the most internationally well-known member of the 
Constance School, echoes Jauß’s commitment to the reader and the work as a socially 
productive relationship. In one of his earliest and most influential works, The Implied Reader 
(Der implizite Leser) [1972], Iser establishes a similar link between the active reader, the 
work, and both social and historical conditions: 
Normen sind gesellschaftliche Regulative, deren Transponierung in den Roman 
zunächst ihre Entpragmatisierung zur Folge hat. Sie rücken in einen neuen Kontext 
ein, der insofern ihre Funktion verändert, als sie nun nicht mehr – wie im 
gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhang – als Regulative wirken, sondern selbst thematisch 
werden.46 
Iser grants a certain amount of reflection in relation to societal norms in the novel, but at the 
same time, holds that this reflection already alters said norms. That they no longer contain 
the same regulative function as before is due to both their aestheticization and, moreover, the 
response of the reader.47 The negation of the societal norms contains a positive in which the 
reader goes beyond his trusted, socially implemented bounds: 
Diese Negation aber hat einen imperativischen Charakter; sie fordert dazu auf, das 
“Positive” anderswo als im Umkreis des unmittelbar Vertrauten zu suchen. Diese 
implizite Aufforderung der negation ergeht natürlich zunächst an den, für den die 
negierten Normen das Vertraute sind. Das aber ist der Leser des Romans, dessen 
Akivität insoweit beansprucht wird, als er die vom bekannten Horizont sich 
abkehrende Zielrichtung des Romans als dessen Sinn konstituieren muss.48 
The reader takes active part in the construction of meaning, in recognizing the intention of 
the novel as demanding one to go beyond socially regulative norms; pushing the envelope, so 
                                                 
46 Iser, Der implizite Leser (München: Fink, 1972), p. 8.  
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to speak, of what is expected and allowed and therefore changing and challenging both the 
reader and society itself. Reading, for Iser, this becomes a form of discovery and of 
uncovering meaning. This is the basis of his aesthetic theory and this act of discovery, 
moreover, brings a sense of enjoyment: 
Immerhin ließe sich sagen, dass Entdeckung eine Kategorie ästhetischen Vergnügens 
darstellt. Denn sie bietet zwei elementare Chancen: mündet der Akt der 
Sinnkonstitution in eine entdeckung, so ist durch diese zugleich ein Freiheitsgrad 
gewährt, sich […] von dem zu lösen, der man ist, bzw. das zu übersteigen, woran man 
im sozialen Leben gebunden bleibt. Darüber hinaus aber beansprucht die Entdeckung 
unsere Vergnügen, ja vielleicht immer mehere zugleich, in der Regel die emotionalen 
und die kognitiven. (9) 
The aesthetic pleasure of discovery safeguards a degree of freedom in overstepping 
boundaries, of becoming more than what is socially demanded of the reader and this entails a 
further emotional as well as cognitive element. Iser’s response theory, as with Jauß, views 
the work on an aesthetic level, but one that is neither divorced from the active reading subject 
nor its larger social implications. Though Iser’s “implied reader” postulates an “ideal reader,” 
both in the sense of the author’s ideal as well as Iser’s, the important aspect to keep in mind 
for both Jauß and Iser, is the return to literature as form.49 That is, it is not by virtue of its 
politicization that literature can bring about a social effect, but rather in the awareness of the 
force of literature itself as a space of experimentation and discovery. 
 As Jauß’s and Iser’s reception/response theories challenged the relationship between 
literature, audience, and societal positing the productive force of literature and the aesthetic 
realm, others emerged in the wake of the student movement proposing a new relationship 
between literature and utopia. The 1970s are, to be sure, hardly known as a utopian decade. A 
survey of the scholarly landscape, indeed, results in the overall impression that utopia did not 
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survive the downfall of the student movement.50 The void in post-1968 utopian literature and 
theory in current research is all the more surprising when compared to the ubiquity of utopian 
thinking during the following decade. In 1973, the same year in which New Subjectivity is 
said to begin, Karl Heinz Bohrer published Der Lauf des Freitag: Die lädierte Utopie und die 
Dichter. In this work Bohrer definitively states: 
Aber: Es gibt noch Utopien. Nur nicht mehr in der Form von Entwürfen, nicht mehr 
als Metaphysik, nicht mehr im System, nicht mehr als Ansprache an die 
philosophischen Geister der Nation. Die Schlächtereien haben die große Festung 
namens Utopie zerstört, aber über Nacht entstanden Widerstandsnester, zerstreut, 
weniger prächtig bestückt und von weniger Überlebenden gehört. In ihnen sitzen 
keine Philosophen mehr, die Brücken schlagen, sondern Poeten, die wagen, über das 
Eis zu reiten.51 
In Bohrer’s account, not only does literature reappear in the seventies, but it becomes the 
exclusive realm, not philosophy, in which utopia reemerges. According to Bohrer, the 
literature of the 1970s, whether aware or not, is tied to Friedrich Schiller’s concept of the 
“ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen:” “Die Utopie, die sich entwickeln wird zur 
ästhetischen Utopie, fungiert stellvertretend für alle anderen Sektionen menschlicher 
Bedürfnisse.”52 For Bohrer, as for Schiller, it is within the aesthetic realm, in general, and 
literature, in particular, that utopia is not only expressed, but realized through its very 
literarization, taking part in the shaping and molding of society.53 
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 Two years after the publication of Bohrer’s treatise, another work appeared that 
challenges the notion of the end of utopia in the seventies. In 1975, the third volume of the 
newly-founded Literaturmagazin was published titled “Die Phantasie an die Macht: Literatur 
als Utopie.”54 The slogan “all power to the imagination,” graffitied on walls and proclaimed 
in protest banners across Western Europe and the United States during the 1960s, is 
teleported into the seventies, a specter of the student movement. At the same time, this motto 
appears to reach back and resurrect the energies of the recent past, the subtitle points to 
something quite different. In other words, the title of this volume alone asserts that the 
utopian aspirations of the student movement moved into literature. Moreover, it proclaims, as 
does Bohrer, literature itself as utopia. The editor of this volume was Nicolas Born and in the 
introduction he outlines the idea of literature and utopia. Born sums up the status of literature 
following the student movement thusly:  
Funktionalität und Effizienz haben sich als Werte im wirtschaftlichen Moloch 
verselbständigt. Auch ein Teil der Literatur (ich denke an gefriergetrocknete 
Realismen, […] an Agitprop und an einige besonders sklavische 
Dokumentarliteraturen) hat sich von kritischen Außensteuerern auf Funktion 
reduzieren lassen. Dabei muß sie ihre ureigenste, aus gutem Grund unausgesprochene 
Funktion verlieren, nämlich den sowohl zerstörischen wie auch aufbauenden, auf 
jeden Fall aber erschütternden Zusammenprall der Imagination mit dem Faktischen 
darzustellen bzw. dieser Zusammenprall selber zu sein.55 
For Born, the reduction of literature to functionality and efficiency as witnessed by the shifts 
from realism to documentary literature, championed as literature’s only mode of 
                                                                                                                                                       
ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000), p. 123. Bohrer’s assessment mirrors, moreover, 
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54 Literaturmagazin 3. Die Phantasie an die Macht: Literatur als Utopie, Nicolas Born, ed. (Reinbeck bei 
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55 Born, “Vorbermerkung,” in Literaturmagazin 3. “Die Phantasie an die Macht:” Literatur als Utopie, ed. 
Nicolas Born (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1975), pp. 9-12, p. 9-10. 
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politicization by Enzensberger, results in the loss of its function, namely as a utopian space 
of contradiction and dialectical collisions.56 The literature Born describes simply mirrors 
what he terms elsewhere the “Wahnsystem Realität” that is founded on “der Verzicht auf 
Widersprüche und das Verbot von Widerspruch.”57 To be sure, Born admits that a return to a 
utopia that is the good or best place, is, in a sense, impossible: 
Die Utopie ist zerplatzt wie eine Panoramascheibe. Sie ist imperialistisch geworden, 
hat sich in raubende und mordende Armeen verwandelt. […] In den Scherben der 
zerplazten Utopie erkennen wir unsere eigene Zersplitterung. Im Schweiße unserer 
Angesichter sammeln wir sie auf und wickeln sie ein in die eigene Haut.58 
As with Bohrer, Born is aware that utopia has been carried out in the name of imperialism 
and on the backs of armies, it has led to slaughters. But this downfall is the very precondition 
for the renewal of utopian literature. “Wo ist der harte Kern der Imagination,” Born asks, 
“Wo liegen die inneren Kontinente? (Ich meine in diesem Fall nicht ‘Flucht in die 
Innerlichkeit.)”59 Born is not after New Subjectivity or New Inwardness, but rather a new 
utopian literature that does not take part in the imperialism of external or internal reality. In 
Born’s assessment, this utopian literature acts counter to the utopia carried out in deed. It is 
the space of contradiction and conflict between the imagination and the factual that shows 
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this reality for what it really is and creates a literary realm counter to it.60 
The theoretical outline sketched above is not necessarily meant as a road map 
suggesting that this dissertation culminates in Iser, Jauß, or Bohrer. Rather, it is a breif 
history of theory’s reassessment of the role of literature as well as its connection to utopia as 
an aesthetic concern. It demonstrates the ways in which literature and theory after sixty-eight 
were thinking the same problem, namely the fate of the idea of utopia. The utopian literature 
of the 1970s arose alongside a reevaluation and reassessment of the function of literature in 
the wake of the student movement and after the death of Adorno. In this way, my work 
echoes Judith Ryan’s recent book The Novel After Theory in which she argues, albeit within 
the realm of French postmodern literature, “In the last third of the twentieth century […], an 
entire array of novels had appeared that might be said to ‘know about’ literary and cultural 
theory.”61 The revitalization of literary theory during this period is thus evidence as well of 
the return of literature and, moreover, of the literary utopia. Aesthetic theory that had once 
placed literature in the sole service of the political and resigned to realism and documentary, 
on the one hand, and Adorno’s critical negativity that removed it from the realm of a 
committed political stance, on the other hand, began to query and offer new models of what 
literature is and can do. For Hans Robert Jauß and Wolfgang Iser, literature plays a crucial 
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role in aesthetic experience that challenges the reader’s worldview, contains an emancipatory 
potential, and fosters creative experimentation and self-discovery. At the same time, Bohrer 
and Born propose a fundamental relationship between literature and utopia. For Bohrer, 
literature during the seventies reflects a change in the concept of utopia that places it back 
again in the realm of literature from whence it originally emerged. Further, as the title to the 
1975 volume of Literaturmagazin suggests and Born’s introduction confirms, literature after 
sixty-eight strove to become a space of utopia, a realm in which the contradictions and 
conflicts of reality are not falsely reconciled, but rather find their place.  
As both Bohrer and Born suggest, this utopian literature no longer portrays the best of 
all possible places—a totality at it were—but is rather a critical literary space of contradiction 
and contestation. As W. Martin Lüdke argues at the end of the decade: “Die Barrikaden der 
Studentenbewegung haben […] die Straße versperrt, aber einen Weg eröffnet. Sie haben, 
anders gesagt, den utopischen Horizont wieder aufgerissen.”62 That utopian literature of the 
seventies has been largely overlooked or ruled out of literary history as nonexistent is not the 
result of an actual void, but rather the product of a series of redefinitions of literature, utopia, 
and utopian literature. Moreover, as these theories were determining a new role for literature, 
literature that itself theorizes fell to the wayside. That is, the utopian horizon torn open in the 
1960s brought forth both new aesthetic theories as well as new literatures that not only 
engage with, but also do theory. Two places to begin reassessing this utopian legacy are two 
unlikely kindred spirits, literary spaces that seemingly have nothing in common. Upon closer 
inspection, we will begin to see how West German postcolonial literature and science-fiction 
were, in fact, prime venues to work through and theorize utopia as other literary spaces. 
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The Utopian Horizon: Postcolonialism and Science Fiction 
 
As I demonstrated in Dieter Kühn’s Und der Sultan von Oman and outlined above, 
literature and theory in the seventies underwent dramatic changes that challenge the way we 
view this decade as well as the legacy of 1968. In the 1970s, both postcolonialism and 
science fiction, as with the new aesthetic theories of Jauß, Iser, Bohrer, and Born, were 
burgeoning literary terrains just beginning to come into their own and provide a different 
dimension to the literary and intellectual history of the seventies as one mired in a private, 
albeit political subjectivity. This dissertation maintains that the utopias of the seventies were 
principally concerned with other worlds, spaces of alterity to Germany and Western Europe, 
and this in turn is reflected in the terrain so common to postcolonialism and science fiction. 
Moreover, both genres represent the shift from a concept of utopia as the good or perfect 
place to a literary space of contradiction. In a word, these utopias are non-places. 
 There are, to be sure, socio-cultural precedents for the emergence of these new 
genres. In comparison to the previous decade, the 1970s witnessed a boom in international 
travel. As Ulla Biernat notes, by 1973 West Germany had not only surpassed the USA in 
travel spending, but the places travelled to were further away.63 Where in 1968 travel 
destinations were mainly Scandinavia, Great Britain and the Mediterranean, by the 1970s this 
had mushroomed to include Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.64 At the same time this 
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64 Ibid. Paul Michael Lützeler also stresses this in Bürgerkrieg Global: Menschenrechtsethos und 
deutschsprachiger Gegenwartsroman (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2009), p. 28.  
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increased travel brought Germans into contact with other worlds, advances in space flight 
and explorations of outer space also reached a new stage in this decade. In 1969, the U.S. 
became the first nation to land on the moon and in the following decade would launch 
satellites further into the outer reaches of space. Further, in 1975 U.S. together with the 
Soviet Union established and met aboard the first space station. Thus, on two fronts the 
1970s were a time of space exploration, both terrestrial and extraterrestrial. Postcolonialism 
and science fiction take part in this increased spatial awareness as representatives of a 
literature of spatial alterity. At first glance, as Gerald Gaylard notes, while these two genres 
“might appear to be worlds apart” they indeed center on the same issues: “the two terms are 
related because both are centrally concerned with issues of travel, migration, alterity, other 
cultures, colonization, empire, power and alternatives to imperialism.”65 Postcolonial and 
science-fiction literature of the 1970s thus reflect both the history of this decade as one of 
spatial expansion and exploration as well as the continued military, scientific, and economic 
imperialism that go hand in hand with it. 
 The rise of these two genres in the seventies is indicative of a new interest and 
examination of space. As Arlene Teraoka points out, during the West German seventies, 
literature began to shift its focus from time to space.66 This literary move was echoed as well 
in new theoretical approaches, most notably by the French Marxist theorist Henri Lefebvre. 
In 1974, Lefebvre published The Production of Space, which, he states, is “concerned with 
logico-epistemological space, the space of social practice, the space occupied by sensory 
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phenomena, including products of the imagination such as projects and projections, symbols 
and utopias.”67 For Lefebvre, the dictates of a “science of space” founded on an ideology of 
“disinterested knowledge” both carves out and divides space “in order to control it,” much as 
Said describes the process of the colonial control of space and maps quoted above.68 
Lefebvre proposes three types of space that provide possible alternatives to this spatial 
hegemony: 1) spatial practice, which includes “production and reproduction, and the 
particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation;” 2) 
representations of space, which is the “conceptualized space [of] scientists, planners, 
urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers;” and 3) representational spaces that 
“embody[] complex symbolism’s” and are linked to “art (which may come to be defined less 
as a code of space than as a code of representational spaces.”69 What is of concern for this 
project is the last register of space, the representational spaces of art and literature. The 
representational space of literature, to be sure, contains elements of the other two; it is 
founded on the “‘real,’ material” spaces of spatial practice as well as the conceptualized 
knowledge of these spaces.70 It is within the representational space of literature that, as 
Lefebvre argues, the alternatives to a scientific, epistemological spatial hegemony arise; 
those “conceptions of space that tend to form in dreams, in imaginings, in utopias or in 
science fiction.”71 In short, it is within the space of literature that, to speak with Edward Soja, 
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a “critical spatial awareness takes place.”72 The postcolonial and science fiction literatures of 
the seventies are precisely such spaces. In Lefebvre’s terms, they are indicative of an effort to 
describe space and “aspire to do more than describe,” to create a representational space.73 
These works not only reflect and critique the epistemological foundations and control of 
space, but in so doing create the utopian space of literature. 
 As with the core topic of this dissertation—utopia—both postcolonialism and science 
fiction do not traditionally find themselves on the literary map of the West German 1970s. 
Again, this can be attributed to their status as outsiders within the general literary scholarship 
on this decade that is principally dedicated, somewhat myopically, to New Subjectivity. Let 
us begin with postcolonialism. Indeed, to speak of a postcolonial German literature is in 
many ways complicated and has only begun to develop in recent years. “In the strictest sense 
of the term,” Sara Lennox asserts, “Germany is not rich in postcolonial literature, and that is 
a consequence of its brief colonial history.”74 Though Germany’s colonial projects were not 
as extensive as their Western European neighbors’, they were nonetheless very real. Paul 
Michael Lützeler, in his study on the Third World and postcolonialism in German literature, 
emphasizes Germany’s colonial aspirations from the time of Bismarck and the “scramble for 
Africa” to Hitler’s own colonial politics to regain lands in Eastern Europe.75 Further, he 
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traces the development of what can be termed German postcolonialism back to the 1960s: 
In der Studentenbewegung wurde aber nicht nur die kolonialistische und faschistische 
Vergangenheit zu bewältigen versucht; man entwickelte – ganz im Sinne desses, was 
man ein Vierteljahrhundert später das postkoloniale Projekt nennen wird – auch ein 
Gespür für neo-kolonialistische Zwänge im Verhältnis zwischen “Dritter” und “Erster 
Welt.”76 
Thus, postcolonialism, was only beginning to germinate during the student movement, 
arrived on the West German literary stage after the sixties. Moreover, in light of Germany’s 
limited colonial expansion, to compare German postcolonial literature to the larger and richer 
traditions of the former colonies of France, England, Portugal, and Spain will not bring the 
discussion much further. As Lennox suggests, however, “it is possible to understand the 
designation ‘postcolonial literature in Germany’ in a somewhat broader sense than simply 
writing in German by authors from countries Germany formerly colonized.”77 To talk of 
German postcolonialism is also to speak of an engagement by German authors with 
postcolonial countries and, moreover, with the colonial legacy of literature. As Lützeler 
writes: 
Im Zentrum des Interesses der postcolonial orientierten Literaturwissenschaft steht 
aber einerseits nach wie vor die Auseinandersetzung mit der Dichtung des 
kolonialistischen Zeitalters und andererseits die Diskussion um jene Literatur, in der 
es um das (neokoloniale oder nach-koloniale) Verhältnis zwischen “Dritter” und 
“Erster Welt”geht.78 
Accordingly, my dissertation focuses on the literature of German authors coming out of the 
student movement who began to write postcolonial literature in the sense of a literature that 
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interrogates the continued colonial and imperial pursuits of the present.79 At the same time, I 
demonstrate that this critical, postcolonial literature also provides an alternative other world 
through the utopian literary space of the text. In other words, as a representational space it 
not only describes these spaces and the colonization thereof, but in doing so creates a literary 
space of contradiction that is critically aware that it too is part of a larger literary and 
epistemological colonial history. To speak with Born, where utopia has become imperialistic, 
only a literature based on spatial contradiction rather than an affirmation can resuscitate 
literature as utopia. 
  Just as postcolonialism is an outlier on the literary radar of the seventies, so too is 
science fiction. Curiously, the publication of German science fiction reached its pinnacle in 
the 1960s. Manfred Nagl notes in 1972 that at the beginning of 1967, science-fiction 
literature dominated twenty percent of the “Heftroman- und Taschenbuchgeschäft,” most 
notable the Perry Rhodan series that first appeared in 1961.80 Indeed, it was only this series 
that survived the initial boom and the subsequent shrinkage of science-fiction publications 
after 1967.81 Nagl’s analysis of science fiction is, however, symptomatic of the general 
suspicion harbored against the genre both in the sixties and seventies. For him, science 
fiction, in general, and German science fiction, in particular, is representative of “die 
Bagatellisierung und Rechtfertigung von Kriegen, die Entlastung von Kriegsschuld und 
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Verantwortung.”82 In his comprehensive analysis of German science fiction, Hans-Edwin 
Friedrich confirms such damning assessments of the genre in the sixties. Science fiction 
during this time was viewed, especially by the student movement, as a portrayal of “mit 
faschistischen Zügen ausgestatteten Superhelden” that carries on the tradition of imperialism, 
feudalism, and militarism in service of maintaining the status quo.83 In the 1970s, the attitude 
toward science fiction slowly began to change. As Friedrich notes, during this decade 
attempts were made to view science fiction in a critical, positive light; the seventies were a 
time of “good” science fiction.84 Science fiction, he argues, was presented as providing 
“Alternativen zum Gegebenen in einer raumunabhängigen möglichen Situation.”85 Three 
harbingers of the potential of science fiction were Dieter Wellershoff, Alexander Kluge and 
Oskar Negt. 
In 1969, Wellershoff develops concept of literature taken from space travel that, like 
Jauß, Iser, Bohrer, and Born, challenges the pure functionality and politicization of literature. 
“Ich möchte deshalb einen Begriff vorschlagen,” he asserts, “der den scheinbaren 
Widerspruch von autonomer und realitätsbezogener Literatur in einen funktionalen 
Zusammenhang umdeutet: Literatur ist in meinem Verständnis eine Simulationstechnik.”86 
Like simulating weightlessness or lunar terrains for astronauts, literature for Wellershoff 
ist ein der Lebenspraxis beigeordneter Simulationsraum, Spielfeld für fiktives 
Handeln, in dem man als Autor und als Leser die Gernzen seiner praktischen 
                                                 
82 Ibid., p. 195. 
83 Friedrich, Science Fiction in der deutschsprachigen Literatur: Ein Referat zur Forschung bis 1993 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1995), p. 42. 
84 Friedrich, Science Fiction in der deutschsprachigen Literatur, p. 43. 
85 Ibid., p. 44. 
86 Wellershoff, “Fiktion und Praxis,” in Literatur und Veränderung: Versuche zu einer Metakritik der Literatur, 
(Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969), p. 21. 
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Erfahrungen und Routinen überschreitet, ohne ein wirkliches Risiko dabei 
einzugehen. [...] [Die Literatur] macht [dem Leser] das scheinbar Bekannte 
unvertraut, das Eindeutige vieldeutig, das Unbewußte bewußt und öffnet ihm so neue 
Erfahrungsmöglichkeiten. Die Simulationstechnik der Literatur erlaubt es ihm, 
fremde Verhaltens- und Denkweisen in seinen Erfahrungsspielraum mit 
einzubeziehen, also weniger borniert zu sein, und in bezug auf den gesellschaftlichen 
Zusammenhang weniger normenkonfrom.87 
Literature as science fiction is not only simulation, but represents what Darko Suvin later 
terms the “cognitively estranged,” that with which one is both familiar and unfamiliar.88 
Moreover, it brings the conflicts and contradictions of reality to the fore and presents new 
and different ways of thinking about and dealing with them. Similarly, in Public Sphere and 
Experience [1972] Negt and Kluge address the potential of science fiction to critique rather 
than merely confirm the status quo. They state: 
Tatsächlich vermag gerade dieses Genre auf die Erfahrungsweise der im Arbeits-und 
Sozialisationsprozeß zurückgedrängten Phantasie zu realisieren. Nur soweit sich 
dieser Science-Fiction-Film wiederum von der Phantasie-, Traum-, Angst-, 
Wunscherfahrung loslöst und anfängt ‘zu spinnen’ oder sich technologisch 
verselbständigt, stößt er an seine Grenzen.89 
For Negt and Kluge, science fiction is directly related to the repressed fantasies that occur in 
the process of labor and socialization and only when it digresses from this does it cease to be 
critical. Thus, where science fiction in the sixties was deemed conformist, at best, and fascist, 
at worst, in the 1970s it began to gain a critical currency. Though science fiction was no 
longer taboo, it was nevertheless just beginning to emerge from its popular, serialized form 
into the realm of “serious” literature. My dissertation focuses on two instantiations of this 
new, “good” or “serious” science fiction in the seventies. Like postcolonialism, I argue that 
                                                 
87 Ibid., pp. 22-23.  
88 Suvin The Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, p. 4. 
89 Negt and Kluge, Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung: Zur Organisationsanalyse von bürgerlicher und 
proletarischer Öffentlichkeit, in Der unterschätzte Mensch. Gemeinsame Philosophie in zwei Bänden, Band I 
(Frankfurt am Main: Zweitausendeins, 2001), p. 466, footnote 11. 
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science-fiction literature deals primarily with other worlds as spaces of alterity that, while 
projecting economic and imperial expansion into the future and outer space, is founded on 
the contradictions between this world and other worlds. In this respect, the other, 
representational space of postcolonialism literature becomes a relative of the outer space of 
science fiction. 
This investigation of postcolonial and science-fiction literature is not designed to 
provide an all-inclusive, definitive account of utopia in the seventies. By delving into the 
mostly unexplored realm of these literatures in the seventies, however, I demonstrate that 
utopia was not a fated endeavor after 1968, but rather underwent a paradigm shift that leaves 
much ground to be covered. Utopia as a really existing other world in literature is in both 
instances exposed as a colonial, imperial project that is invested in appropriating and 
exploiting other worlds. Rather the postcolonial and science-fiction literatures of the 
seventies return to the origins of utopia as a literary endeavor that recognizes and displays the 
contradiction that in knowing and writing about other worlds, they are taking part in their 
construction. That is, the ambiguity of utopia, as the no-place (“ou-topia”) and the good place 
(“eu-topia”), is reestablished in the utopian literature of the 1970s as a space of 
contradiction.90 Postcolonialism and science-fiction are representations of spatial alterity, 
literature as utopia. 
This dissertation is divided into two sections, the first on postcolonialism and the 
second on science fiction. These two parts not only share a concern with both spaces of 
alterity and knowledge of these spaces, but are also related dialectically as a pair of 
engagements with the idea of utopia. The first section on postcolonialism centers on 
                                                 
90 See Frank E. and Fritzie P. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1979), 
p. 1; Louis Marin, Utopics, pp. xv-xvi. 
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empirical, self-reflexive epistemologies that draw the limits of knowledge about other 
worlds. Here, postcolonial critique of the knowledge and aesthetic representation of other 
worlds is the means to creating the utopian space of the text. The following section on 
science fiction, by contrast, begins with the utopias of science fiction and ends in a critique of 
the spaces and knowledges of other worlds. Where postcolonialism engages in an empirical 
epistemology of space, science fiction imparts a speculative, self-reflexive epistemology to 
the exploration of imaginary worldsin outer space. In short, part one investigates critique as a 
means to utopia where part two poses utopia as a means to critique. These two sections are 
subsequently divided into two chapters that also relate dialectically to one another. The first 
chapters on postcolonialism and science fiction, respectively, not only establish the 
parameters of the discussion, but also set the proverbial stage for the second text. That is, my 
dialectical approach to knowledge and space reflected in the two parts also necessitates a 
second work within each section that illuminates the other side of this dialectic that one text 
alone cannot achieve.   
The first chapter deals with the epistemological structure underlying the creation of 
spaces of alterity by journalists in Nicolas Born’s Die Fälschung [The Forgery] [1979]. This 
chapter demonstrates the paradox of knowing other worlds—that the desires to know and 
represent other spaces are responsible for creating the very subject of knowledge they seek to 
describe—and the work of the text in exposing this contradiction. Born’s work wrestles with 
both journalism and photojournalism’s creation of knowledge—a prominent constituent of 
the public sphere—and with it colonial power vis-à-vis reporting on other spaces. I contrast 
Born’s work and his critique of journalism with Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s essay 
“Gemeinplätze, die Neueste Literatur betreffend,” his proclaimed death of literature and his 
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espousal of the documentary and the reportage as political literature. Further, I outline the 
ways in which Born’s novel responds to and elucidates Edward Said’s anaylsis of 
colonialism in Orientalism [1978] and in many ways prefigures Homi Bhabha’s reevalutaion 
of Said’s work in The Location of Culture [1994]. With respect to his incorporation of 
photography, I bring Die Fälschung into dialogue with Susan Sontag’s On Photography 
[1977] and Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation [1981] in order to historicize Born’s 
novel and Sontag’s theory and to demonstrate the ways in which it anticipates Baudrillard. 
Born’s text exposes the colonial culpability of accumulating journalistic knowledge at any 
cost and proposes literature as a space of contradiction that is flattened by journalistic 
explorations of other worlds. 
The second chapter continues the investigation of colonial and postcolonial 
epistemologies in Hubert Fichte and Leonore Mau’s Xango [1976]. For Fichte, the stakes are 
the same though his focus is ethnology and the ethnography and their promulgation of 
knowledge about other worlds. This chapter centers on his travel writings on and Mau’s 
photography of Haiti. Further, I examine Fichte’s polemic against Claude Lévi-Strauss’s 
Tristes Tropiques [1955] and bring Fichte’s work into dialogue with Clifford Geertz’s The 
Interpretation of Cultures [1973] as well as Jauß’s post-Adornian theories on reader 
reception and aesthetic experience. Fichte’s work establishes a reciprocal relationship 
between the reader of ethnographies/viewer of ethnographic photography and the other 
spaces depicted therein and argues for the limits of epistemological constructions. These 
limits are imposed both by the structure of colonial systems of knowledge as well as the other 
world that has agency in divulging or restraining knowledge and power. Thus, while Born’s 
work ends with the limits of knowledge and the role of literature, Fichte and Mau’s begins 
43 
therewith and argues for such limitations as the very precondition for writing about or 
photographing other worlds. Such an approach imbues this joint work with a reciprocity not 
to be found in Born’s Die Fälschung.    
In the second half of this project, I shift from postcolonial spaces to outer space and 
examine two science fiction works. The third chapter looks at epistemologies of the future in 
Alexander Kluge’s Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang [Learning Processes with a Deadly 
Outcome] [1973]. In this chapter, I argue that Kluge’s science fiction provides a spatial 
representation of the future of capital as the displaced present of capital. At the same time, I 
propose reading Kluge’s text as an allegory that counters the spatialized future of capital in 
outer space by representing the spatialized past of its terrestrial ruins. My examination of this 
work entails reading this work through the lens of Walter Benjamin’s Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels [The Origin of the German Tragic Drama] [1928], Darko Suvin’s 
Metamorphoses of Science Fiction [1979], and Seo-Young Chu’s recent work on science 
fiction, Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep? [2010]. I examine three spaces of 
extraterrestrial capital in Kluge’s Lernprozesse: 1) buildings and outposts; 2) terraformed 
planets and; 3) spaceships. I demonstrate that as capital moves through outer space each of 
these spaces of capital produces knowledge of its own allegorical past that it must continually 
outrun. Kluge’s text not only captures these moments, but through both the juxtaposition of 
the past and future of capital as well as the narratives and images that document its 
interstellar travels creates a space of contradiction that stages a critique of capital. In this 
way, the text itself becomes the allegorical other of and the space of alterity to the time and 
space of capital.  
The final chapter of my dissertation deals with the legacy of Marxism after sixty-
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eight by examining the anonymous cult writer P.M.’s Weltgeist Superstar [1980]. With the 
waning of the critical importance of Western Marxism, most notably the Frankfurt School, as 
a theory of revolution and utopia, the status of Marxism in the 1970s was rendered almost 
untenable. P.M.’s novel interrogates this fate by projecting Marxism and Marx himself into 
outer space. After sixty-eight, Weltgeist Superstar heretically posits Marx as the arbiter of 
extraterrestrial capital in the service of an extraterrestrial race intent on utilizing the extreme 
emotional vitality on Earth as an energy source. P.M.’s novel is, on the one hand, an exercise 
in negotiating literary spaces and epistemologies. It is at once an epistolary novel, science 
fiction, postcolonial, hard-boiled detective fiction, passion play, and classical utopia. On the 
other hand, as the title suggests, it also interrogates theory, namely the Hegelian legacy of 
Marxism that is posed as the source of the affirmative, capitalist Marx as well as Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s Dialektik der Aufklärung [1947]. In Weltgeist Superstar, Marx and Marxism 
have become a commodity of capital in the service of the culture industry that neutralizes the 
revolutionary potential of Marxism. Similar to the relationship between the chapters on Born 
and Fichte, where Kluge’s science fiction terminates in a critique of the outer spaces of 
capital, P.M.’s ends with the very impossibility of a sustained Marxist critique of capital that 
is, at once, the precondition for a renewed utopian literature. In P.M.’s novel, the 
revolutionary, utopian promises of theory in general and Marxism in particular are 
proclaimed dead. At the same time, however, the death of Marxism and the survival of 
capital secure, in contrast to Kluge’s text, literature as a critical, self-reflexive space in which 
utopia survives.  
Thus, this dissertation comes full circle in that the postcolonial critique as a means to 
utopia and the utopia of science fiction as a means to critique culminate in each case with the 
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espousal of the medium of literature as an aestheticization of utopian spaces of alterity. The 
idea of utopia survives the downfall of the student movement in a literature that is capable of 
both responding to and doing theory. This is the idea of utopia as contradiction and paradox 
that is elucidated through the above texts. Not only does each section establish the dialectic 
of knowledge and space, the epistemologies that inform and construct the representations of 
other worlds, but each chapter with the sections dialectically completes the other. These 
works expose the paradox of utopia in that they are, at every turn, self-aware of their 
participation in this dialectical creation of other worlds out of the knowledges about them and 
nevertheless take part in this productive, aesthetic act. While postcolonial and science-fiction 
literature, to be sure, engage utopia in different ways, either as a means to critique or the 
result thereof, by placing them side by side this dissertation endeavors to reconstruct the idea 
of utopia after sixty-eight as a multifaceted investigation of the epistemologies of spaces of 
alterity.              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Knowing Other Worlds: 
Wittgenstein’s Paradox in Nicolas Born’s Die Fälschung 
 
Postcolonial Utopia: A Paradox Revealed 
 
During the West German student movement, a great deal of energy was invested in 
creating other worlds—social utopias to be borne out of revolution. On the streets as well as 
in literature, the protest movement turned its gaze outward to the revolutions abroad with 
which they sought solidarity. And yet solidarity in the streets eventually came undone in the 
revolt’s attendant debates and aesthetic practices.1 As Rudi Dutschke, the charismatic leader 
of the Berlin-based student movement, claimed in 1967: “Der Begriff der Revolution ist 
heute auch nur noch international zu begreifen. Es wird keine deutsche Revolution geben. Es 
wird aber einen weltweiten Prozess der Emanzipation in einem langen Sinne geben. Völker 
kämpfen schon.”2 This call for internationalization is echoed in myriad literary works such as 
                                                 
1 Cf. Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham: Duke UP, 
2012). Slobodian’s new and groundbreaking historical work sheds much needed light on the actual presence and 
agency of the Third World in West Germany in the 1960s mostly though international students (from Africa, 
Asia, and the Americas) and other forms of collaboration that crossed international borders. While this work 
challenges the notion of a simplistic solidarity with the Third World founded on imagination and projection, I 
still contend that West German literature at this time nevertheless clung to a naïve solidarity that failed to take 
into consideration broader historical and geographic differences. 
2 Rudi Dutsche, Mein langer Marsch: Reden, Schriften und Tagebücher aus zwanzig Jahren, eds., Gretchen 
Dutschke-Klotz, Helmut Gollwitzer and Jürgen Miermeister (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1980), p. 15. 
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Erich Fried’s poetry collection und Vietnam und [1966] and Peter Weiss’s Der Gesang vom 
Lusitanischen Popanz [1967] and Viet Nam Diskurs [1968].3 In his 1968 play, Weiss aims, 
for example, at nothing short of encapsulating two thousand years of Vietnamese history and 
the struggle for freedom. Weiss’s solidarity rests on his firm belief in Enlightenment 
principles, his faith in progress through reason and rationality, and the didacticism of his 
work in presenting universal lessons of exploitation and resistance to be gleaned from the 
specific historical development of Vietnam.4 In spite of its noble intentions, this aesthetico-
political solidarity with the revolutions of the so-called Third World so typical of the 1960s 
effectively collapsed the distinctions between other worlds. The issue of solidarity and the 
utopian aspiration of a global, collective revolutionary movement in Dutschke’s assertion 
that the movements are essentially the same as well as Weiss’s Eurocentric claim to speak for 
other worlds through the application of Western European Enlightenment ideals flattened all 
historical, spatial, and ideological specificity and difference.5 In both instances, solidarity 
rested on the universalization and internationalization of knowledge of the other in search of 
                                                 
3 In addition, Third World issues became a main focus of the literary magazine Kursbuch, especially in the third 
volume from 1965 and ninth from 1967, in which Martin Walser claims regarding, “Das ist unser Krieg.” 
Martin Walser, “Praktiker, Weltfremde und Vietnam,” Kursbuch 9, ed. Hans Magnus Enzensberger (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967), p. 171. 
4 As ArleneTeraoka notes, the full title of the play, Diskurs über die Vorgeschichte und den Verlauf des lang 
andauernden Befreiungskrieges in Viet Nam als Beispiel für die Notwendigkeit des bewaffneten Kampfes der 
Unterdrückten gegen ihre Unterdrücker sowie über die Versuche der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika die 
Grundlagen der Revolution zu vernichten, “borrow[s] from and appeal[s] to the Enlightenment tradition, 
proclaim[ing] that there is a lesson to be demonstrated in the ensuing text.” Arlene Teraoka, East, West, and 
Others: The Third World in Postwar German Literature (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 42. 
Teraoka’s work discusses at length the issues surrounding the depiction of the Third World in the 1960s through 
the debates between Peter Weiss and Hans Magnus Enzensberger that took place beginning with the third 
volume of Kursbuch [1965] that was dedicated to the Third World. 
5 In the “Vorbermerkung” Weiss states: “Wir schildern Figuren in einer Einheit mit dem historischen Prozeß, 
auch dann, wenn es sich um Entwicklungsstufen handelt, in denen die Betroffenen selbst diese Einheit nicht 
sehen können.” His faith that his all-encompassing undertaking is able to represent that which the Vietnamese 
are unaware of betrays the idea that they are unable to speak for themselves. Peter Weiss, Viet Nam Diskurs 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), p. 5 
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revolution, a solidarity that effectively spoke in the name of the other in the hope of realizing 
a utopia that bridged the First and Third Worlds, fusing them into a seamless network. 
The matter of international solidarity in the Federal Republic of Germany was, 
however, not entirely blind to the other. For example, Hans Magnus Enzensberger took such 
positions to task in his 1965 essay “Europäische Peripherie.”6 As the title of his essay 
suggests, Europe is not the center but rather the periphery of the world. Acts of supposed 
solidarity such as Weiss’s are indicative of the false view of the centrality of Europe out of 
which alone solidarity is possible. For Enzensberger such positions are mere posturing. “Alle 
diese Haltungen,” Enzensberger asserts, “stellen gescheiterte Versuche zur Schau sich mit 
dem Los der Armen Welt zu solidarisieren. Am wenigsten ernst zu nehmen ist die Attitüde 
der Liberalen. Sie reduziert das Problem auf eine Frage der Manieren: es handelt sich nicht 
darum, Armut und Ausbeutung zu beseitigen, sondern darum, den Schein zu wahren.”7 
Enzensberger’s differentiation is, however, one of bearing rather than method. With Weiss he 
values an objective aesthetic that claims to be able to represent other worlds without 
subjective bias.8 His demand for the rejection of belletristic in favor of “Faktographien,” in 
the essay “Gemeinplätze, die Neueste Literatur betreffend” mirrors Weiss’s stripped down, 
objective aesthetic, from his stage directions which correspond to the compass to his 
wardrobe directives that clothe the Vietnamese and black and the colonial powers in white—
                                                 
6 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “Europäische Peripherie,” Deutschland, Deutschland unter anderm. Äußerungen 
zur Politik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967). First published in Kursbuch 2, 1965.  
7 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “Europäische Peripherie,” p. 172. 
8 It should be noted that at the time of writing Vietnam Diskurs and “Europäische Peripherie,” neither Weiss nor 
Enzensberger had visited the countries about which they wrote. Weiss went to Vietnam only after the 
publication of his work and, as Arlene Teraoka states, was “filled with shame” and reflected on the need to 
describe all the “sickness, fear, and inner sense of loss” that he experienced there, qualities notably lacking from 
his play. Teraoka similarly argues that, while Enzensberger did live in Cuba for a year in 1968, “it is doubtful 
whether he lived the life other than the privileged intellectual.” Teraoka, East, West and Others, p. 31, 47. 
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attempting to literally depict the issue in black and white terms.9 Thus, while the two pivotal 
authors disagree on the issue of solidarity, they are of one mind on the aesthetic depiction of 
other worlds and the transmission of knowledge about them—through as objective a lens as 
possible. Moreover, both authors are symptomatic of the dialectic of ignorance and 
awareness of the limits of speaking about other worlds prevalent during the 1960s. 
In the wake of the student revolts and the concomitant push to articulate solidarity, 
the seventies were dominated, by contrast, by Wittgenstein’s paradox: “Wovon man nicht 
sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.”10 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s prohibition, which is 
meant to foreclose any discussion of metaphysics, is a paradoxical proposition in that, as 
Slavoj Žižek states, it “prohibits something which is already in itself impossible.”11 It is a 
problem of both impossible knowledge as well as ethical representation. How is it possible to 
know that which is fundamentally different and write about it without concocting the self-
serving conditions for its existence? This same paradox extends, however, beyond the realm 
of metaphysics. As will be argued over the course of this chapter, Wittgenstein’s paradox 
governs the recovery and writing of both utopias and the postcolonial in the 1970s—both of 
which are attempts to know about and depict other worlds—as a response to and outgrowth 
of the aesthetic and political debates of the 1960s. Indeed as, Hubert Fichte laments in 
                                                 
9 Weiss’s use of black clothing for the Vietnamese and Chinese and white for the colonial powers is, to be sure, 
a critique of colonialialism with its simplistic and patriarchal view of natives in need of Western civilization—
the colonial powers are the good and the natives the bad. Weiss’s “ascetic” approach to his play, however, also 
strips Vietnam of any “local color.” As Teraoka states: “the staging of the play suggests that political alliances 
can be abandoned or exchanged according to a shift in physical (as a cipher for ideological) viewpoint […] 
without regard to differences of race, class, culture, or nationality.” Teraoka, East, West, and Others, p. 43. See 
Weiss, Viet Nam Diskurs, p. 6. Enzensberger, “Gemeinplätze, die Neueste Literatur betreffend,” Kursbuch 15, 
ed. Hans Magnus Enzensberger (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), pp. 187-197, p. 189-195. 
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Barnes & Nobel, 2003 [1922]), p. 156. 
11 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (New York: Verso, 
2012), p. 24. 
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Xango, his ethnographic travelogue in South America and the Caribbean, were there only a 
way around the “Wittgenstein’sche[] Schweigen.”12 Whereas attempts to depict and 
disseminate knowledge about other worlds in the 1960s ran aground on the shores of 
colonialist assumptions about knowing the other, the 1970s were a time of heightened critical 
and aesthetic awareness of the contradictions involved in writing about other worlds. Rather 
than renouncing and falling silent about that which the first world cannot know, the 
postcolonial work in the 1970s tackled these contradictions head-on. They exposed the 
contradictions subtending the debates of the 1960s—the core of which was the myth of the 
mutual inclusivity of solidarity and objectivity—and in their place argued for the power of 
the space of literature where paradox became the very condition of possibility of a 
postcolonial utopia. 
The literary link between utopia and postcolonialism was established on a 
longstanding contradiction. Utopia, the island at the center of Sir Thomas More’s eponymous 
work, incorporates this contradiction into the very concept. “Outopos, Outopia is a 
paradoxical, even giddy toponym,” Louis Marin argues, “since as a term it negates with its 
name the very place it is naming.”13 This is not to say, he continues, that utopia is merely a 
figment of More’s imagination, but rather a “no-place […] the ‘other’ of any place.”14 This 
“other” place is that which lies outside the known and the knowable and is the space 
examined by West German postcolonial literature of the seventies. For Marin, utopia is “the 
book in which the book has been deconstructed by showing the processes that constituted 
                                                 
12 Hubert Fichte, Xango. Die afroamerikanischen Religionen: Bahia, Haiti, Trinidad II (Frankfurt a/M: S. 
Fischer, 1976), p. 119. 
13 Louis Marin, “Frontiers of Utopia: Past and Present,” Critical Inquiry 19:3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 397-420, p. 
411. 
14 Ibid. 
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it.”15 That is, utopian literatures are reflexive and reflective texts that foreground their own 
contradictions; they seek to describe what cannot be described, an other world that is beyond 
anything that can be known. German postcolonial literature of the seventies confronts this 
very contradiction. As with the colonialism of its European neighbors, German colonialism 
involved both the physical conquest of other worlds, in particular South-West Africa, as well 
as a concomitant constitution of first-world focused knowledge about it, knowledge ranging 
from scientific and scholarly reports to fictions and fantasies.16 As such, it exhibits, to speak 
with Edward Said, “a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, 
manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) 
world.”17 Accordingly, German postcolonialism is haunted by the ghosts of its own colonial 
contradiction, namely that to understand what is “manifestly different,” “alternative” and 
“novel” is to exact control and power over other worlds and therewith destroy their 
otherness. Contrary to its colonial origins, however, the German postcolonial work exposes 
this contradiction at the core of the colonial will to knowledge and casts at glance at the 
conditions of its own creations. Like More’s Utopia, the literature of the seventies reveals the 
paradox that constitutes it. This tension created by contradiction—the exposure of 
Wittgenstein’s paradox—comprises the utopian space of West German postcolonialial 
                                                 
15 Louis Marin, Utopics: The Semiological Play of Textual Spaces, trans. Robert A. Vollrath (New York: 
Humanity, 1984), p. 65. 
16 Key literary texts concerning German colonialism include Wilhelm Raabe’s Stopfkuchen [1890], Gustav 
Frenssen’s Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest [1906], Hans Grimm’s Südafrikanische Novellen [1913] and Der 
Leutnant und der Hottentott und andere afrikanische Erzählungen [1913]. To these literary works we must add 
the Deutsches Kolonialblatt [1890-1918] that dealt solely with the state of Germany’s colonial territories, most 
notably in the reports from Hans Dominik, the leader of Germany’s colonial troops in Southwest Africa. These 
include, for example, Die Zustände auf der Station Yaúnde und im Gebiet des oberen Sannaga [1895] and 
Bericht des Premierlieutenants Dominik über seinen Zug gegen den Häuptling Ngila [1898]. It should be noted 
that in 1967, members of the SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studenten Bund) tore down Dominik’s statue that 
stood in front of the University of Hamburg. 
17 Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 12. 
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literature. It is, as Marin states, “the gap between two frontiers or two continents, the old and 
the new worlds; […] between two edges that will never join together as an identical line.”18 
This is the gap eliminated by the solidarity and objectivity of the 1960s that again finds its 
place in the postcolonial literature of the 1970s. 
This chapter explores the contradictions that form the basis of Nicolas Born’s Die 
Fälschung [1979]. This work, I contend, turns on the same pivotal question, namely: how can 
a text know another world such that the knowledge produced knows of the impossibility of 
this knowledge acquisition? For Born, the medium of this crisis and paradox of postcolonial 
knowledge is journalism. Journalism, which constitutes popular knowledge, reflects Weiss’s 
and Enzensberger’s insistence on an objective aesthetic while at the same time taking this 
objectivity to task. Further, by focusing on journalism I demonstrate how the paradox of 
knowledge and representation of other worlds is accounted for differently across disciplinary 
divides, here journalism and fiction, which are themselves part of colonial formations. I turn 
first to Born’s novel on the Lebanese Civil War to set up the problem of knowledge of other 
worlds and the terms of engagement. I bring this text into dialogue with Said’s Orientalism 
[1978] as well as the West German aesthetic debate surrounding Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger’s analysis of the fate of literature after 1968. This work does not merely reflect 
the theoretical backgrounds against which it is produced—the aesthetic and political debates 
on objectivity and solidarity in the 1960s—but also respond to them. That is, it is highly 
reflexive, querying and exposing the methods of its production as well as the limits of what it 
are able to achieve—the representation and transmission of knowledge of other worlds that 
always already takes part in their creation. Ultimately, this work neither aims nor claims to 
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resolve Wittgenstein’s paradox. It pushes this contradiction to the fore and in doing so argues 
for literature as a postcolonial and utopian space. 
 
Die Fälschung and the Desire for Other Worlds 
 
Born’s novel Die Fälschung revolves around the journalist Georg Laschen, who, 
together with the photographer Hoffmann, is sent to Lebanon in the winter of 1976 to report 
on the Lebanese civil war.19 Laschen is not only a respected figure in the ranks of the 
Hamburg magazine for which he works, but also a seasoned war reporter having covered the 
Czechoslovakian uprisings in 1968, the coup d’état against Salvador Allende in Chile, and 
the outbreak of the war in Lebanon six weeks before the present trip. In spite of the breadth 
of his journalistic pursuits, however, Laschen has never really known the other “worlds” he 
has visited and on which he is tasked to report. While his work revolves around war and 
crisis, he nevertheless laments: “Nie hatte er eine andere Welt kennengelernt; er besuchte sie 
nur, haftete jeweils ein paar Tage an ihrer Außenschale, das war alles.”20 The question at the 
center of Die Fälschung is thus how knowledge about other worlds is acquired and 
disseminated—a knowledge that in Laschen’s journalism centers on conflict thus reducing 
other worlds to sites of struggle and war. Born’s novel interrogates the ways in which 
                                                 
19 The prototype for his protagonist was Kai Hermann, reporter for the magazine Stern, who published articles 
for the magazine on the 1976 Damur massacre in Lebanon. Born not only interviewed Hermann for the novel, 
but travelled to Lebanon to familiarize himself with the situation and the surroundings. Paul Michael Lützeler, 
Bürgerkrieg Global: Menschenrechtsethos und deutschsprachiger Gegenwartsroman (München: Wilhelm Fink, 
2009), p. 187. See also Heinrich Bosse and Ulrich A. Lampen, Das Hineinspringen in die Totschlägerreihe: 
Nicolas Borns Roman “Die Fälschung” (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1991), pp. 11-12. Bosse and Lampen also 
note that in 1979, after the publication of the novel, the critically ill Born asked Hermann to present his work at 
the Frankfurt Buchmesse (12). 
20 Nicolas Born, Die Fälschung (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1979), p.18. From here on cited as “DF.”  
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representations of other worlds, here reportage and photographic realism, create the very 
realities they aim to represent through the promulgation of knowledge as information. In 
contrast to other West German authors during the 1970s who, as Paul Michael Lützeler 
states, “participate in the international postcolonial discourse through their travel reports” 
thereby “wish[ing] to raise their readers’ as well as their own awareness of the dilemma 
facing the Third World,” Born questions the very process of this transmission by highlighting 
the fiction behind the facts.21 Born emphasizes the contradictions that inevitably arise in 
realistic representations of other worlds; the paradox that any representation thereof 
potentially participates in their continued colonization.22  
 To understand Laschen’s urge to know and experience an other world we need to first 
query his relation to that world from where he comes, namely West Germany. Laschen lives 
together with his wife Greta, a photographer, and three kids in the pastoral town of Elbholz 
outside of Hamburg. While their move from the city to the country initially offered the 
promise of “eine andere Zukunft,” a bucolic life of gardens and meadows, idyllically 
gathering mushrooms with wife and children, Laschen and Greta grow further apart, leading 
each eventually into the arms of other lovers (DF, 93-96). His increasing discontent with his 
life at home manifests itself in violent outbursts directed at others. Before he leaves for 
                                                 
21 Paul Michael Lützeler, “The Post-colonial View: Writers from the German-speaking Countries Report from 
the Third World,” World Literature Today 69:3 (Summer, 1995), pp. 539-546, p. 540.  
22 As Edward Said argues in Orientalism: “The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some 
version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does 
the job, for the West, and faute de mieux, for the poor Orient. ‘Sie können sich nicht vertreten, sie müssen 
vertreten werden,’ as Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” Edward Said, Orientalism, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 21. Even under the best intentions, attempts to represent the postcolonial 
from a Western point of view inevitably strip it of its own voice. Hans Magnus Enzensberger points to this 
paradox as well as early as 1965: “Keinen ihrer Namen und keine ihrer Losungen hat die Arme Welt selbst 
hervorgebracht.” Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “Europäische Peripherie,” Deutschland, Deutschland unter 
anderm. Äußerungen zur Politik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967), p. 163. First published in Kursbuch 2, 
1965. 
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Lebanon, Laschen calls a repairman to fix the heating lines to his house. In a moment of 
irritation and impatience with the plumber, Laschen “nahm Wolfs Kopf in die Hände und 
stieß ihn gegen den Kessel” (DF, 13). In order to exert control over a life in which he feels it 
slipping from his hands, Laschen resorts to violence to reestablish his patriarchal and 
“manly” prowess.23 Such violent impulses are aimed as well against Greta and her 
extramarital dealings: 
Die Gier war noch da und sogar stärker, die Gewalt war noch da, mit der er sie 
niederzwingen, wenn er wollte, auch erwürgen könnte, mit der er sie auch nur, wenn 
er wollte, bedrohen, erpressen könnte, wenn er eines davon wirklich nur noch gewollt 
und damit gekonnt hätte. (DF, 33) 
If he wanted to, he could, Laschen believes, restore order to his marital relationship if not by 
sheer physicality (“niederzwingen,” “erwürgen”), then by threats and extortion. Though he 
does not act on his various desires to subjugate his wife, Laschen emphasizes the force and 
violence, in the dual meaning of “Gewalt,” that he thinks he can exercise over her. That his 
loss of control is violently enacted and therewith reestablished in surrogate on the 
unsuspecting repairman signals the extent to which his hierarchical dominance at home is 
itself a sham. 
 The desire to experience an other world directly reflects his unrest at home. Just as his 
move to the countryside brought with it the promise of a fresh start, Lebanon offers Laschen 
a similar opportunity. In Lebanon he creates for himself an illusory world, a “Fälschung,” in 
which he imagines himself living: 
In solch einer Fälschung kann ich gut weiterleben, nicht schlechter als andere. Ich 
lebe hier, in Beirut, lebe schon lange hier, bin Kaufmann, nein, bin Inhaber einer 
Agentur, seit Jahren, braun gebrannt, noch immer nicht vierzig. Mit meinem Geschäft 
                                                 
23 Arnd Bohm’s essay deals at length with the issue of gender and “manliness” in Born’s novel. Arnd Bohm, 
“The Quest Past Manhood and Nicolas Born’s Die Fälschung,” Modern Language Studies 18:3 (Summer 
1988), pp. 30-37. 
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in Deutschland habe ich Konkurs gemacht. Was Deutschland anbetrifft, da bin ich 
pleite, da kann ich nicht hin zurück. (DF, 89) 
 
In contrast to West Germany where he views himself a failure, in Lebanon he has another 
chance at succeeding in asserting his authority. To complete the forgery, however, Laschen 
needs a replacement for his German wife. This he finds in Ariane Nasser, a former contact at 
the German embassy in Lebanon whose husband, a Lebanese Christian, has passed away 
from a brain tumor. Laschen envisions himself as Ariane’s suitor and in the ultimate act of 
their potential yet illusory and elusive union, Laschen accompanies Arianne to a cloister 
where she hopes to adopt a child. With the prospect of a child, the father-mother-child trinity 
seems to loom on the horizon with Laschen in his renewed patriarchal position. 
 Laschen’s desire to begin anew in Lebanon is, however, more than an attempted 
escapism. His infatuation with Ariane and the fantasy that he constructs around it is a means 
to regain the control he has lost at home and simultaneously establish hegemony over the 
Other. As both German and Lebanese, albeit through marriage, Ariane represents a hybrid 
figure. She moves seamlessly between the two worlds of the German embassy and Lebanon, 
where she has made a life for herself, refusing to leave even as her colleagues have long 
since fled (DF, 46). She is thus both a self-proclaimed “Araber” and representative of 
Germany abroad (DF, 131). It is through Ariane that Laschen is offered the possibility of 
experiencing the Other that has previously eluded him in his hermetically sealed world of 
hotel rooms and bars, and further mediated through various contacts who provide him with 
his journalistic fodder. Laschen’s longed-for union with Ariane and the experience of an 
other world that she promises betrays itself, however, as an extension of his need to regain 
dominance and authority. As Arnd Bohm states, “At first, it appears to Laschen and the 
readers as if [Ariane’s] role will be that of the heroine who is to be rescued from a dangerous 
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situation, as if the knight has come to rescue the damsel in distress.”24 This dangerous 
situation is that of the single woman in the midst of a war zone to which Laschen is the 
solution as both hero and husband. This articulates the continuous view of the foreign, as 
Said states, in “its feminine penetrability […] requiring Western attention, reconstruction, 
even redemption.”25 His wish to experience the Other and with it an other world becomes an 
act of reestablishing his patriarchal hierarchy and power over both. Laschen hopes not only 
to redeem himself as the virile German, a position he has lost at home, but also to assert 
himself as the colonizing Westerner saving the East from itself. 
 The nature of Ariane’s hybridity is not only opportunistic for Laschen, enabling him 
to regain his lost authority as well as experience and control the Other. It is also a threat. 
Hybridity, as Homi Bhabha notes, “resists the binary oppositions of racial and cultural 
groups” at the same time it elicits moments of “panic” and confrontation.26 Thus, as Ariane 
suggests to Laschen that he “bleib hier […] werde Araber wie ich,” he laughs, “war aber 
doch erschrocken” (DF, 131). Registering this moment of shock in which he breaks out in 
sweat, Ariane states, “Du mußt dich nicht ängstigen […] ich würde dich nie festhalten” (DF, 
131). In this instant the tables are turned and it is the Other which threatens to intrude upon 
Laschen, to take hold of him. The moment of panic is exposed as colonial impotence in the 
face of hybridity which fails to conform to a simplistic polarity, the “fixity” of otherness and 
the “rigidity” of an “unchanging order” upon which colonial power rests.27 As Laschen 
                                                 
24 Arnd Bohm, “The Quest Past Manhood and Nicolas Born’s ‘Die Fälschung’,” p. 35.   
25 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 206. 
 
26 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 296. 
27 Ibid., p. 94. 
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admits, “Er glaubte, all seine Mühe bestünde darin, sich das, was verständlich war, 
verständlich zu erhalten. Es ging nicht mehr darum, nach und nach immer mehr zu 
verstehen” (DF, 77). Laschen’s desire to experience an other world through the Other is 
nothing more than an attempt to uphold previous experiences and knowledges and in essence 
to control them. Greta is merely exchanged for Ariane, one family for another. No difference 
is allowed in unless it is already familiar. Said best explains this paradoxical process: 
Something patently foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a status 
more rather than less familiar. One tends to stop judging things either as completely 
novel or as completely well known; a new median category emerges, a category that 
allows one to see new things, things seen for the first time, as versions of a previously 
known thing. In essence such a category is not so much a way of receiving new 
information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some 
established view of things.28 
The novelty of hybridity, its ability to produce new experiences and challenge previously 
held conceptions precisely through, as Bhabha asserts, “a traumatic moment of […] the 
indeterminate or the unknowable,” here diffuses the colonial process of rendering the new as 
always the same.29 As if catching Laschen red-handed, Ariane remarks, “und du willst im 
Grunde nichts von mir wissen, willst sogar in meiner Gesellschaft für dich sein” (DF, 131). 
Her revelation, confronting the perpetrator with his planned deed, weakens Laschen’s control 
and ultimately results in another familiar act in which he will attempt to neutralize the threat 
and again regain his dominance. 
 On his way to visit Ariane one evening unannounced, Laschen glimpses another man 
leaving Ariane’s apartment. He observes them from afar as she sees him off, embracing and 
kissing, as jealousy overwhelms him. Not only has he been seemingly betrayed by Ariane, 
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but also replaced by an “Araber,” rendered useless on two fronts, as a lover and husband and 
as the colonizing hero in yet another familiarly different circumstance that mirrors the 
extramarital affairs at home (DF, 249). Unable to accept his fate as the vanquished 
conqueror, Laschen decides he will confront Ariane: 
Am Dienstag, nahm er sich vor, bleibe ich, bis der andere Freund gegangen ist. Er 
würde Deutsch reden mit ihr, kein Wort Englisch oder Französisch. Aber: wie 
lächerlich, blöder Nichtsnutz, du taube Nuß, die du bist, du alberner herumtanzender 
und –beißender Deutscher. Sie war Araber geworden, da hatte sie recht. Weder ergriff 
sie irgendwie richtig Partei, noch war sie deshalb gleich eine Unparteiische. Sie 
kannte solche deutschen Gegensätze nicht mehr, hatte jedes Entweder-Oder verlernt. 
(DF, 250) 
His plan initially rests on the reassertion of linguistic authority, speaking only German with 
her in a country that, as with Ariane, is not regulated by a fixed sematic authority. However, 
precisely because of her hybridity that dismantles the “German” either-or, Laschen again 
comes face to face with his powerlessness, here in the form of speechlessness and empty 
gestures, as the “herumtanzender und –beißender Deutscher.” As with his inability to speak 
with Greta, both at home and through the various letters he writes to her from Lebanon but 
never mails, the different in Lebanon attains the characteristics of the familiar, though in this 
instance not as a colonial control mechanism, but as its opposite, as a sign of colonial 
impotence and postcolonial resistance. To the extent that hybridity here gains an enunciatory 
force, one which Laschen does not possess, it is, as Bhabha argues, an “intervention” that 
“challenges our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing unifying 
force.”30 The ambivalence of hybridity refuses Laschen’s attempt to impose his control on 
Ariane through the linguistic, homogenous, cultural code of the German that she has shed. 
Unable to control her through language, Laschen repeats the misogynist fantasy once 
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directed at Greta, perceiving her as a “Puppe, die geschüttelt wird, um sie ‘zur Vernunft zu 
bringen’” (DF, 250). His imagined masculinity reappears when he forces her, as a passive 
and, moreover, mute puppet, to come to her senses. Ultimately, however, Ariane is anything 
but the submissive woman in need of Laschen’s saving. She requires him neither to attain the 
child that she so desires nor to fill the empty patriarchal position in which Laschen would 
like to envision himself. On both accounts, he is proven impotent and if anything it is Ariane 
who gains the upper hand by, as Bohm states, “foil[ing] Laschen’s plan in which he would be 
confirmed in a patriarchal dominion, enacting in the colonized space of the Middle East an 
authority which had eluded him in Europe.”31 She is thus more than the strong feminine 
figure, but the representation of what Jean Baudrillard terms the “radical alterity” of the 
Other.32 As he argues, this Other is that “which does not miss me, of that which can exist 
very well without me” and at the same time that which “we want to share and destroy in its 
perfection and impunity.”33 The dialectic of the desire for the Other, to both preserve and 
destroy it, that Die Fälschung highlights is the core of Laschen’s own desire—to attain that 
which does not need him and simultaneously extinguish it (to bring Ariane “zur Vernunft”). 
That he does not succeed in this with Ariane, however, does not mean that he ceases his 
pursuit of control and authority, in the end completing the violent circle of destruction of the 
Other. 
Just as the imagined violence to Greta ended in its real projection onto another, so too 
does his fantasy of subjugating Ariane. During a battle near the American hotel in Lebanon, 
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Laschen seeks shelter in the basement of a building with other Lebanese. Here more than 
ever the threat of the Other and his desire to subdue it rears its head. “Das Grauen, mit diesen 
Fremden ein gemeinsames Grab zu finden in einem so fremden arabischen Nichts […]” leads 
to another moment of panic in which he unsheathes the knife that he carries strapped to his 
leg and stabs wildly until it finally sticks “tief im Fleisch” (DF, 268-272). The impetus for 
this violent act lies not with the physical threat from those with whom he is sheltered and 
who even offer him food, but rather from the peril of being entombed “mit diesen 
Fremdgläubigen, Fremdsprechenenden,” literally subjugated by and with the Other (DF, 
268). Rather than viewing this potential murder as “einen Anlaß gar, abzureisen,” Laschen 
experiences “Momente händereibender Genugtuung über seine ‘Einmischung’” and 
“ausgekochte Freude darüber […] endlich heimlich dazuzugehören, eingemischt zu sein” 
(DF, 275). Although it seems that in this moment Laschen achieves that which eluded him 
with Ariane—to both share in and destroy the Other—in fact the opposite is the case. 
As Bohm notes, the knife “links [Laschen] to the armed soldiers and he wears it token 
of his participation in traditional male rituals of killing.”34 What he neglects to mention is 
that Laschen has quite literally brought a knife to a gunfight, to a warzone in which rifles, 
tanks, and artillery are the order of the day and hand-to-hand combat has been replaced by 
combatants who “vielmehr […] allesamt zu Heckenschützen [würden]” (DF, 88). The knife 
is more than a symbol or a “parody” of that “which might have once been a rite of passage to 
manhood,” but rather a stereotype of precisely those “male rituals” which he believes ties 
him to the Other through the destruction its destruction.35 Taking his cue from Said’s 
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“median category” which aims to control the threat of the new by recasting it as the familiar, 
Bhabha expands this process of simultaneous recognition and disavowal of difference as 
stereotype and fetishism. Bhabha contends that the stereotype mirrors Freud’s concept of the 
fetish in its “normalization of that difference and disturbance” at the site of the mother’s 
missing penis through which the fetish object becomes a replacement and guarantee against 
the threat of castration.36 The fetish then becomes a triumph over and memorial to castration 
and further a means to retain male dominance.37 Similarly, the stereotype functions to 
neutralize difference in the face of the identification of it. As such, the knife for Laschen and 
the penetrating deed committed therewith are both stereotypical and fetishistic. It not only 
stereotypes the violence around him as the experience of the Other—of finally “eingemischt 
zu sein”—as well as the stereotypical image of the “feminine penetrability” of the Other, but 
also becomes a substitute for his lack of power over Ariane. The parody that Bohm attributes 
to the act and the knife itself should be understood then both as the subversion of Laschen’s 
“heroic” and “macho” qualities as well as the colonial stereotype and fetish which is exposed 
as latent impotence and fear. The stereotype is not merely dismissed or displaced “on the 
basis of a prior political normativity,” as Bhabha states, but rather is engaged with its 
“effectivity” which is here presented as absurd and pusillanimous as it is futile.38 
Laschen’s desire to experience the foreign not only reflects his loss of power at home 
and his efforts to regain it abroad, but moreover displays the degree to which this is enacted 
over and against that which he longs for, the Other and other worlds. Recalling the title to 
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Born’s previous novel, Die Fälschung represents “die erdabgewandte Seite” of attempts to 
both experience and know (“kennenlernen”) the Other that ultimately repeats colonial 
appropriation.39 Yet, while the novel highlights what Said terms the “latent Orientalism” at 
work in Laschen’s relation to the Other, that is an “unconscious (and certainly an 
untouchable) positivity” with which he upholds colonial superiority, it equally and forcefully 
negates this dominance at precisely those sites where it most often manifests: in the 
patriarchal, masculine, sexual, stereotypical, and fetishistic matrices that connote colonial 
power.40 If these represent the “systems” or “regime[s]” of truth that Said and Bhabha 
respectively attribute to colonialism, then part of the forgery upon which Die Fälschung rests 
is exposing of the illusion behind them.41 In this way, Laschen’s desire for the Other, that is 
simultaneously a desire to devour and undo it, reveals the “productive ambivalence” of 
colonialism that when confronted with its own “truths,” as Bhabha argues, “reveals the 
boundaries of colonial discourse and […] enables a transgression of these limits from the 
space of that otherness.”42  Each of Laschen’s attempts to subjugate the Other through his 
personal experiences, his “latent” internalized colonialism, is exposed as a moment of 
impotence in which the very “boundaries” and “limits” he seeks to uphold dissolve. 
 
Reporting from Other Worlds 
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Laschen’s vain attempts to exert his control over the Other, his latent colonialism that 
expresses itself through his relation with Ariane, are but one side of the same coin. Die 
Fälschung goes beyond the depiction of one individual’s encounters with the foreign and his 
desires for the Other and other worlds by querying both the representation as well as the 
mode of representing. As a reporter, it is Laschen’s job to convey his experiences abroad as 
objective, factual knowledge to his readers back in West Germany. This move from 
experience to the transmission of knowledge as value-free information requires we bring 
Laschen’s latent colonialism into dialogue with its “manifest” materialization. The latent 
aspects refer to long-held, unconscious expressions of colonial dominance and superiority. In 
contrast, “manifest Orientalism,” according to Said, concerns the “various stated views about 
Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth” which underscore its 
“systems” and “regimes” of truth through the authority of knowledge. 43 Accordingly, 
“manifest” and “latent Orientalism” enjoy a reciprocal exchange whereby the former seeks to 
ground the latter in “‘scientific’ validity” and “disinterested objectivity” thereby confirming 
the presuppositions of the latter.44 In Die Fälschung the locus of this “manifest Orientalism” 
is journalism and, mirroring Laschen’s latent colonialism, its efforts to control the Other and 
other worlds through the promulgation of information. 
That journalism figures prominently as the target of criticism in Die Fälschung is no 
mere coincidence or simple matter of plot or character development. Rather, the issue of 
journalism and reportage places Die Fälschung simultaneously within the debates around 
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literary aesthetics after 1968 as well as the increased interest with the Third World in West 
Germany during the 1970s. On the one hand, the novel is a response to Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger’s pronouncement of the death of literature and his demand for “Faktographien” 
in the form of documentaries and journalism along the lines of the work done by Günter 
Wallraff, Erika Runge, and Ulrike Meinhoff, all of whom called for a triumph over the 
dominion of “Belletristik.”45 It is, according to Enzensberger, only through a “politische 
Alphabetisierung” provided by such works, that literature can still claim an operative 
function.46 Such is the proclaimed fate and future of literature after 1968; reduced to the 
gathering and recording of facts. On the other hand, as Lützeler notes, the West German 
media in the 1970s turned more of its attention to coverage of foreign countries due, in part, 
to the rise in travel to distant locales, increased contact with foreigners in West Germany, and 
the beginnings of a globalization of German businesses drawn to the “Billiglohn” of other 
countries.47 Born’s criticism of journalism is thus two-pronged, tackling both the fate of 
literature in the wake of 1968 and representations of the Third World and the lingering traits 
of colonialism. Although Die Fälschung is not alone in its attack on journalism—it finds 
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good company with Heinrich Böll’s Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum [1974] for 
example—it is nonetheless singular in bringing attention to the journalistic portrayal of the 
Third World and the power relations that lurk beneath it.48 
 In both instances, the main issue is a reliance on an instrumental realism typical of 
journalism, one cobbled together by various facts and figures, interviews and documents or, 
in short, information. Rather than critiquing or informing, information reverts to its opposite, 
that is, an affirmation of the very reality it claims to re-present. As Laschen reflects toward 
the beginning of the novel: 
Greta betrachtete sicher wieder ihre Fotos von arbeitslosen Werftarbeiter, oder war 
das Thema längst abgeschlossen? Was war an den Fotos von arbeitslosen 
Werftarbeitern nicht in Ordnung? Das Problem Arbeitslosigkeit? Schön, 
Arbeistlosigkeit war nicht in Ordnung. Vielleicht waren alle Fotos von der 
Wirklichkeit nicht in Ordnung, falsch, alle Sätze über die Wirklichkeit falsch. Es 
passierete dabei etwas mit der Wirklichkeit, mit den Gesichtern der Arbeitslosen, mit 
dem falschen Auge, dem verdrehten, das die Bilder aufnahm, mit den bösen 
verdrehenden Beschreibungswörtern, die etwas herstellten, wie sie damit etwas 
verschlimmerten und auch verbesserten, nebenbei andeuteten, ob und wie noch 
Geschäfte zu machen seien in jener (jener!) Wirklichkeit. (DF, 53) 
 
In what is a clear allusion to the works of Günter Wallraff and Erika Runge and their 
reportages on factory workers as well as Enzensberger’s “politische Alphabetisierung,” Die 
Fälschung highlights the extent to which realistic and factual representations, in both word 
and image, conform and indeed encourage assimilation to the reality they critique. According 
to Born, they are “kritische[] Partner der Macht.”49 As Born states in the afterward to his 
poetry collection Das Auge des Entdeckers, “Vorläufig machen die Macher die Realität, und 
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die Literatur liefert den passenden Realismus dazu.”50 The photographs and accompanying 
written descriptions about the plight of the unemployed accomplish little more than the 
replication of a harsh reality. Rather than exposing it as iniquitous, they take part its 
perpetuation. Before turning our sights to the role of photography in Die Fälschung, let us 
begin with its own performance of reportage. 
Born’s concern with journalism and the media precedes Die Fälschung. As he states 
in his 1977 essay “Die Welt der Maschine,” media, “die Schaltstellen unseres öffentlichen 
Lebens,” are responsible for both producing and conveying “eine Scheinwirklichkeit.”51 This 
“zweite Wirklichkeit,” not only hides “eine tatsächliche Wirklichkeit” but threatens to 
overcome the latter to the point where the “Täuschung” produced by the former becomes a 
“Welt-Surrogat,” more real than the reality it conceals.52 Thus, in addition to its conciliatory, 
affirmative qualities vis-à-vis established reality journalism is complicit in creating the 
reality it purportedly re-presents. The creation of such a substitute reality is reflected at the 
outset of Die Fälschung: 
Er schrieb über die Ursachen, die zu dem aktuellen Palästinenserproblem geführt 
hatten, die Palästinakriege, über das traditionell gute Verhältnis von Muslims und 
Christen im Libanon. Damit fütterte er die aktuellen Ereignisse. Woran lag es aber, 
dass es nie gewesen war? Entweder griffen die Sätze nicht, erhielten kein bestimmtes 
Gewicht, oder alles klang nach unverschämt launig vorgetragenen Anekdoten. Es 
erschien alles erfunden. (DF, 14) 
 
In merely supplementing or “feeding” the current events in Lebanon, Laschen realizes that he 
is fabricating a reality, weaving together disparate facts into a “Lügengewebe” (DF, 54). As 
Thomas Wegmann argues in his essay on the novel, “Wirklichkeit ist demnach nichts, was 
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den Texten vorausgeht, sondern durch Textsorten wie Reportage oder Bericht allererst 
erschaffen wird, in dem eben diese durch bestimmte Schreibtechniken eine ungeschriebene 
Wirklichkeit suggerieren. Minutiös zeigt der Roman, wie solche Texte generiert werden 
[...].”53 While some scholars have drawn the comparison between Die Fälschung and what 
Jean Baudrillard analyzes two years later under the concept of the “simulacrum,” that is “a 
real without origin or reality: a hyperreal,” Born’s novel does not yet delve into such 
postmodern territory.54 As Laschen admits, “seine Schwierigkeit sei es oft, das Geschriebene 
anzuerkennen angesichts der immer ungeschriebenen Realität der Ereignisse” (DF, 239). 
Thus, in line with Born’s proposed second reality, there exists a reality beneath the created 
journalistic, textual one. The original still lies lurking beneath the sheen of journalistic 
realism. The problem of this created reality then cannot be reduced to Baudrillard’s 
simulacrum that “liquidates all referentials” and “threatens the difference between ‘true’ and 
‘false,’ the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary.’”55 To do so would be to relegate representations of the 
Third World to the realm of the purely imaginative and ideational and ignore the power that 
is exerted by the created reality over the “ungeschriebene Realität.”  
Journalism’s creation of reality should rather be understood in its relation to 
knowledge, information, and power. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, Edward Said 
states, “such texts [purporting to contain knowledge about something actual] can create not 
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only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe.”56 It is in this simultaneous 
creation of knowledge and reality from which colonialism as a discourse draws and exercises 
its power, for as Foucault states, “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined 
together.”57 Accordingly, Said argues “[…] it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient 
was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality […],” to which he adds, 
“To believe that the Orient was created […] and to believe that such things happen simply as 
a necessity of imagination, is to be disingenuous. The relationship between Occident and 
Orient is a relationship of power, of domination of varying degrees, of a complex hegemony 
[…].”58 The reality created by the discourse of colonialism is thus not a creation of the Orient 
proper, but rather an extension of the means of power through the control of the knowledge 
and information disseminated about it. In this way, Die Fälschung interrogates the continuing 
colonial appropriation of other worlds through journalism that rather than increasing political 
awareness, “Alphabetisierung,” or understanding of these worlds creates and reinforces 
colonial hierarchies.  
The colonial production of knowledge and resultant reality is founded on converting 
that which is new and ultimately different into the familiar. This transformation from novelty 
into the known aims to neutralize difference and thereby maintains colonial control. As Said 
explains: 
Something patently foreign and distant acquires, for one reason or another, a status 
more rather than less familiar. One tends to stop judging things either as completely 
novel or as completely well known; a new median category emerges, a category that 
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allows one to see new things, things seen for the first time, as versions of a previously 
known thing. In essence such a category is not so much a way of receiving new 
information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some 
established view of things.59 
 
Accordingly, Laschen admits, “Er glaubte, all seine Mühe bestünde darin, sich das, was 
verständlich war, verständlich zu erhalten. Es ging nicht mehr darum, nach und nach immer 
mehr zu verstehen” (DF, 77). He is therefore not invested in providing new information or 
knowledge so much as upholding the known and the familiar. This is reflected most clearly 
in his interview with “Exzellenz Tony,” son of the “Staatspräsident” and leader of a private 
army fighting against the Palestinians.  
Laschen’s construction, or better reconstruction, of his interview with Tony from his 
notes is guided by his wish that “jemand wie Tony solle bald sein Ende finden” and “Tony 
fertigzumachen” (DF, 122-124). While he confesses to Tony that he sympathizes more with 
the Palestinians “weil sie die Schwächeren sind,” his desire to portray Tony in a negative 
light stems not from his will to help the Palestinian cause over Tony’s, but from the threat of 
the new that challenges the “established view of things” (DF, 112).60 “Vielleicht kämpfen 
wir hier für Deutschland, für Italien, Frankreich,” Tony states, “vielleicht sind wir die 
einzigen, denen etwas liegt an der Substanz der Freiheit. Vielleicht hat der Westen insgesamt 
schon aufgegeben” (DF, 109). Tony’s revelation that he is continuing that which the West 
has given up on shifts the emphasis to what Enzensberger terms the “europäische 
Peripherie.”61 Against the threat of a new constellation of power in which the West has 
ceased to be the center of an ever-expanding socio-political world stage, Laschen flexes his 
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journalistic muscle to depict Tony as a callous armchair “Killer:” “Er schrieb, Tony werde 
massiert von einem seiner Gorillas und lese Comics dabei, Sergeant Peng Peng” (DF, 124). 
As Heinrich Bosse and Ulrich Lampen are quick to note, “als Laschen da war, wurde Tony 
nicht massiert und er las auch nicht Comics.”62 That his depiction is an obvious lie, however, 
does not detract from the power behind it and the control enacted through disarming the new 
as the familiar in order to maintain an established hierarchy: 
Mit dem Verständnis andererseits ließ sich ohnehin nichts machen, nichts schreiben. 
Es ging um Kontraste, immer noch, immer noch um “Gut und Böse”, obwohl beides 
nichts mehr bedeutete, da alle nur noch verrückt in den Kategorien der Verrücktheit 
staken. (DF, 123) 
 
By transforming the threat of the new into a familiar binary of “good versus evil,” Laschen 
simultaneously enacts his own control over the powerful Tony and propagates this new 
information under the banner of the known. 
 On the other hand, the journalistic modification of his interview with Tony emerges 
from his realization of the parallels between his work and that of someone like Tony. It 
becomes possible then to speak of Laschen’s conscience and sense of ethics vis-à-vis the 
other, a self-reflexivity prevalent not only in the novel itself, but in the very character of 
Laschen, one that materializes in this interview. Laschen wonders, as the narrator states, 
“Warum er für diesen Pseudo-Feldherrn so schnell die Formulierung finden [konnte]? 
Vielleicht verabscheute er diese Existenz nur deshalb, weil er sie so gut verstand” (DF, 123). 
He is able to understand Tony and to write about him in part because they are both engaged 
in the business of war, conflict, and death. This is then another impetus for Laschen’s 
embellishment as well as his awareness of his will to knowledge and power through 
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journalism. “Er war froh,” the narrator continues, “mit Tony nicht mehr gesessen zu haben, 
weil er dann hätte Angst haben müssen vor seinem eigentlichen Interesse—an einem Killer, 
vor seiner Sympathie womöglich” (DF, 124). The lie that he constructs out of his interview 
with Exzellenz Tony is a way of countering his bad conscience that he and Tony are 
essentially the same and the fear of his sympathy with such figures that essentially drives his 
journalism. We should, however, be careful in ascribing to Laschen an ethical standpoint that 
makes him a sympathetic anti-hero. For while the careful reader of the novel is aware of his 
lie, the eponymous falsity and forgery of the novel, Laschen’s readers are not. The liberty 
Laschen takes with his reportage is driven more by the demands of the readers than by the 
pangs of his colonial conscience. 
It is not simply a matter of Laschen’s own desire as a journalist to maintain the 
familiar but to deliver “einen noch heißen Artikel,” something original and fresh, to his 
readers reaffirming their preconceptions as well as their own power over the foreign (DF, 
64). At the beginning of the novel, before he is sent for a second time to Lebanon, Laschen 
reflects on the nature of war reporting: “Andererseits hatte er bemerkt, wie denen in 
Hamburg der andauernde Krieg auch schon langweilig wurde, ein untrügliches Zeichen für 
die Langeweile der Leser. Andauernde Kampfhandlungen hatten etwas so Einschläferndes 
wie keine Kampfhandlungen” (DF, 32). Laschen is then tasked with keeping the readers 
interested in his product, providing them something new. Indeed, Laschen is tethered to his 
readers, ensuring that they constantly receive that which they desire, their “Gier nach den 
Schrecken” (DF, 218). The “[unersättliche] Nachfrage” of his readers who “immer mehr 
wissen [wollen] über ihren eigenen Stellvertreterkrieg” demands that Laschen repetitively 
reproduce the new as the same (DF, 187). In this way, no new information is provided, no 
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knowledge gained, that is not already predetermined. As the narrator states: 
Dagegen kannte Laschen zu gut das dominierende deutsche Echo (er persönlich 
differenzierte ja), die libanesischen Christen schlügen endlich zurück, und, was die 
Palästinenser anbetraf: die siegrichen Israelis in der Bundesrepublik, die es, nachdem 
sie ihnen gezeigt, es anderen zeigten. (DF, 91) 
 
While the narrator places Laschen’s own “differentiation” in doubt, there is little reservation 
that the public sees this as their war, albeit fought for them by others representing their 
interests. In contrast to Enzensberger’s notion that the documentary and reportage produce a 
“kritische Wechselwirkung, ein feedback zwischen Leser und Schreiber” that through 
“Widerstände, Beschimpfungen, Gegegenbeweise” yields “Folgen,” in Die Fälschung this 
feedback becomes an incessant loop.63 “There is a rather complex dialectic of 
reinforcement,” Said argues, “by which the experiences of readers in reality are determined 
by what they have read, and this in turn influences writers to take up subjects defined in 
advance by readers’ experiences.”64 Although Said refers here to the “experience” of readers, 
what he proposes is equally true of knowledge. The information that Laschen provides 
confirms the readers’ knowledge of these other worlds as perpetual sites of a conflict in 
which the readers can continue the colonial war of “us” against “them” even if by proxy. 
Thus even as he states that “Die unerhörten Berichten sollten in die Bundesrepublik 
hineinfahren, in die Glieder der Bundesrepublik, nicht zum Vergnügen” his declaration that 
“Ich mach [sic] euch euren Realismus, mühelos mörderisch” merely conforms to that which 
his readers want (DF, 92, 218). Laschen as well as his reporting become a mere sounding 
board that possesses an “unbegrenzte Fähigkeit […], Erlebnisse aufzunehmen, zu speichern, 
wiederzugeben” delivering the “deutsche Echo” nothing more than the sound of its own 
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voice and the repetition of familiar information that reinforces its hegemony over other parts 
of the globe (DF, 65). 
Through the production of knowledge and reinforcement of the new as the known and 
familiar, Die Fälschung demonstrates how journalism and realistic representations of other 
worlds are complicit in the creation of the very reality they aim to describe. Rather than 
informing or contributing to an understanding of other worlds, such attempts are imbued with 
an incessant circularity that ultimately reproduces colonial control mechanisms and 
hierarchical power structures as well as the reality to which they are tied. Journalism 
contributes to the construction of a “Weltgeschichte” and a “Welt-Unterhaltungsprogramm” 
geared towards a “Verträglichkeit” that ensures that everything will remain as it is, a state of 
war in which colonial interests are continually maintained (DF, 299-302): 
Die Weltberichte waren notwendig, wenn sie auch mit ihrem Echo die Schlächtereien 
beflügelten: die Schriften gingen fortlaufend in Erfüllung, wurden oft noch 
übererfüllt. Und alles sollte berichtet werden, erst dann war es endgültige 
Vernichtung, und darauf konnte alles erneut sich ereignen, besser, weil gewuβter, 
geplanter und berichteter. (DF, 241) 
 
The reportage is thus not only responsible for fanning the flames of war—here again through 
the echo of predetermined information—but also sets the stage for renewed and improved 
colonial conquests. In the place of a realism whose “Maßstab” is, according to Born, a 
“Realität, die doch abgeschafft werden soll,” journalism is bound to the dissemination of 
information that both constructs and maintains a reality that even in its moments of 
destruction, provides a blueprint for a (re)new(ed) reality that is nevertheless always the 
same.65 
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Photography and the Colonial Gaze 
 
Laschen is not alone in the creation and promulgation of a reality that seeks to 
maintain colonial control. His journalism is, in fact, supported by photographic 
accompaniment that becomes the visual accomplice to his writing. Just as the focus on 
journalism in Die Fälschung is a product of a particular moment in West Germany, the post-
1968 aesthetic crisis and the rise in media reports from abroad, photography figures as well 
into a broader German context. In the case of photography, however, we have to turn our 
sights further backward in history. In After Images, Eric Downing examines in part the 
connection between Germany’s archaeological interest in the Mediterranean and the rise of 
photography in the nineteenth century together with Germany’s colonial aspirations. Echoing 
Said’s contention that “the German Orient was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least a 
classical, Orient: it was made the subject of lyrics, fantasies, and even novels, but it was 
never actual,” Downing argues: 
Unlike the majority of its powerful European neighbors, Germany was more or less 
excluded from the extensive imperialist enterprise of colonization of Africa, Asia, and 
the Americas during the nineteenth century. In its stead, through its immense 
investment (both financial and cultural) in archaeology, the Germans opted, as it 
were, to colonize the past—the Mediterranean past—and in the process to ride as 
roughshod over the culture of the present inhabitants as their European neighbors 
were doing in more concrete and conspicuous a fashion.66 
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Where Germany’s archaeological pursuits substituted for its lack of colonial expansion, 
photography filled the void of imperial booty through, as Downing contends, its “capacity 
[…] to steal images, to take them away from their original context and, in a quasi-
imperialistic way, traffic in them as virtual artifacts, as appropriated trophies.”67 Both 
archaeology and photography then produced and propagated evidence so as to confirm 
Germany’s classical heritage and simultaneously take part in larger colonial pursuits. 
In Die Fälschung, photography becomes simultaneously the replacement for and 
reinforcement of West German culture’s (neo)colonial aspirations. Where archaeology and 
photography previously conspired to “colonize the past,” Born’s novel interrogates 
photography’s continued colonization of the present. Together with Laschen’s journalism, 
photography establishes a foothold in the here and now by creating and proliferating a reality 
over and through which it has control. It is an archaeology of the present that trades in the 
trowel for a camera and photographic evidence of buried artifacts for that of an extant reality 
that it claims to capture passively. If archaeology once produced artifacts for which 
photography supplied the proof, photography in Die Fälschung is both production and 
product. The logic of the photograph functions thus on a different register than that of 
journalism. The image in Die Fälschung verges on the postmodern of Baudrillard’s 
simulacra whereas print journalism does not. In this way, the photograph becomes the 
objective seal of approval for Laschen’s journalism. It is, then, photography that explicates 
journalism rather than vise versa. Laschen simply forges the captions to the images 
(“Bildunterschriften fälschte”) such that it is the photograph that connects his writing to 
reality, albeit reality as a simulacrum (DF, 89). The novel focuses on both the photograph as 
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well as the act of photographing, although the absence of photographs in the work clearly 
points to the importance placed on the latter. In both instances, however, photography is 
queried as a colonial apparatus that functions under the same triumvirate as journalism—
knowledge, reality, and control. In contrast to the latter, however, there is no recourse to a 
different reality—the photograph becomes both object and proof in which Born’s “zweite 
Wirklichkeit” collapses in on the first coming dangerously close to a pure simulacrum. 
Die Fälschung thus asserts both one genre over another, the novel over reportage, and 
stakes a claim with respect to the medium as well, the word versus the image.68 This 
distinction is also prevalent between the two characters themselves. Whereas the narrator 
depicts the moral and occupational complexity of Laschen through his constant self-
reflection, Hoffmann is decisively flat: “Hoffmann in seiner Stärke und unmißverständlichen 
Anwesenheit war eigentlich nicht rätselhaft. Wahrscheinlich hatter er es nötig, jede 
Gefühlsäußerung, auch jeden Gedanken, der über das knapp Notwending hinausging, zu 
verachten” (DF, 22). Unlike his journalistic counterpart, Hoffmann displays an objective 
callousness and obstinacy that seldom if ever goes beyond his duty as a photographer: “Als 
Fotograf war [Hoffmann] mehr am Fotografieren interessiert, wechselte Filme und Objektive 
aus.  So gab es selten etwas Gedachtes oder Ausgedachtes von ihm zu hören, wenn, dann 
hörte es sich endgültig an, wie eine Aufforderung an alle, zu schweigen” (DF, 22). While 
Laschen struggles to voice the horrors of the war and come to grips with the type of 
knowledge and reality he is culpable of producing, the photographer demands silence. For 
Laschen, Hoffmann’s lack of reflection, his photographic reticence, is indicative of his desire 
to remain safely within the boundaries of his own knowledge, never seeking more than that 
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which he already knows. “Laschen war es aufgefallen,” the narrator states, “daß Hoffmann 
nur selten Fragen stellte und offenbar es gut aushalten konnte, nicht zu wissen, was er nicht 
schon wußte, und das eigentlich Wörtliche anderer, ihre Weise zu sprechen und damit etwas 
sagen zu wollen, interessierten ihn nicht […]” (DF, 23). Hoffmann’s character traits, 
however, go beyond narrative significance imbuing his photographic product with the same 
objectivity, coldness, and epistemological apathy that contributes to their colonial complicity. 
 Before the photograph comes into existence, the very act of photographing enables 
one to establish a position vis-à-vis the world as it appears through the view-finder. As Susan 
Sontag states at the beginning of her work On Photography, “To photograph is to appropriate 
the thing photographed. It means to put oneself into a certain relation with the world that 
feels like knowledge—and, therefore, like power.”69 In Die Fälschung the relation formed by 
the photographer Hoffmann is precisely one of knowledge and power. “Und welche 
erstaunlichen Bestimmungen stecken erst in diesem Hoffmann,” Laschen ponders, “welch 
eine triumphale Neutralität des Blicks durch den Sucher, welch eine brutale Zivilisiertheit” 
(DF, 186)? The civilized gaze imposed by Hoffmann places him in a position of authority 
over that which is on the opposite side of the lens. If, as Sontag asserts, through photographic 
acquisition “something becomes part of a system of information, fitted into schemes of 
classification and storage […],” then Hoffmann’s participation in this systematic 
categorization is part of a predetermined classification.70 In this way, Hoffmann is part of 
what Terry Smith terms the visual regime of colonization central to which is the practice of 
“calibration.”71 Together with mapping and measurement, Smith argues, the “surveillance of 
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peoples” is part of a system of calibration that is more than an act of pure observation, but 
rather a process of “continuous refinement, of exacting control, of maintaining order” that 
“require[s] nothing less than this constantly reflexive watchfulness.”72 Hoffmann’s colonial 
gaze is likewise a means of maintaining order that both reflexively assures him of his 
civilized status and simultaneously reduces the observed, the photographed, to the realm of 
the inferior in need of this civilizing control. 
 That Hoffmann’s “triumphale Neutralität” and “brutale Zivilisiertheit” are both one in 
the same is not paradoxical. Indeed, as Said argues, at the heart of colonial discourse is the 
idea that “Orientalists […] are [objective], by definition, by training, by the mere fact of their 
Westernness” which renders any information provided ipso facto objective and neutral even 
as it supports preconceived colonial hierarchies.73 In contrast to Laschen’s reporting, 
however, photography is presented as colonial objectivity par excellence. Where Laschen’s 
blatantly manipulated interview with Exzellenz Tony is passed off as objective journalism, 
Hoffmann as well as his photographs are always already neutral, albeit triumphantly so. This 
is, in fact, one of photography’s defining characteristics, which, as Sontag states, “is 
essentially an act of non-intervention.”74 It is in this way that Said’s analysis of orientalism 
parallels Sontag’s discussion of photography. Both are founded on claims of an a priori 
neutrality and objectivity that ultimately aims to maintain the status quo through the 
production and simultaneous control of knowledge and information. As Sontag argues: 
                                                                                                                                                       
Visual Culture Reader (New York: Routledge, 1998) ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff, pp.483-494, p. 483. 
72 Terry Smith, “Visual Regimes of Colonization,” p. 483. For Sontag, one of the primary characteristics of 
photography is surveillance and control. On Photography, p. 3, 122. 
73 Said, Orientalism, p. 319. 
74 Sontag, On Photography, p. 8. 
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Although the camera is an observation station, the act of photographing is more than 
passive observing. Like sexual voyeurism, it is a way of at least tacitly, often 
explicitly, encouraging whatever is going on to keep on happening. To take a picture 
is to have an interest in things as they are, in the status quo remaining unchanged 
[…], to be in complicity with whatever makes a subject interesting, worth 
photographing—including, when that is the interest in another person’s pain or 
misfortune.75 
 
The neutrality and objectivity of both colonial discourse and photography is thus not to be 
confused with passivity. Just as the production of colonial knowledge contributes to the 
perpetuation of colonialism itself, to photograph is to acquire and disseminate information in 
order to ensure that everything remains the same. Hoffman’s ruthless “Zivilisiertheit” and his 
conquering “Neutralität” are then two sides of the same coin allotted to him as a 
photographer and as a civilized colonial power. 
The photographic information provided by Hoffmann is, moreover, responsible for 
the creation of a second reality, or what Sontag terms an “image-world.”76 As the narrator 
states: 
Ein Panzer stand schief in ein Gebäude hineingedrängt, festgefahren, und hatte eine 
Ladenfront eingedrückt. Einen kleinen Mann in grauem Kaftan sahen sie mit 
ausgebreiteten Armen vor dem Haus stehen und klagen. Es war ein Foto, schon bevor 
Hoffmann die Kamera hob. (DF, 55-6) 
 
It is not reality that is captured here through photography, but the image itself that precedes 
and becomes a stand-in for the real. Here the photograph has progressed from Baudrillard’s 
third to fourth, and final, phase of the image in which “it has no relation to reality 
whatsoever.”77 In the third phase, he states, the image “plays at being an appearance,” a form 
of sorcery, whereas in the last stage it is “no longer of the order of appearances, but of 
                                                 
75 Sontag, On Photography, pp. 8-9. 
76 Ibid., p. 131.  
77 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, p. 6.  
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simulation.”78 This shift is further reflected in Sontag’s argument that “the primitive notion 
of the efficacy of images presumes that images possess the qualities of real things, but our 
inclination is to attribute to real things the qualities of images.”79 The reduction of reality to a 
standing reserve of images and information to be taken and subsequently categorized is not 
without its consequences. Photographs, Sontag further claims, redefine reality “as an item for 
exhibition, as a record for scrutiny, as a target for surveillance” that “provid[es] possibilities 
of control that could not even be dreamed of under the earlier system of recording 
information: writing.”80 In the passage above, the precedence of the image relegates the 
reality of other worlds as such to the status of an exhibition that is as central to photography 
as it is to colonial discourse. As Timothy Mitchell argues: “The consolidation of the global 
hegemony of the West […] can be connected not just to the imagery of Orientalism but to all 
the new machinery for rendering up and laying out the meaning of the world, so 
characteristic of the imperial age.”81 Among the museum, world exhibitions, and tourism, 
photography certainly belongs to the “new machinery” that in Mitchell’s analysis creates the 
“world-as-exhibition” in which the world is not so much exhibited as “organized and grasped 
as though it were an exhibition” in turn creating the reality of the very world it displays.82 
For Hoffmann, as for Laschen, the reality of this other world is consigned to an incessant 
exhibitionary staging, “einen Kriegsschauplatz,” that is created, organized, and reproduced 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Sontag, On Photography, p. 123. 
80 Ibid., p. 122. 
81 Timothy Mitchell, “Orientalism and the Exhibitionary Order,” in The Visual Culture Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 1998) ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff, pp. 495-505, p. 495. Originally published as “The World as 
Exhibition,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 31:2 (April, 1989), pp. 217-236. 
82 Ibid., 500. 
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for their readers/viewers (DF, 217). 
As with Hoffmann’s “civilized” photographic gaze, the creation of this image-world 
and world-as-exhibition underscores a hierarchical structure in which the image-world both 
conforms to and continues the colonization of other worlds. Rather than informing the public 
or contributing to their knowledge of these worlds, the image-world created by photographs 
emphasizes that which is already known, or assumed to be known, about them. The 
photographs that Hoffmann provides are “solche zum Kopfschütteln und besseren 
Bescheidwissen, dreckige Bilder in sauberen Zimmer anzusehen” (DF, 57). The almost 
obligatory “Kopfschütteln” is not a moment of increased knowledge but a predetermined 
reaction triggered by that about which the viewer is already certain (“Bescheidwissen”). This 
information, which is nothing more than the repetition of the known, and the accompanying 
image-world it produces maintains the distant, civilized gaze that ensures them of difference 
between ‘here’ and ‘there,’ ‘us’ and ‘them,’ by contrasting the cleanliness of their world with 
filth and grime of others. Such images, moreover, secure the viewer’s part in the 
“Stellvertreterkrieg” as a neutral and objective accomplice waging a war from the confines of 
unsoiled living rooms without ever having to know it themselves, thereby ensuring their 
ersatz control of this image-world.  
  This neutral, non-interventionist preservation of the status quo is best reflected in 
Laschen’s disgust at Rudnik’s, one of Laschen’s contacts in Lebanon, reaction to 
photographs taken by a Syrian photographer. The photos show two men at a 
“Begrenzungsmauer des Schlachthofs” turning to face “ihre[] Bewachern” as they are shot, 
their bodies beginning to slide down the wall (DF, 166-7). Although he admits that he finds 
the images disturbing, Rudnik states, “Aber man muß doch allem ins Auge sehen können, 
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jeder Wahrheit, damit man sieht, was realisitisch ist” (DF, 167). It is, however, neither 
enjoyment nor sadism that Laschen registers in Rudnik’s response to the images but rather 
“die trostlose Sachlichkeit” and “mörderische Objektivität, mit der ein solcher Mensch 
niemals in Versuchung geriete, sich selbst mit einem Sterbenden oder Toten zu vergleichen, 
das Nichts und das Niemehr, in das jene hineinstürtzt, für sich selbst vorbereitet zu sehen, 
oder auch nur für einen Moment ein anderer zu sein, fremd dem eigenen Blick” (DF, 167). 
The neutrality and objectivity that Rudnik displays upon viewing the images, his feeling of 
immunity, is the ultimate act of non-intervention that delights in the continuation of the status 
quo and the control and power allotted by the image-world. As Sontag explains: “The feeling 
of being exempt from calamity stimulates interest in looking at painful pictures, and in 
looking at them suggests and strengthens the feeling that one is exempt. […] In the real 
world, something is happening and no one knows what is going to happen. In the image-
world, it has happened, and it will forever happen in that way.”83 Rudnik is likewise accused 
of believing himself to be exempt from the circumstances of war and death that for him only 
exist in the reality of the image-world. The realism he accords to the images and the 
“Wahrheit” they encapsulate are merely characteristics of the image that, nevertheless, 
transform into informational constants guaranteeing that everything will remain as it is. War, 
death and destruction become the property of the Other while civilized, colonial scrutiny 
maintains its control through the aggressive neutrality and murderous objectivity of 
photographic realism. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
83 Sontag, On Photography, p. 131. 
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Born’s third and final novel Die Fälschung is founded on contradiction. Through his 
critique of the reportage and photojournalism, Born’s work highlights how the representation 
of other worlds is always already complicit in their construction. As I have shown, far from 
simply reflecting and reporting on the reality of Lebanon during the Civil War, Die 
Fälschung lays bare the ways in which journalism, as a means of gathering and transmitting 
information in words and images qua knowledge, is engaged with the continuation of 
colonial power structures. By highlighting the very construction of journalistic reports 
together with realistic photographic evidence, Born’s novel demonstrates how both 
knowledge and reality are created by an organ of the public sphere and thus controlled. 
Journalistic realism, in both word and image, is indicted as producing a second, substitute 
reality for consumption by readers always hungry to know more and yet longing to be 
confirmed of that which they already know thereby upholding (neo)colonial hierarchies and 
presuppositions. As Alo Allkemper argues, however, Die Fälschung may very well expose 
the fake and forgery to which its title alludes, but this does not mean that the text leads us to 
the reality behind the journalistic counterfeit.84 Rather, the novel suspends the basic 
contradiction at its core and in doing so makes an argument for the role of literature over the 
proposed “Faktographien,” documentaries, and reportages of Hans Magnus Enzensberger. 
Where the latter are tasked with and thus restricted to realism and accessing objectivity, 
which as with colonial discourse flatten the difference between reality and its representation, 
Die Fälschung is an exercise in literary contradiction and reflexivity on the power and limits 
of literary knowledge. By refusing to reconcile the contradiction at its core in presuming to 
                                                 
84 Alo Allkemper, “‘Warum sollte ich mich nicht in Widersprüche verwickeln?’: Nicolas Borns Probleme mit 
der Utopie,” Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie (103:1), eds., Werner Besch, Hugo Moser, Hartmut Steinecke, 
Benno von Wiese (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1984), pp. 576-603, p. 602. 
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portray the reality that journalism cannot, or is not willing to, Born’s novel casts the glance 
back at itself and recognizes its own possible colonial collaboration. It is through the 
openness produced by the tension of contradiction and the reflexivity of literature’s own 
colonial propensities that the novel accomplishes what its documentary, journalistic foil 
cannot—a critique of reality and (neo)colonial hierarchies that does not revert to their 
aesthetic affirmation. This reflexivity forms the core of Hubert Fichte and Leonore Mau’s 
exploration of other worlds in Xango, which we turn to now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Communicating with Other Worlds: 
Hubert Fichte and Leonore Mau’s Xango: 
 
 Xango [1976] is the first of what constitutes Fichte’s decade-long engagement with 
African-American religions and cultures. In this work, Fichte documents his travels through 
Brazil, Haiti, and Trinidad together with his longtime partner and photographer Leonore 
Mau.1 In Xango, in general, and in the chapter on Haiti, in particular, I argue that Fichte and 
Mau’s work strives to put a German audience into dialogue with other worlds and other 
peoples. Through both writing—namely in the form of interviews as well as allusions to 
Germany’s intellectual heritage—and photography, Xango places the reader in the position of 
the researcher. In doing so, Fichte’s work creates a contact zone between two worlds that 
provides a model for understanding other worlds that does not lead to their continued 
colonization as was just illustrated in Born’s novel Die Fälschung. 
 Fichte’s Xango appeared at a time when the role of literature as well as the reader’s 
relation to it were undergoing thorough reevaluation. The first shift involved the rise of 
reception/reader response theory in the works of Hans Robert Jauß and Wolfgang Iser, as 
                                                 
1Xango is divided into two volumes, the first of which contains Mau’s photographs and the second Fichte’s 
writings. Both volumes were published during the same year by the same publishing house and are meant to be 
a “gemeinsame Publikation” and “Buch-Paar.” See Peter Braun, “Irmas Kunst: Zu den gemeinsamen Arbeiten 
von Leonore Mau und Hubert Fichte,” Medium und Maske: Die Literatur Hubert Fichtes zwischen den 
Kulturen, eds. Hartmut Böhme and Nikolaus Tiling (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1995), pp. 54-86, p. 74. Mau also 
provides the photographs for Petersilie, which also precede Fichte’s work. Accordingly her photography 
volumes are numbered I (Xango) and III (Petersilie) where Fichte’s works are II (Xango) and IV (Petersilie).  
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already discussed at length in the introduction to this dissertation. The second was an 
increased interest in ethnology as a form of knowledge of other worlds and the reevaluation 
of the boundaries between ethnography and literature. A child of the student movement, 
reception theory began already in 1967 with Jauß’ inaugural address at the University of 
Constance titled, “Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft,” which was 
published in 1969/70.2 As the name suggests, reception theory deals with the reader, who, 
Jauß feels, has been largely left out or ignored by other theories, namely Marxist and Russian 
formalist literary theories that dominated the late sixties and early seventies.3 Similarly, 
Iser’s reader response theory, beginning with his 1972 Der implizite Leser (The Implied 
Reader), is focused on the relation between work and reader.4 This new approach to the 
literary work stands, moreover, in stark contrast to that of Adorno, whose work is largely the 
impetus for Jauß’ reassessment. “To [Jauß], as to Adorno,” Pauline Johnson states in her 
essay on the two theorists, “the social significance of the aesthetic object is measured in 
accordance with its ability to promote in the receptor a critical, reflective consciousness of 
                                                 
2 Jauß, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970). As Robert C. Holub notes, 
“In fact, the University of Constance, where both Iser and Jauß taught beginning in the late sixties, was founded 
at the time as an alternative to the rigid, restrictive system of higher education at most German universities. […] 
With student protests demanding a total restructuring and rethinking of institutional standards and the 
emergence of a generation of young scholars willing to undertake such sweeping reforms […] several 
alternative methods became popular. […] This was the intellectual climate into which reception theory was 
born, and when the birth occurred, it was not quietly announced in the appropriate section of the local 
newspaper, but brashly proclaimed on the front page in bold headlines.” Robert C. Holub, Crossing Borders: 
Reception Theory, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), p. 8. In 
the decade following the student movement, Holub recounts that “Gunter Grimm was able to cite over four 
hundred entries in one section of a bibliography […].” Holub, p. 4. 
3 Jauß, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation, p. 168. 
4 In contrast to Jauß, whose literary theory is based on the reception of the work, it is possible to speak of Iser’s 
as a reader response theory, one interested not so much in gauging the value of the work on its reception, but by 
the response (Wirkung) it induces. This shift from reception to response is partially what made him more 
palatable to international scholars (primarily American), as it was seen as having an affinity to New Criticism 
with its emphasis on meaning and production of meaning and away from significance on a sociological and 
historical level. See Robert C. Holub, Crossing Borders, p, 17-18. 
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the present. The main difference here is that, quite unlike Jauss [sic], Adorno denies the work 
an ability to communicate its critical negativity to a mass public.”5 In both cases, Jauß as 
well as Iser, reception and reader response theories provides both a receptive/responsive and 
communicative link between work and audience that fosters critical thinking, a task which 
Adorno relegates to the realm the philosopher-critic.6 
At the same time literary theory was turning its attention to the reader and 
communication, ethnology was beginning to reevaluate its own foundations. In 1973, 
Clifford Geertz published his seminal work The Interpretation of Cultures.7 Geertz’s answer 
to the perhaps not-so-rhetorical question “‘What does the ethnographer do?’” is, quite 
simply, that “he writes.” 8 This straightforward claim stood in diametrical opposition to the 
standard response of “‘He observes, he records, he analyzes’—a kind of veni, vidi, vici 
conception of the matter” and gauges the merit of the ethnographic text not on “uninterpreted 
data” and “radically thinned descriptions,” but its ability to “bring us into touch with the lives 
                                                 
5 Pauline Johnson, “An Aesthetics of Negativity/An Aesthetics of Reception: Jauss’s Dispute with Adorno,” 
New German Critique 42 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 51-70, p. 70. Jauß’ critique of Adorno is published in Ästhetische 
Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik (München: Fink, 1977) as the second part of his “Aufriss einer Theorie 
und Geschichte der Ästhetischen Erfahrung.” The first part is the above quoted “Was heißt ästhetische 
Erfahrung.” 
6 As Johnson summarizes: “The truth content of the work is yielded only by the interpretive work of 
philosophical criticism. By immanent analysis of the forms, the configurations within the work, the 
philosopher-critic is also one equipped to reveal the antipathy of the work to a false, reified semblance of 
reconciliation and its allegiance to an image of authentic reconciliation.” Pauline Johnson “An Aesthetics of 
Negativity/An Aesthetics of Reception,” p. 59. 
7 This work had a large impact both on the writing of ethnographies as well as on the literary world, West 
Germany included, not least because of Geertz’s emphasis on the literary strategies involved in writing about 
cultures over textual objectivity—his technique of “thick description” whereby context is stressed as much as 
the observed behavior itself. See for example Ulla Biernat, Ich bin nicht der erste Fremde hier: Zur 
deutschsprachigen Reiseliteratur nach 1945 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004), p. 108. Christoph 
Schmitt-Maaβ stresses this as well in “Erbrechen oder Einverleiben? Zwischen eigenmotivierter 
Fremdforschung und Gefährdung des Subjekts: Ethnographie im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft, Poesie und 
Autobiographie,” Monatshefte, 100.2 (Summer 2008), pp. 191-212. 
8 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 19. 
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of strangers.”9 Indeed, Geertz sums up the overarching goal of ethnology itself as a 
communicative one: 
We are not, or at least I am not, seeking either to become natives (a compromised 
word in any case) or to mimic them. Only romantics or spies would seem to find 
point in that. We are seeking, in the widened sense of the term in which it 
encompasses very much more than to talk, to converse with them, a matter a great 
deal more difficult, and not only with strangers, than is commonly recognized. “If 
speaking for someone else seems to be a mysterious process,” Stanley Cavell has 
remarked, “that may be because speaking to someone does not seem mysterious 
enough.” Looked at in this way, the aim of anthropology is the enlargement of the 
universe of human discourse.10  
 
For Geertz, ethnology is ultimately an exercise in conversation and communication. More 
than simply talking to someone, it is invested in a dialogic exchange on a scientific (field 
work) as well as a textual level. Through the text the reader becomes part of the 
conversation—a participant in Geertz’s proclaimed “enlargement of the universe of human 
discourse.” 
Fichte’s Xango takes part in this larger discussion and reexamination of the role of the 
reader and work. This is, to be sure, a loaded task. As with Born, Fichte is well aware of the 
colonial proclivities of writing about the foreign and, moreover, of the dissemination of 
knowledge about it. In what is perhaps the most often quoted passage from Xango, Fichte 
states, “Wir sind die Sieger. Wir treten auf mit der Haltung der Siegreichen. Wissen ist 
Macht.”11 Fichte’s chapter on Haiti in Xango and Born’s novel thus both revolve around the 
central contradiction that knowledge about and representations of other worlds is complicit in 
the perpetual colonization thereof. For Fichte, this rests to a large extent on the lack of 
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 16, 20. 
10 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, pp. 13-14. 
11 Hubert Fichte, Xango. Die afroamerikanischen Religionen: Bahia, Haiti, Trinidad II (Frankfurt am Main: S. 
Fischer, 1976), p. 119. From here on citied as “X.” 
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communication within both the ethnographic and literary text, which, rather than speaking to 
or with other worlds, more often commit the act of speaking for them and thereby participate 
in the “Wissen ist Macht” structure of the production of colonial knowledge. On the 
ethnographic level, this is most evident in Fichte’s polemic against Claude Lévi-Strauss’ 
Tristes Topiques [1955]. As Fichte points out, although Lévi-Strauss admits that he cannot 
speak the language of the peoples he studies, claiming that they refused (“verweigern”) to 
speak to him, this does not prevent him from definitively asserting facts about these tribes 
upon which his entire work is based.12 Literature, particularly German literature, is for Fichte 
similarly limited in its communicative, dialogic efforts. Fichte poses the question in his essay 
“Elf Übertreibungen: Einführung in ein Lesebuch:”  
Deutsche Literatur—gibt es das überhaupt? 
Als ein Netz von Beziehungen—Correspondances? 
[…] Als ein Netz von Beziehungen aus Sprache—über das Innere und über die Welt? 
Deutsche Weltliteratur im doppelten Sinn: 
In der Welt und aus der Welt?13 
 
For Fichte, German literature is a hermetically sealed world, barely in communication with 
itself much less the world writ large. Rather than a “Weltliteratur” in the Goethean sense 
based on, as Andreas Huyssen states, the “translation and appropriation” of foreign texts that 
Edward Said notes aided in establishing a “kind of intellectual authority over the Orient 
within Western culture,” Fichte desires a literature in conversation with the world.14 To 
overcome the lasting colonial attributes in both ethnology and literature, Fichte’s Xango 
                                                 
12 Fichte, “Das Land des Lächelns: Polemische Anmerkungen zu Tristes Tropiques von Claude Lévi-Strauss,” 
Homosexualität und Literatur I, ed. Torsten Teichert (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1986), pp. 319-351, p. 
339. It should be noted that Fichte was fluent in numerous languages from Spanish and French to Haitian 
Creole and Brazilian Portuguese. 
13 Fichte, “Elf Übertreibungen: Einführung in ein Lesebuch,” Homosexualität und Literatur I, ed. Torsten 
Teichert (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1986), pp. 9-21, p. 10.  
14 Andreas Huyssen, “Geographies of Modernism,” New German Critique 100, 64:1 (Winter 2007), pp. 189-
207, p. 195. Edward Said, Orientalism, p. 19. 
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attempts to bring the implied reader into dialogue both with the work and thereby with other 
worlds. 
 
Between the Land of Laughter and the Sad Tropics 
 
As with Born and journalism, Fichte accuses ethnographies of upholding colonial 
power structures through the production of knowledge, reality, and control. While references 
to the ethnographical works of James Frazer, Michel Leiris, and Bronisław Malinowski 
occasionally find their way into Fichte’s texts and interviews as well most secondary 
literature on Fichte, the one modern ethnographer that Fichte engages with in detail is Claude 
Lévi-Strauss. 15 “Der Ethnologe geht siegreich aus der Strukturenanalyse des 
Indianerstammes hervor,” Fichte writes at the beginning of Xango (X, 119). Referencing 
Levi-Strauss’s groundbreaking work Tristes Tropiques, Fichte places him among the list of 
conquerors, those who under the motto of “Wissen ist Macht” emerge as colonial victors 
from their research expeditions. In his essay “Das Land des Lächelns: Polemische 
Anmerkungen zu Tristes Tropiques von Claude Lévi-Strauss,” Fichte locates this victorious 
colonial mentality already in the title of Lévi-Strauss’ work: 
Denn wie bei Africa Addio steht hinter diesem Titel ja noch ein anderes 
Sprachverhalten, eine weitere ideologische Auffassung: 
                                                 
15 The reason for his polemic against Lévi-Strauss’s work is often attributed to the similarity of their projects. 
As David Simo states: “Die poetischen und ideologischen Unterschiede zwischen beiden Autoren sind 
allerdings unverkennbar, aber Fichtes Abgrenzungswut verrät paradoxerweise das Bewußtsein der Nähe.” Simo, 
Interkulturalität und ästhetische Erfahrung, p. 3. Klaus Neumann expands on Simo’s sentiment arguing: “The 
harshness of [Fichte’s] critique makes me wonder, though, whether he recognized in Lévi-Strauss’ confessions 
basic premises of anthropology that Fichte himself could not completely evade in his own writings.” Neumann, 
“Fichte as Ethnographer,” Cultural Anthropology, 6:3 (August, 1991), pp. 263-284, p. 275. Fichte’s essay first 
appeared as the third part of the series Poetische Anthropologie broadcast by the Nord- and Süddeutsche 
Rundfunk. Many of the critiques leveled against Lévi-Strauss in this essay find their first expression in the Haiti 
chapter in Xango.   
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Die Tropen waren doch sicher nicht immer triste. 
Sie sind es ja erst geworden.16 
Tristes Tropiques, Traurige Tropen: for Fichte the poetic alliteration of the title is 
symptomatic of its factual and colonially restorative pretense. “Man hat dem Strukturalismus 
eine restaurative Tendenz vorgeworfen,” Fichte states, “—mir geht es weniger um die 
Beurteilung einer Philosophie—mir geht es um Sprachverhalten, um das Transportieren von 
Fakten.”17 And further: “Aber selbst wenn ethnographische Dürre hier in den Schatten junger 
Mädchenblüte hochgerilkt werden sollte—ist es denn auch nur in einem restaurativen Sinn 
eindrucksvoll, poetisch, schön.”18 “Reportagen,” Fichte writes in Xango, “sind Trophäen aus 
Hunger, aus Hermaphroditen, aus Hingerichteten” (X, 119).  
The colonial reach of ethnographies such as Lévi-Strauss’, to be sure, extends beyond 
the title of the work. Fichte finds in the very method of ethnographers a colonial 
comportment that exploits the peoples they attempt to understand. “Die Länder der Dritten 
Welt,” Fichte asserts in Xango, “liefern Rohmaterialien für das aus ihnen konstruierte 
marxistische, strukturalistische, existenzialistische, naturwissenschaftliche, 
geisteswissenschaftliche Weltbild” (X, 217). The studied peoples of other worlds become 
reduced to raw materials and resources to be used up, exploited, and discarded in the name of 
knowledge and understanding. The underlying destructive, exploitative nature of colonialism 
that is partly based on a desire to know and understand is, indeed, Fichte’s most damning 
criticism of Lévi-Strauss and ethnology: 
                                                 
16 Fichte, “Das Land des Lächelns: Polemische Anmerkungen zu Tristes Tropiques von Claude Lévi-Strauss,” 
Homosexualität und Literatur I, ed. Torsten Teichert (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1986), pp. 319-351, p.322.  
In his essay Fichte references both the original French version as well as the 1960 German translation from 
Susanne Heintz published by Kiepenheuer & Witsch.  Africa Addio is an Italian documentary film from 1966 
about the decolonization of East Africa.     
17 Fichte, “Das Land des Lächelns,” p. 322. 
18 Ibid. 
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 Die Tortur des französischen Universitätsbetriebs. 
 Die Tortur der Ethnologie. 
 Und allen Kolonialismus’. 
 Wußte Strauss das nicht? 
 Doch. 
 Nur eine Seite später finde ich: 
Die Ethnologie beruhigt diesen unruhigen und zerstörischen Appetit, von dem ich 
sprach, indem sie meiner Reflexion ein praktisch unerschöpfliches Material 
garantiert, welches duch die Verschiedenheit der Sitten, der Gebräuche und der 
Institutionen geliefert wird.—19 
For Fichte, Lévi-Strauss’ “Sprachverhalten” and the manner in which he transports his facts 
divulge his participation in the destructive appetite of colonialism that reduces human 
subjects to “unerschöpfliches Material.” 
Herodotus and Fichte’s Poetic Anthropology 
 
“Mein Freund Herodot” is the title of Fichte’s essay on Herodotus’s The Histories.20 
Unlike “Das Land des Lächelns,” this essay’s title is by no means critical or ironic. Rather it 
is a fan letter to someone whom Fichte considers an intellectual and literary friend. What 
Fichte finds praiseworthy in Herodotus is precisely opposite of that in Lévi-Strauss: 
 Herodot, mein Freund. 
 Herodots Umgetriebensein, nicht still sitzen können. 
Was ist hinter der Ecke! 
Was ist jenseits der Bergkette! 
Nicht: Wissen ist Macht!—sondern: Reisen ist Wissen!21  
The remaining vestiges of a colonial production and dissemination of knowledge that Fichte 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 331. 
 
20 This was first delivered in the Norddeutsche Rundfunk and appears for the first time in print in 
Homosexualität und Literatur I, ed. Torsten Teichert (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1986), pp. 381-406. 
Fichte’s references Herodotus’ Historien, ed. Josef Feix (München: Heimeran, 1977). 
21 Fichte, “Mein Freund Herodot,” p. 383. 
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levels against Lévi-Strauss is turned on its head in Herodotus. The goal is not the knowledge 
in the service of power, but rather the urge and desire to travel in order to know anything at 
all. To be sure, the two are closely related and almost indistinguishable. Was it not Lévi-
Strauss’ own travels that facilitated the knowledge that Fichte criticizes as an extension of 
colonial power? The difference between knowledge-is-power and travel-is-knowledge for 
Fichte, however, is two-fold. For one, the latter expresses a curiosity that is not founded on 
predetermined knowledge that one sets out to prove, as Fichte’s analysis of Tristes Tropiques 
claims. Second, this curiosity allows for doubts and uncertainties that are always already 
absent in the “Wissen ist Macht” mentality.  
 The characteristic of curiosity for Fichte stands in diametrical opposition to the type 
of interest and knowledge that appears in Lévi-Strauss. Where Lévi-Strauss’ work displays 
its colonial tendencies in no small part through its confirmation of the already known, in 
which the sadness of the tropics reflects Said’s neutralization of the new through the familiar, 
Herodotus’ work is dominated by a restless inquisitiveness: 
Neben dem Selbstbewußtsein wird Herodots Neugier deutlich dokumentiert; es ist 
jene enzyklopädische Neugier, die vor nichts zurückschreckt, Herodots Neugier 
umfaßt alles, bündelt es, holt es jedoch, kritisch, ins menschliche Maß zurück. 
 
Es bleibt unfaßlich, daß nach einem so neugierigen Beginn ein so unneugieriges 
Europa entstand, für das Wissen selten etwas andres war als Macht, die 
Kolonialgeschichte Europas bleibt die Geschichte der Unempfindlichkeit, die 
Philosophie Europas unneugieriger Idealismus, Scholastik, Scheuklappen und 
Gebetsmühlen […], die Fehler in der praktischen Anschauung füllen Bände 
Aristoteles, Sartre und Lévi-Strauss.22 
Contrary to the later Western European tradition, Herodotus possessed a genuine curiosity of 
other worlds. “In wenigen Worten,” Torsten Teichert poignantly states, “skizzert Fichte seine 
Kritik an einer Tradition europäischen Denkens, deren ideologisches Rückgrat nicht die 
                                                 
22 Fichte, “Mein Freund Herodot,” p. 396. 
95 
Neugier auf die fremde Welt, sondern der Machtanspruch auf Weltbeherrschung und 
Weltdenkung war […].”23 It is, moreover, in curiosity that knowledge or the desire for 
knowledge renounces the totalizing world views of philosophy, whose raw material is the 
peoples and cultures of other worlds, and in its place there emerges a recognition of the limits 
of knowledge in the form of doubt. Fichte highlights the element of doubt in one passage 
from Herodotus: 
Ich staune aber, meine Rede, meine Wörter untersuchten von Anfang an 
Nebensachen, Abschweifungen, Anhängsel, Details. 
 Staunen—das bedeutet auch Zweifeln. 
Trotz dieser ein für allemal Empirie, Naturwissenschaft festlegenden Formeln hat 
man Herodot der Fälschung, der Flüchtigkeit bezichtigt.24  
Herodotus’ astonishment at the irrelevancies and digressions of his work creates a moment of 
doubt concerning that which he thinks he knows. For Fichte, this should be the foundation 
for empiricism and natural science, doubt and curiosity rather than a totalizing, all-
encompassing view of the world. 
 It is this curiosity combined with doubt that guides Fichte’s own approach to the 
representation of other worlds. Echoing Herodotus, he declares in Xango 
 Ich gehe aus Haiti nicht als Sieger hervor. 
Meine Aufzeichnungen sind die Aufzeichnungen von Irrtümern, Fehlschlüssen, 
Kurzschlusshandlungen. (X, 119) 
It is not just the act of admitting the shortcomings and failures of his venture that allows for 
Fichte’s position outside the rank and file of the victors, but the exposure thereof throughout 
the work. As Klaus Neumann argues, “Fichte demands that ethnographies no longer be 
cleansed of what their authors consider to be irrelevant or false information and that they no 
                                                 
23 Torsten Teichert, ‘Herzschlag aussen:’ Die Poetische Konstruktion des Fremden und des Eigenen im Werk 
von Hubert Fichte (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1987), p. 34. 
24 Fichte, “Mein Freund Herodot,” p. 383. 
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longer be cleansed of the ethnographers’ doubts either.”25 Lévi-Strauss, to be sure, admits to 
his own limitations, for instance his inability to speak the language of the Brazilian natives, 
which Fichte finds to be “eine der wenigen ehrlichen Aussagen Strauss.’”26 Admitting this 
weakness, however, is not an exposure thereof, as Lévi-Strauss can nevertheless claim, “Die 
Frauen denken sich als eine Kollektivität” to which Fichte responds: “Ich möchte die 
Methode wissen, wie man, ohne eine Sprache zu beherrschen, über Gedanken in diesem 
Sprachbereich etwas Stichhaltiges äußern kann.”27 Lévi-Strauss has no doubts and admitting 
his flaw does not prevent him from expressing concrete, definitive conclusions about the 
peoples he studies. For Fichte, as for Herodotus, it is not about the research itself, but the 
very exposure of the processes behind the research:  
Ich muß Forschungen aufdecken, wie jeder Schriftsteller, wie Herodot […]. 
Forschung. 
Aufdecken. 
Es ist ein zerstörerischer Reflex. 
Ohne ihn höre ich auf zu existieren.28  
The destructive reflex of exposing research is that it dismantles both the steadfast truth 
claims of said research as well as the colonial, knowledge-is-power world view such research 
propagates. 
 The basis of Fichte’s poetic anthropology is the triumvirate curiosity, doubt, and 
exposure through which he believes to avoid the pervasive colonial consequences of 
ethnology. But what of the poetic side to Fichte’s project? For all of Fichte’s interest in 
ethnology, he was not a trained ethnologist and was indeed looked upon with suspicion from 
                                                 
25 Klaus Neumann, “Fichte as Ethnographer,” p. 268.  
26 Fichte, “Das Land der Lächeln,” p. 339. 
27 Fichte, “Das Land der Lächeln,” p. 339. 
28 Fichte, “Mein Freund Herodot,” p. 383. 
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those in academia.29 Fichte was a writer and never claimed any differently. As he asserts in 
Xango: 
Ich habe nie gelogen und mich als Doktor oder Professor ausgegeben oder als ein in 
Afrika oder sonstwo Eingeweihter. Ich habe immer gesagt, dass ich Schriftsteller bin 
und über den Synkretismus berichten will. (X, 146)  
As much as Xango is an exercise in rectifying Fichte’s perceived wrongs in Lévi-Strauss’ 
Tristes Tropiques, it is also an aesthetic one. Among his list of colonial victors, Fichte 
includes the author: “Der Romanschriftsteller siegt im Roman” (X, 119). The basis for the 
literary, aesthetic problem is one of language and ultimately communication: 
[…] unsere Wörter sind die Franzosen, die die Spanier und die Indianer 
niedermetzeln. 
[…] 
Gäbe es zwischen dem Wittgenstein’schen Schweigen und der Sprache unserer 
Siegeranalysen und Siegersynthesen eine Sprache, in der die Bewegung sich 
abwechselnder und widersprechender Ansichten deutlich werden könnte, das 
Dilemma von Empfindlichkeit und Anpassung, Verzweifeln und Praxis – ich würde 
sie benützen. 
Es wäre eine wesentlich andre Sprache. 
Vielleicht verfügten die Indianer und die Afrikaner über weniger kolonisierende 
Ausdrucksweisen. (X, 119)30 
What Fichte is searching for, in other words, is a language that goes beyond the colonizing 
tendencies of language itself, from the “Sprachverhalten” of Lévi-Strauss to that of 
                                                 
29 As Klaus Neumann asserts, “Hubert Fichte had no degree in anthropology.  Nor any other academic degree, 
for that matter.  Maybe defining himself in halves (and sometimes as two persons in one) helped him to bear 
recording the fragmentation of reality and to resist the temptation to construct coherent wholes. Maybe his 
position outside academia helped him to make do without applying structures and systems to what he observed. 
(Certainly his position as a renowned writer of novels helped main-stream academia to neglect his work as an 
ethnographer.)  Neumann, “Fichte as Ethnographer,” p. 267.  Michael Fisch as well points to the “Skepsis” with 
which Fichte was received upon visiting the “Völkerkundemuseum” in Hamburg to learn more about the 
African-American religions he encountered after his first visit to Brazil in 1969. Fisch, Verwörterung der Welt, 
pp. 163-4. 
 
 
30 The reference to Wittgenstein is from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in which he states “Wovon man nicht 
sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.”  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New 
York: Barnes & Nobel, 2003 [1922]), p. 156.   
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“Romanschrifsteller.” This desire for a post- and anti-colonial language remains, however, 
trapped in the subjunctive.31 Moreover, although Fichte was fluent in numerous languages 
from Spanish and French to Haitian Creole and Brazilian Portuguese, he wrote exclusively in 
German for a German audience. Without taking away from Fichte’s linguistic concern, I 
contend that the ultimate goal of Xango is to promote communication between two worlds, 
the world of Fichte and the implied reader and the other world of Haiti. 
 The importance of communication for Fichte also has its roots in Herodotus. The 
success of Herodotus’ work lies not only in its foundation of curiosity and doubt, but 
ultimately in his communication thereof. Fichte sees in Herodotus an attempt at the 
“Verwörterung der Welt:”32 
Jedoch als Herodot, wohl gegen die Mitte des fünften Jahrhunderts, […] die Welt in 
Wörtern neu erstellte und verstellte, bewegte er sich, für uns heute kaum vorstellbar, 
bereits in einer Welt aus Wörtern, zageren, einzelneren.33 
Herodotus not only participated in the written portrayal of the world, he also moved within a 
world that was dominated by words. In this way, his work was more than a simple act of 
depiction. The act of writing for Herodotus is both motile and communicative (“er bewegte 
sich”) one with and within a world composed of words. Fichte highlights this in his own 
choice of words. Herodotus “erstellt” and “verstellt” the world anew, both creating and 
altering it. This is in stark contrast to “erstehen” and “verstehen” in meaning—to acquire and 
                                                 
31 For more on Fichte’s concern with language see David Simo, Interkulturalität und ästhetische Erfahrung: 
Untersuchungen zum Werk Hubert Fichtes (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1993), pp. 79-96; David Simo, “Die Suche nach 
einer postkolonialen Sprache.  Hubert Fichte: Psyche,” Schriftsteller und “Dritte Welt:” Studien zum 
postkolonialen Blick, ed. Paul Michael Lützeler (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1998), pp. 207-220;  Hubert Uerlings, 
Poetiken der Interkulturalität: Haiti bei Kleist, Seghers, Müller, Buch und Fichte (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 
1997), pp. 251-285. 
32 Fichte, “Exkurs: Mittelmeer und Golf von Benin.  Die Beschreibung afrikanischer und afroamerikanischer 
Riten bei Herodot,” Homosexualität und Literatur I, ed. Torsten Teichert (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 
1986), pp. 407-422, p. 413. 
33 Ibid., p. 410. 
99 
understand versus to construct and adjust—and, moreover, morphologically, in which the 
root “stellen” connotes movement where “stehen” a fixed position. The former, “erstellen” 
and “verstellen,” expose the movement of a dialogic structure, the back-and-forth of 
communication and conversation whereby one creates an argument, or position, and alters it 
accordingly through the course of discussion. Fichte’s work is, like Herodotus’, an attempt to 
communicate with different worlds, both the other worlds that he visits as well as his own 
German world.34 The act of “erstellen” and “verstellen” is an aesthetic move that creates the 
conditions of possibility for communication based not on “Wissen ist Macht” but “Reisen ist 
Wissen,” a communicative, dialogic movement against the colonial euro-centrism founded 
on “ver-stehen” and “er-stehen.” 
In Xango, Fichte proposes the dialogue as a way of presenting knowledge about other 
worlds that does not participate in their continued colonization. Where the “Wissen ist 
Macht” characteristic of the colonial production of knowledge is a unidirectional process—
one speaks for rather than with the other world—whereby knowledge is created and 
appropriated from other worlds neutralizing the new in favor of the known and familiar, the 
dialogue is a bidirectional exchange. As Fichte remarks, however, the dialogue can also 
contain colonial attributes: “Im Gespräch siegen wir auf zwei Fronten: Über das Sujet und 
über den Partner” (X, 119). The dialogue initiated by Fichte in Xango attempts to overcome 
this victorious, colonial posturing by exposing the very conditions that make the dialogue 
possible. Moreover, as with Herodotus, this exposure as un-covering research (“Forschung 
aufdecken”) is a reflexive process that casts the glance back at the researcher/writer, reader, 
                                                 
34 As David Simo argues, “Die Bücher Fichtes weisen eine vielschichtige dialogische Struktur auf.  Sie 
organisieren einen Dialog unter den Informanten, zwischen beiden Quellen und eigenen Beobachtungen des 
Autors.  Andererseits sind sie auch eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen den Ichs des Erzählers und den Ichs 
anderer und zwischen seinen Ichs und dem wir (deutsche bzw. europäische Kultur).” Simo, Intertextualität und 
ästhetischer Erfahrung, p. 113. 
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and the text itself reminding them of their position within a colonially culpable power 
structure and challenging the colonial knowledge-is-power worldview. After all, as Fichte 
states, “Wir sind die Sieger” (X, 119, emphasis added). The dialogic structure in Xango 
brings the reader into conversation with other worlds and, at the same time, with their own 
world and the cultural and historical baggage that comes along with it. The following section 
looks at the dialogue through the lens of Jauß’ reception theory and breaks it down into the 
two interrelated processes that constitute it: reception and communication.35 I argue that 
Xango first establishes a communicative element with the reader through the use of allusions 
which reflexively places him and Fichte’s work within a particularly German context 
bringing the reader and the work into dialogue—establishing a “Netz von Beziehungen – 
Correspondances.” Lastly, I turn to the interviews that form the receptive side of the 
equation. The interview, for Fichte, allows the other world to speak for itself with the reader 
through which the latter receives information. This, too, is a reflexive mechanism that 
exposes the process of interviewing and turns it on its head—the researcher becomes the 
researched, the reader transforms into that which is read.  
 
Xango: Establishing a Dialogue with Other Worlds 
 
Allusions are, as expressed in the German “Anspielung,” a form of play that is 
founded on communication. As Sybille Benninghoff-Lühl poignantly remarks on the 
                                                 
35 David Simo as well points to Fichte’s interest in reception. As he states: “Er vertritt den Standpunkt, daß die 
Literatur gerade dort etwas Exemplarisches hervorbringt, wo sie sich um das Exemplarische nicht kümmert, und 
plädiertfür eine Literaturrezeption aus Neugierde, wo der Leser in Büchern nicht etwas Exemplarisches sucht 
oder sich wiederzufinden hofft, sondern eine Begegnung mit dem Anderen zustrebt.” Simo, Interkulturalität 
und ästhetische Erfahrung, p. 157. 
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etymology of allusion in her essay on Fichte: “Alludere: Sich spielend nähern. Leise 
herankommen, auf etwas anspielen. Ludere heißt spielen, heißt auch täuschen, mit Jemandem 
sein Spiel treiben.”36 This play is to be understood both in the sense of the tension between 
distance and proximity, as in the play of a rope or cord, and as a game. On the one hand, the 
recognition of the allusion draws one nearer (“sich spielend nähern”) to the text. On the 
other, one is involved in a deceptive game (“mit Jemandem ein Spiel treiben”) that creates a 
distance from the text as it points to another beyond the confines of the covers. As 
Benninghoff-Lühl notes, the allusion “genügt sich nicht selbst, sondern verlangt die 
Aufklärung über ein Anderes, Ähnliches” through which “einmal eingeschlagene Richtungen 
abgeschnitten [werden].”37 The play initiated by the allusion is thus not a solitary endeavor 
but a communicative one that presupposes both bi-directionality and an interlocutor—that is, 
it is in dialogue with that which it alludes as well as with the reader for whom the allusion is 
intended. The distance and proximity created by the play of the allusion echoes, moreover, 
Jauß’ concept of the communicative element of aesthetic experience, which, he argues, 
facilitates “eigentümliche Rollendistanz des Zuschauers” as well as “spielerische 
Identifikation” with the text.38 Key to this process of identification/nearness and distance is 
the reader’s familiarity with other texts. “Die ästhetische Implikation liegt darin,” Jauß states, 
“dass schon die primäre Aufnahme eines Werkes durch den Leser eine Erprobung des 
                                                 
36 Sybille Benninghoff-Lühl, “‘Schon irgendeinmal nämlich war ich Knabe und Mädchen und Baum und 
Raubvogel und auch aus der See ein stummer Fisch.’ Zur Verwendung des Zitats in Hubert Fichtes 
Forschungsbericht. Roman,” Medium und Maske: Die Literatur Hubert Fichtes zwischen den Kulturen, eds., 
Hartmut Böhme and Nikolaus Tiling (Stuttgart: M&P Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, 1995), pp. 143-
159, p. 153. 
37 Benninghoff-Lühl, “‘Schon irgendeinmal nämlich war ich Knabe und Mädchen und Baum und Raubvogel 
und auch aus der See ein stummer Fisch,’” p. 154. 
38 Hans Robert Jauß, “Aufriss einer Theorie und Geschichte der Ästhetischen Erfahrung,” Ästhetische 
Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik (München: Fink, 1977), p. 32. 
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ästhetischen Wertes im Vergleich mit schon gelesenen Werken einschließt.”39 The text, for 
Jauß, initiates a dialogue with the reader that is largely based on the knowledge of other texts. 
This not only entails involvement from the reader in the aesthetic act through investigation 
and probing of the aesthetic landscape (“Erprobung des ästhetischen Wertes”), but also adds 
to his critical understanding (“kritisches Verstehen”) of the work.40 Allusions create therefore 
both a critical distance from the text at hand and a sense of nearness and identification with it 
that is not only active but moreover communicative. 
Fichte’s allusions function to communicate with the reader, locating him within a 
certain historical and cultural tradition and, at the same time, distancing him critically from 
it. The first of these allusions appears in the opening lines of the Haiti chapter. “Das 
Unbehagen in der Kultur,” Fichte muses, “ist dem blanken Horror gewichen” (X, 119). 
Fichte’s reference to Freud’ Das Unbehagen in der Kultur [1930] could, upon first glance, 
suggest escapism.41 For Freud, the discontent with one’s own culture arises from the 
renunciation of instinct and the sublimation of libidinal desires that make the development of 
culture possible. This deep-seeded dissatisfaction, however, leads many to seek solace in a 
primitive state before and beyond culture. As Freud argues: 
[Die Behauptung] lautet, einen großen Teil der Schuld an unserem Elend trage unsere 
sogenannte Kultur; wir wären viel glücklicher, wenn wir sie aufgeben und in 
primitive Verhältnisse zurückfinden würden. Ich heiße sie erstaunlich, weil — wie 
immer man den Begriff Kultur bestimmen mag — es doch feststeht, daß alles, womit 
wir uns gegen die Bedrohung aus den Quellen des Leidens zu schützen versuchen, 
                                                 
39 Jauß, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation, pp. 169-170, emphasis added. 
40 Ibid. 
41 It is worth noting Freud’s own interests in anthropology that are prevalent not only in this work, but more so 
in Totem und Tabu [1913]. Freud also decorated his Vienna study with anthropological artifacts from around 
the world. For more on Freud’s relation to anthropology see Edwin R. Wallace, Freud and Anthropology: A 
History and Reappraisal (New York: International Universities Press, 1983).   
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eben der nämlichen Kultur zugehört.42 
 
In Freud’s account, it is not possible to escape one’s culture in search of primordial state in 
which suffering does not exist. Such a condition, the imagining of a different state of affairs 
beyond the constraints of civilization, is itself a construct of the culture from which one seeks 
liberation. In short, everything emanates from this very culture, both cause and sought-after 
cure. There exists therefore the possibility that the search for something beyond our own 
civilization only serves the continuation thereof. Escaping from or revolting against this 
culture contains a conservative element.43 As Freud suggests, such attempts “[kann] so einer 
weiteren Entwicklung der Kultur günstig werden, mit der Kultur verträglich bleiben.”44 
Fichte’s allusion to Freud is not an affirmation of escapism.45 Quite to the contrary, it 
establishes a cultural, intellectual heritage in which both Fichte and the reader are located and 
initiates a confrontation with and critical inquiry into its own colonial past and present. In the 
same way Freud’s theorized discontent with culture poses both a desired distance from as 
                                                 
42Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Wien: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1930), p. 41. 
43 These conservative, repressive elements in culture later become the focus of the Frankfurt School’s interest in 
Freud. Herbert Marcuse’s concept of “repressive desublimation” and “affirmative culture” as well as Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s “culture industry” are based largely on this dilemma posed first by Freud. See, 
for example, Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon, 1964); Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on 
Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1969); Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002 [1947]). 
44 Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, p. 57. 
45 Simo as well discounts the idea of escapism in Fichte’s ethnographic works. As he argues, Fichte’s question : 
“Ist die afroamerikanische Kultur die Marotte von ein paar Escapisten, die sich in der eingen Kultur nicht mehr 
zurechtfinden und deshalb ins Exotische fliehen und ins Pauvre?” “richtet sich gegen diejenige Kritik, die hinter 
jeder Beschäftigung mit der außereuropäischen Kultur eine Flucht vor der eigenen vermutet.” Simo, 
Interkulturalität und ästhetische Erfahrung, p. 31. Fichte’s quote is from his essay “Mittelmeer und Golf von 
Benin: Die Beschreibung afrikanischer und afroamerikanischer Riten bei Herodot,” Homosexualität und 
Literatur I, ed. Torsten Teichert (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1986), pp. 407-422, p. 407. Yet, in an 
interview with Rüdiger Wischenbart, Fichte does not necessarily exclude the idea of fleeing and escaping: “Ich 
schließe nicht aus, daß alle unsere Reisen Erinnerungen an Fluchten sind. Ich bin nicht sicher genug und ich 
glaube, man kann über so generelle Dinge nicht sicher sein. Ich würde das vielleicht auch nicht als Theorem 
setzen, aber ich vermute es schon.” Wischenbart, “‘Ich schreibe, was mir die Wahrheit zu sein scheint’: Ein 
Gespräch mit Hubert Fichte,” Text + Kontext 72, ed. Heinz Ludwig Arnold (October 1981), pp. 67-85, p. 73. 
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well as an identification with it—the need to escape from one’s culture that betrays one’s 
proximity to it—Fichte’s work establishes an “eigentümliche Rollendistanz” as well as a 
“spielerische Identifikation” to the work as well as culture in which it exists.46 His allusions 
thus speak to a German audience within a particular cultural tradition and, at the same time, 
through his alterations rub this tradition against the grain. Discontent has been replaced by 
the horror of one’s own culture, the horror of being part of the catalogue of colonial victors 
from which one seeks to distance himself and yet is always already a part of it. 
 The second primary allusion in Xango occurs when Fichte is participating in a 
voodoo ritual. Fichte is given an elixir to drink by a male priest, or Houngan, at the 
ceremony. For all of his desire to take part in a Voodoo ritual, Fichte is suddenly overcome 
with fear and wonders what effects this potion will have: “Ist es ein Gift? Ein 
Neuroleptikum? Ein Dysleptikum? Werde ich krank davon? Langsam verrückt? Fallen mir 
die Zähne davon aus? Die Haare? Die Nägel?” (X, 146). Moreover, this fear elicits certain 
stereotypes: “Verwandle ich mich in einen Zombie? Einen lebenden Leichnam? Ich habe 
Angst” and, he continues, “Aber jetzt erfinde ich mit der Flasche magischen Hokuspokus” 
(X, 146). This moment, in which his desire to know the intimate intricacies of a voodoo 
ceremony and convey this knowledge to his readers reverts to stereotypes of Zombies and 
Hocus-pocus, triggers an allusion to Nietzsche: “Vollführe ich hier gedrängt die Geburt der 
Magie aus dem Geist der Angst?” (X, 146). What do Nietzsche and Die Geburt der Tragödie 
[1872] have to do with the walking dead and magic? The key lies in the nature of the 
stereotype as knowledge that generates the allusion. As I outlined in Chapter 2, Homi Bhabha 
                                                 
46 Hans Robert Jauß, “Aufriss einer Theorie und Geschichte der Ästhetischen Erfahrung,” p. 32. 
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expands Said’s process of the simultaneous recognition and disavowal of difference in the 
colonial production of knowledge to the stereotype as fetishism. For Bhabha, the stereotype 
mirrors Freud’s concept of the fetish that serves to retain dominance in the face of impotence 
and castration.47 It is in the fetish of the stereotype then that colonial knowledge veils its fear 
of the new and preserves its power over the colonized. 
Fichte’s allusive “Geburt der Magie aus dem Geist der Angst” functions in the same 
way. The birth of magic, the stereotype of voodoo, is born out of the fear of the new that 
elicits recourse to the known—the allusion to Nietzsche. In contrast to Bhabha’s stereotype 
cum fetish, however, Fichte does not cloak this fear, but rather exposes it and the process 
behind it disclosing his own preconceptions as well as those of the reader. This is the 
Apollonian moment which, Nietzsche states, consists in both “offenbaren” and “verhüllen” 
through which the reader/audience desires “zugleich schauen zu müssen und zugleich über 
das Schauen hinaus sich zu sehnen.”48 In this way, he tackles what Bhabha terms the 
“effectivity” of the stereotype, as encountered in the previous chapter, that confronts the 
stereotype “with the repertoire of positions of power and resistance, domination and 
dependence that constructs colonial identification subject (both colonizer and colonized).”49 
The stereotype here has an identificatory and reflexive function that exposes the reader and 
their knowledge about other worlds within the framework of colonially determined positions 
of power. Rather than displacing the stereotype, Fichte brings the reader face-to-face with it, 
                                                 
47 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 106. Sigmund Freud, 
“Fetishism,” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume XXI 1927-
1931 (London: Hogarth, 1964), pp. 152-157. 
48 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1987), p. 
178. 
49 Ibid., p. 95. 
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confronting him both with the way in which he constructs his view of himself and the Other 
and, moreover, the way he creates this identity vis-à-vis his stereotyped knowledge thereof. 
Fichte thus turns the stereotype back on itself by placing the reader (and himself) within the 
“position of power” and “dominance” that it grants and simultaneously defusing it through 
the reflexivity and identification thereof accorded by the allusion. The Apollonian instant of 
the “Offenbarung des Schleiers,” lifting the veil of the stereotype/ fetish to expose the very 
functioning thereof, forces at the same time an identification with it in order to confront it 
from within.50 
For the Apollonian, however, we must consider its opposite, the Dionysian, to the 
“spielerische Identifikation” of aesthetic communication, the “eigentümliche Rollendistanz.” 
In what is a Dionysian moment, the “das narkotische[] Getränk[],” what Nietzsche also refers 
to as a “Hexentrank,” of the eastern god becomes the magical elixir of the voodoo ceremony 
through which Fichte experiences the “Wollust und Grausamkeit” in the shattering of the 
“principii individuationis.”51 As with the Apollonian element above, however, the Dionysian 
turns the stereotype on its head. In this moment Fichte is aware of his very distance from this 
other world. He is not a “romantic or spy,” to quote Geertz, who seeks to infiltrate and 
become part of this other world. As Fichte states “Ich habe nie gelogen und mich als Doktor 
oder Professor ausgegeben oder sonst als ein in Afrika oder sonstwo Eingeweihter” (X, 146). 
Rather, the instant of the disintegration of individuation creates an idiosyncratic distance for 
both Fichte and the reader. As Jauß argues, the tension of distance and identification with the 
text “läßt genießen, was im Leben unerreichbar oder auch schwer erträglich wäre.”52 Thus, 
                                                 
50 Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 178.  
51 Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 31, 35. 
52 Jauß, “Aufriss einer Theorie und Geschichte der Ästhetischen Erfahrung,” p. 32.  
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while identification brings the reader into the text allowing him, in this case, to experience 
the voodoo ceremony alongside Fichte, it also provides a safe distance from which to enjoy 
this potentially dangerous activity in the same way the Apollonian “Maß” balances out the 
Dionysian “Übermaß” and vice versa.53 
The critical function of this process lies, as with the reflexivity of identification and 
exposure of the stereotype and the reader through the allusion, in the reflexivity of the 
distance created by it.54 This is most evident in two scenes in which the dissolving of 
Fichte’s “principii individuationis,” his feeling of belonging, is betrayed as distance. In one 
instance he writes:  
Ich verstehe was es heisst, ein Schwarzer zu sein; wieviele drehen sich nach uns um 
und rufen:  
-Weisse!  
-Blancs! (X, 123) 
 
This is echoed later as he encounters a young “Afrikaner” on the street who is shocked at his 
appearance: “Ich bin weiss,” writes Fichte, “Er hält mich für einen lebenden Leichnam” (X, 
176). The irony of the above statements, the simultaneous claim to belong to and be excluded 
from this other world, reflexively reveals our distance from it.55 This reflexive irony finds its 
most poignant expression when Fichte queries a voodoo priest about the existence of 
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zombies to which the latter answers: “-Nein, es gibt keine. Ich war gestern auf dem Markt 
und wollte welche kaufen. Es waren einfach keine zu haben” (X, 183). In each case, it is not 
the stereotype that is revealed as truth, but the (colonial) truth is exposed as a stereotype. 
Zombies and magic are then not displaced as superstitious fantasies and replaced by the 
rational and scientific; rather they are dismissed as a type of knowledge through the reflexive 
exposure of their colonial foundations. We are the zombies. We are the stereotypes that we 
have created. We are the victors. Yet, just as the balance of the Apollonian and Dionysian for 
Nietzsche allows us to endure the suffering induced by the will, the balance of identification 
and distance of the allusion, its communicative function enables us to converse with other 
worlds in a way that resists their colonial appropriation. Through the allusion, the colonial 
production of knowledge as stereotype and fetish turns on itself and reflexively interrogates 
its own basis. 
Fichte’s use of allusions establishes the communicative side of the dialogic makeup 
of his ethnographic work. Through the play and tension of identification and distance, the 
allusion puts the reader in touch with the colonial foundation of knowledge of other worlds. 
At the same time, this play initiates a critical reflection and understanding thereof that refutes 
the colonial “Wissen ist Macht” structure by reflexively defusing this power at the site where 
it arises—exposing the processes behind knowledge/power production, confronting it and the 
reader with their own shadows. We turn now to the receptive side of the equation that, 
together with the communicative, completes the dialogic circle. For Jauß, the receptive 
element of the aesthetic experience contains an “entdeckende[] Funktion” that “läßt neu 
sehen” through opening a door to “andere Welten der Phantasie.”56 Fichte’s depiction of 
                                                 
56 Jauß, “Aufriss einer Theorie und Geschichte der Ästhetischen Erfahrung,” p. 32. 
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Haiti in Xango, however, adds a twist to this. On the one hand, he relies on the interview to 
provide the reader an exploratory glimpse into other worlds allowing them to view them 
anew. On the other, as with the communicative side, the receptive is also a reflexive process 
that confronts the fantasy of these other worlds with itself. That is, while the reader is granted 
access to other worlds through the interview—as a way of receiving new information and 
knowledge—he is also confronted with that which makes this information gathering possible. 
The fantasy that the other world is divulging its secrets to the readers is exposed as precisely 
that, a fantasy. Further, this reflexivity puts the reader on display in that he is simultaneously 
the interviewer and interviewee, the one doing the research and the one being researched. 
For Fichte, the interview is a way of accruing and (re)presenting knowledge about 
other worlds. As Torsten Teichert states concerning Fichte’s work: “Andere kennenzulernen 
heißt sie zu befragen.”57 It is no surprise then that a large portion of Xango consists of the 
interviews Fichte conducts with various informants, from voodoo priests, priestesses, and 
practitioners to artists. One of the most notable attributes of these interviews is, however, the 
absence of the interviewer. This is not to say that Fichte disappears from the process (and to 
this point I shall return below), but rather that questions are left out so that what remains are 
the answers to a set of questions to which the reader is never privy. That Fichte removes 
himself from the interviewer position allows for two things. First, it gives the impression that 
the informants are voluntarily divulging information. When Fichte “sich ganz aus den Texten 
[zurückzieht],” Teichert argues, “[d]ann führen andere das Wort.”58 In this way, then, Fichte 
attempts to short circuit the colonially victorious procedure of the interview. “Wenn Fichte 
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20 Jahre lang als Vertreter der Ersten Welt und der weißen Rasse vorwiegend Farbigen der 
Dritten Welt Fragen stellte,” Hartmut Böhme writes, “so darf man sicher sein, daß ihn dabei 
der Schatten des Kolonialisten begleitete, mit dem identifiziert zu werden sofort den 
Zusammenbruch jeder ethnopoetischen Forschung herbeiführt.”59 The removal of the 
questions as well as the interviewer then acknowledges at once this colonial heritage and 
attempts to subvert it by letting the other world speak for itself. 
Secondly, and this point is related to the first, this exclusion provides for the reception 
of knowledge about other worlds. The absence of the questions, David Simo states, turns the 
“Aussagen” of the informants into “Zitate” that aim “von der Perspektive der dargestelleten 
Kultur aus zu informieren.”60 The interview cum quote is then a way of receiving first-hand 
information and knowledge about other worlds without the potentially colonial commentary 
guide of the interviewer. This is, indeed, one of the guiding forces at work in Fichte’s text. 
As he states in his essay of Herodotus: “Herodot trennt auf eine moderne Weise Bericht und 
Kommentar, zu einem Vorfall zitiert er oft mehrere Zeugenaussagen und überläßt dem Leser 
das Fazit.”61 In this way, reception becomes more than a passive act, but an active 
participation in processing and gathering knowledge and information. Without the questions 
the statements are merely a loose affiliation of quotes that only gain meaning through the 
involvement of the reader. “Die Totalität,” Simo contends, “wird erst in dem Bewußtsein des 
Lesers aus Mosaiksteinen rekonstruiert […].”62 The act of reconstruction, of filling in the 
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holes left by the missing questions, makes the reader’s reception of knowledge about other 
worlds an active process in which the reader accumulates and interprets information and 
thereby construcs (or better completes) the text. 
The pure reception of knowledge through Fichte’s particular use and (re)presentation 
of the interview, whereby he attempts to strip the dissemination of knowledge of other 
worlds of its colonial baggage, is, to be sure, idealistic. Fichte, indeed, admits as much in the 
closing of the Haiti chapter: 
Wäre nicht eine andre Welterfahrung denkbar? 
Nicht Touropa, Spartakus-Guide und Marcel Mauss—die Magazinierung von 
Erlebnissen, das Präpieren von Erfahrungstrophäen—, sondern Warten, in der Mitte 
einer Welt und ihres Geschehens, bis das Fremde auf einen zukommt und sich 
erschliesst? (X, 217) 
 
Fichte is painfully aware of the difficulties of realizing his ideal—waiting for the foreign to 
willingly divulge itself thereby negating all the colonial traces of knowledge.63 This does not 
mean, however, that everything that comes before or after this seemingly resigned conclusion 
is rendered null and void. Rather, Fichte imbues his interviews with a reflexivity that makes 
the reader’s reception of the information as well as the work as a whole a process of critical 
reflection and understanding. Fichte relies on the exposure of the methods through which he 
gets the informants to open up to him and gains access to this other world. First and foremost 
amongst this list is disclosing his intentions. On his first visit to a voodoo ceremony at a 
waterfall the participants “empören sich” at the presence of Fichte and Mau, who is 
photographing at the time (X, 127). “Ich erkläre,” writes Fichte, “dass wir den Vaudou 
studieren wollen—und dies Bemühen, uns zu erklären, rechtfertigt uns” (X, 127).64 Fichte 
                                                 
63 See David Simo, Interkulturalität und ästhetische Erfahrung, p. 22. 
64 This scene both parallels and departs from Geertz’ experience at the Balinese cockfight. His presence in the 
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thus never completely fades into the background allowing his informants to simply speak for 
themselves. Quite to the contrary, even where he appears to be absent, it is clear that he is 
always there exposing himself and his objectives in order to loosen the tongues of his 
interviewees. On both the level of form and content Fichte makes his presence evident. 
Concerning the former, the white spaces that break up the flow of the work signal his 
presence. “Weiß sind die weggelassenen Fragen in den Interviews,” Rainer Guldin asserts, 
“weiß die verborgenen Bezüge, weiß der Raum den die Anspielungen schaffen.”65 This is 
mirrored in the content through Fichte’s constant reflection on the whiteness of his skin (see 
above and below). Thus Fichte not only emphasizes his position as the researcher/writer, but 
also highlights this as the reflexive “Ethnographie des Ich” that places him under the 
microscope as the outsider.66 
 This act of self-reflexive exposure, however, is often not enough to grant Fichte open 
access to his informants. “Die Informanten reden zwar freiwillig,” Simo contends, “aber sie 
werden öfter durch List, Überrumpelung aber auch durch Bestechung zum Reden 
gebracht.”67 Together then with his self-reflexive exposure, Fichte exposes the often less than 
friendly and honest methods he uses. There are two main scenes in Xango where Fichte turns 
                                                                                                                                                       
looked upon suspiciously by the villagers until a cockfight he is attending one evening is broken up by the 
police. Everyone flees including Geertz after which the villagers are more than happy to speak with him and 
allow him into their world. Fichte’s scene at the waterfall mirrors this in that he too does not attempt to hide 
who he is and why he is there. This is distinguished from Geertz’ situation in that, unlike the latter, the very 
exposure of who he is grants him access. It is then not through participating to the point of acceptance that 
Fichte is allowed into the other world of voodoo, but rather through an act of ex- and disclosure. See Geertz, 
“Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight,” The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
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to bribery to facilitate the information exchange of the interview. The first is with his contact 
at his hotel, the cleaning lady La Merci, who offers him information about the herbs used in 
voodoo: 
Sie versteht etwas von Kräutern und ist bereit, mit mir die Pflanzen meines 
Herbariums durchzugehen. 
Ihr Name ist ihr Zustand: 
Sie muss immer—auch hier, in der unabhängigen, schwarzen Republik—“Merci” 
sagen. 
“A la merci” heist “preisgeben.” (X, 129) 
 
La Merci is here less of a voluntary informant than a resource to be used—her name is her 
function signaling both her status as a “thankful” servant and one who divulges information. 
This could be read as Fichte’s participation in colonial exploitation about which, he writes: 
“Die Länder der Dritten Welt liefern Rohmaterialien für das aus ihnen konstruierte 
marxistische, strukturalistische, existenzialistische, naturwissenschaftliche, 
geisteswissenschaftliche Weltbild” (X, 217). La Merci, however, turns the tables on Fichte. 
He believes, for instance, to be able to win her trust by giving her the herbs about which she 
informs him. This “Trick” does not work, though, and she demands money, making the 
“internationale Geste für Geld” at which point, Fichte states, “alle meine kleinen Listen, um 
ihre Zuneigung zu gewinnen, zerstört [sind]. Ich bin der Weisse, den man mit einer 
verachtungsvollen Geste ausnimmt” (X, 134). In this moment, Fichte and the reader are 
confronted with the conditions of possibility of the reception of information—this reflexive 
moment exposes both Fichte and the reader as the outsiders being used by the other world, 
their own methods being turned against them. This is echoed again when the Houngan 
requires Fichte to pay ten dollars for his entrance to a voodoo ceremony. Fichte writes: 
Und ich begreife, dass all die bewunderten Abhandlungen über den Vaudou, über die 
Ewe, die Fon und die Yoruba durch solch ein Feilschen entstanden sind. 
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Warum schreibt das niemand? 
 
Kein liebevoller Austausch von Wissen, kein graziöser Austausch von Freundlichkeit. 
 
Gekaufte Geheimnisse. Gekaufte Analysen. Gekaufte Systeme. Die Studenten der 
grossen Universitäten werden zum Ankauf von Gesten, Lächeln, Schweiss, Opfern 
erzogen. (X, 144-5) 
 
The veil is lifted here to expose the foundations of gaining, disseminating, and receiving 
information about other worlds. Both of the aforementioned scenes are marked by their 
reflexivity that turns the focus around to both Fichte and the reader. Fichte is always the 
“white man” willing to pay money to gain access to this other world, the outsider who only 
belongs by not belonging, by being signaled out. Further, the reader is brought face to face 
not only with the methods that make the reception of information possible, but with their own 
position as the outsider who is granted knowledge and access to other worlds through means 
employed by Fichte. The receptive side of aesthetic experience, that which, Jauß contends, 
“läßt neu sehen” and “führt in andere Welten,” is exposed as the fantasy of the pure reception 
of knowledge.68 Fichte, however, saturates his text with reflective and reflexive moments 
that initiate a critical understanding of the production and reception of knowledge about other 
worlds.  
The receptive element of Fichte’s interviews is imbued with a critical self-reflexivity 
that allows the reader a new look into their own world and their own self. That is, the 
reader’s reception of knowledge and information about other worlds permits them a glimpse, 
a new look, behind the scenes of the ethnologic as well as the ethnographic textual process 
but also produces a moment of critical reflexivity in that they too are being observed and 
studied by the informants of the other world. This is exemplified during one of Fichte’s visits 
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to the artist André. The “Kunsthändler, Botschafter, Sammler” arrive to André’s 
“schedderige[s] Haus” in their Mercedes where inside André “wieder den Vaudoukaspar 
spielt, wieder Quasiweisheiten ausstösst vor den peinlich berührten Weissen” (X, 135). In 
this moment, however, it is not André who is being observed by Fichte. It is rather he and the 
others who are being observed and read by André who delivers both the physical (the 
paintings) and the mental goods (knowledge and information).69 As Fichte states: 
- Ja, das ist noch wirklich Weisheit. Das ist eben das alte, schwarze Afrika. Das ist 
rein. Das ist tief. Das ist naiv. Das ist unverdorben. So sollte man sein. So sollte man 
leben. (X, 135) 
In what Simo calls the “Dialektik der Beobachtungssituation,” the rolls are reversed whereby 
the observer becomes the observed—André knows what they want to hear and provides them 
with it. In this same way, the reader’s own preconceptions are laid bare. He believes to be 
provided with a new and authentic peek into this other world, when, in fact, he is reflexively 
confronted with his own world and his own self. As Fichte states, “Auch der Anspruch des 
echten ist ein touristischer” (X, 138). Even when the tourist, or in this case the reader, 
encounters the new and authentic, this is always already predetermined by what they want to 
see, hear, and know. This does not mean that Fichte’s accounts are not real. “Ein Vaudou 
kann echt sein,” he writes, “auch wenn Touristen gegen Bezahlung daran teilnehmen; wer 
zweifelt an der Echtheit eines christlichen Gebetes, nur weil der Mann mit dem Klingelbeutel 
herumgeht?” (X, 138). The fact of the matter is that each case, be it the voodoo ceremony, the 
artist’s house, or here in the reading of an ethnographic text, is governed to no small extent 
by what the recipient desires—the fantasy of knowing an other world. Fichte, however, 
exposes this epistemological desire and thereby turns it around on itself confronting the 
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receptive reader with himself, his world, and the very production of knowledge that created it 
vis-à-vis that knowledge which creates his understanding of other worlds. 
 The communicative and receptive aspects of the Haiti chapter in Fichte’s Xango thus 
form a dialogue with other worlds that centers as much on the desire to know them as the 
limitations of this desire. On the communicative side of the equation, Fichte brings himself 
and the reader into touch with this other world through the identification with and distance of 
the allusion allowing both to speak to it and simultaneously critically reflect on the colonially 
imbricated foundations of this process. Through the interview, Fichte facilitates the receptive 
end in which we gain knowledge from the other world in an attempt to see it (a)new by 
means of bringing us “in andere Welten.” Similarly, this is a critically reflective/reflexive 
process that exposes the means and methods through which we receive this knowledge. The 
bi-directionality of dialogue reveals the ways in which other worlds are created through 
exchange; just as the First World creates the knowledge and reality about the Third World, 
the Third World also creates the First by casting our own gaze back at us. This dialogic 
process of exchange and (re)casting the colonial gaze is further explored in the photography 
of Xango. 
 
Visual Dialogue and the Postcolonial Gaze 
 
Fichte’s Xango parallels and complicates Born’s Die Fälschung not only on the level 
of the ability to know and represent knowledge of other worlds, but also in the realm of 
photography. In Xango, as in Die Fälschung, we have a pair of travelers reporting on other 
worlds, one a writer, the other a photographer. In contrast to Born’s novel, however, Leonore 
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Mau’s photographs in the first volume of Xango are characterized by a critical reflexivity that 
turns the one-sidedness of colonial gaze (Hoffmann’s “triumphale Neutralität” and “brutale 
Ziviliziertheit”) into a bi-directional postcolonial one. As with Fichte’s text, Mau’s 
photography creates a visual dialogue that relies on identification and distance, reflection and 
reflexivity to query the way we view other worlds and, simultaneously, how it views us. 
Mau’s photographs appear as volume one of Xango, whereas Fichte’s text comprises volume 
two.70 This sequencing, it would seem, raises the “chicken or the egg question.” What comes 
first, Mau’s images or Fichte’s words? Is the text simply a supplement to the photographs? 
Are the two volumes meant to be read independently or side by side? This line of questioning 
has, unsurprisingly, led to two different answers. For Simo, the photographs are dependent 
upon the text. While he grants that “die Bilder zwar manche Beschreibungen 
veranschaulichen,” he nevertheless contends that the “[d]ie Textbände können ohne die 
Photobände allein bestehen und gelesen werden,” whereas the opposite is not the case.71 
Peter Braun views the issue differently. He argues for a “Parallelität des Textes und des 
Bilddiskurses” in which “Fotografien wie Texte breiten sich parallel zueinander aus und 
laufen in einer parallelen Bewegung nebeneinander her.”72 In a similar vein, Rainer Guldin 
states that “Photographie und Schrift stehen speigelverkehrt zueinander. Die Photographin ist 
das Double des Schriftstellers.”73 Although each of the above analyses has its merits as well 
as shortcomings, none of them deal solely with the photographs on their own terms, which is 
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what the photo series in the section on Haiti demands.74  
In the two sections that bookend Haiti—Bahia de Todos os Santos and Trinidad, 
respectively—the photos are accompanied by pull-page layouts of excerpts from Fichte’s 
text. Here it is indeed possible to speak of a doubling or parallelism between image and 
word. The section on Haiti, however, functions quite differently. Here the photos appear in 
succession, one after another without being broken up by text. The captions for the photos—
written by Fichte—are pushed to the end of the volume functioning more as a legend and 
perhaps even an afterthought than a commentary on the photos. Further, these captions are 
not taken from Fichte’s text, but are new though not independent unto themselves. Thus, 
while there is a connection between Mau’s images and Fichte’s words, in the section on Haiti 
it is the photographs that take precedence. In the Haiti section, more so than in the other two, 
we are confronted with the fact that Mau and Fichte are, as Böhme argues, working on 
“einem Werk, […] das in zwei medialen Zuständen überliefert ist.”75 To Böhme’s statement, 
however, we should add the qualifier “different”—one work that is composed out of two 
different mediums. The tension between the image and the word in the Haiti section is 
produced by the difference between these two forms of representation that is neither 
encapsulated by their doubling or parallelism (Braun, Guldin) nor by strict recourse to the 
text (Simo). This tension is, however, not an antagonistic one. Rather, it is productive tension 
that arises from the collaboration on a joint project with a shared goal—to bring the 
reader/viewer into conversation with other worlds. It is not a question then of which medium 
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achieves this end better than the other, but rather how they reach the same goal through 
different means on two different levels—the visual and the textual. In contrast to Die 
Fälschung, in which Laschen’s journalism requires the visual proof of the simulacric image, 
I argue that predominance accorded to Mau’s photographs in Xango points to their ability to 
express visually what Fichte attempts through language and thereby overcome the 
colonialism in language that he laments at the outset.  That is, the other language that he is in 
search of becomes the visual language of the photographs. This imagic language is, 
moreover, not only present in the photographs themselves, but also in the lasting colonial 
images and structures in Haiti as well as the syncretic signs and symbols of Haitian voodoo 
that subvert them.  
 Mau’s first two photographs establish a visual dialogue with the viewer and the other 
world depicted therein. The first photograph depicts three Haitian women each carrying 
buckets and walking past an advertisement for the German chemical and pharmaceutical 
company Bayer claiming “un grand vainqueur” (“a great victory”) accompanied by a hand 
displaying a victory sign (see figure 1, X1, 64-65). In the next photograph a foregrounded 
group of women files past a colonial palace (see figure 2, X1, 66-67).  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
Here we are visually confronted the victor motif as well as the communicative functions of 
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identification and distance as well as the reflexive receptivity of new information that returns 
the gaze back to the viewer. While the viewer is drawn in and identified by the advertising 
slogan in the first photograph and the palace in the second, he is also critically distanced 
therefrom, brought face to face with his victorious colonial position.76 Receptively, the 
viewer is reminded that he is only granted access to whatever other world waits beyond the 
frame through the veil of the colonial foundations of knowledge. The advertising on the wall 
and the colonial palace is that which reflexively exposes him (and Mau) and the means 
through which he has access to this world—the intrusion of marketing, capital, and colonial 
conquest. 
At the same time, however, both images point to the limits of colonial knowledge. 
The screen that sets up the viewer’s critical reflexive gaze is also the wall erected by the 
colonial production of knowledge. This is neither a metaphorical nor symbolic wall, but the 
very physical, spatial, and cultural intrusions of the production of colonial knowledge. It is 
that which both hides the threat of the new and the extraordinary and that which walls us off 
from the other world. That is, our gaze is not only dominated by the wall in the photograph 
but by the desire to see behind it and to follow the women passing in front of it. It points to 
that to which we are not allowed access—the wall that we have created turns against us and 
shuts us out of other worlds. In the second photograph, the viewer is similarly barred from 
the other world. The women in the foreground, like those in the first photograph, do not face 
the camera and one goes so far as to cover her face with her hat mirroring the walled-off 
exclusion in the first. In both instances the viewer is not only confronted with his own gaze 
and the basis of colonial knowledge through what is filtered, but also with the gaze of the 
                                                 
76 See Peter Braun, “Irma’s Kunst,” pp. 70-71.  
122 
other world. This is the postcolonial gaze that is both reflexive and reciprocal. On the one 
hand it reflects the viewer’s glance back at himself and exposes the limits of what he sees or 
is able to see through the colonial veil. On the other hand, this gaze is reciprocal insofar as 
the women in the photographs above allow us to see what their other world wants us to see—
it too imposes its gaze on the viewer by denying him total access thereby turning the colonial 
gaze back on itself. 
As Mau’s series of photographs progresses, the viewer is alternately granted a look 
behind the wall and separated by it. The reflexivity of the postcolonial gaze continues 
through scenes of servitude and poverty. In the former, a waiter dressed in a white suit and 
surrounded by a pristine courtyard nears the camera delivering a drink (see figure 3, X1, 68-
69). In contrast to the first two photographs, here the viewer is faced with the waiter 
approaching the recipient of the cocktail who becomes imbricated in the continuation of 
colonial power structures and hierarchies.77 Concerning poverty, one photograph depicts ill-
equipped workers repairing a drain or sewage line and in another a group of begging women 
(see figure 4, X1, 70 and figure 5, X1, 71).   
                                                 
77 See Peter Braun, “Irma’s Kunst,” p. 72. 
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Figure 3 
As   
Figure 4 Figure 5 
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the viewer moves beyond the wall he carries with him the traces of the victorious colonial 
position inscribed thereon. On the other side, he encounters the conditions of possibility that 
make the erection of the wall achievable in the first place—exploitation in the form of 
continued servitude and poverty. The three photographs are not contrasting images, showing 
opulence and abundance of the colonial position versus the destituteness of everyday 
Haitians. Rather, they point to the imbrication of the two, as is the case with the wall or the 
covered face. Whereas in the first the viewer is in the position of the privileged recipient 
sitting at a table with fresh fruit and a swimming pool at arm’s length away (the edge of the 
pool visible in the lower right of the frame), in the second the man is almost drowning in the 
sewer and in the third the women beg for enough to eat. In each photograph, the viewer is not 
capable of seeing through the wall or removing the hat from the woman’s face; but he is 
nevertheless viewing this through the reflexive filter of the postcolonial gaze. The viewer’s 
gaze is reflected back at him confronting with the foundation of his colonial position and at 
the same time the limits thereof—the limit imposed by the very walls raised in the production 
of colonial knowledge. What we see or are able to see is only that which we have erected for 
ourselves—a Third World voyeurism that hides the new and novel in favor of the familiar 
servitude and poverty. 
 The photograph immediately following the workers and the begging women is taken 
inside of a church from the vantage point of the altar in which the pews are occupied by rows 
of standing soldiers staring directly into the camera as the church goers file out in the 
background (see figure 6, X1, 72-73). 
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Figure 6 
Rather than signaling the end of the first “Bildsequenz des Haiti-Kapitels,” as Peter Braun 
contends, this photograph is a transition into the Haitian world of voodoo.78 Here we have 
two overlapping power structures. The Christian church and colonial efforts of conversion 
intersect with the special troops of the Haitian dictator François Duvalier, a convergence of 
distinct though related modes of oppression and exploitation. While the soldiers’ gaze is 
directed toward the camera and the viewer as if awaiting orders from the altar, the attention is 
simultaneously drawn down the aisle in the center of the frame following those exiting the 
church. As in the first two photographs (the women passing by the Bayer advertisement and 
those filing past the presidential palace), the viewer is pulled toward that which is outside of 
                                                 
78 Peter Braun, “Irmas Kunst,” p. 73. Peter Braun’s excellent reading of Mau’s photos in the Haiti section ends 
with this photograph approximately a third of the way through the volume.  
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frame. This stands in contrast to the image of the waiter in which the viewer is only 
approached or the static images of the workers and begging women in which there is no 
escaping the frame. This transitional photograph establishes at once the limits of our colonial 
knowledge in the reflexivity of the gaze and initiates the reciprocal. We follow those 
abandoning the structures of power in order to be shown something beyond yet always 
limited by that which the other world will reveal, tagging along with those whose backs are 
turned to us. 
 The limit of the reflexive gaze is also that which the other world imposes on us. 
Mau’s photographs thus do not end with the reflexive postcolonial gaze but combine this 
with the reciprocal gaze of the other world, which both conceals and reveals—divulging 
information to the viewer and simultaneously withholding it from him. The photographs of 
the voodoo rites and ceremonies are dominated by this tension. One of the first images 
displays a small voodoo temple shot from the outside (see figure 7, X1, 78-79). In front of the 
temple stands a checkered/striped cross and the white outside walls are covered by writing, 
drawings of various flora and fauna, a man with a drum, and a black cross.  
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Figure 7 
This image both mirrors and contradicts the Bayer advertising wall and the church. On the 
one hand, the contrasting black and images echoes the advertising and the crosses draw 
parallels to the Christian church. On the other hand, the functions thereof are inverted. The 
advertising wall, which forms the limit of colonial knowledge, is replaced by the walls of the 
temple, the reciprocal restriction that shuts us out. Similarly, the crosses—one black against 
the white wall, the other one dual-colored—invert the scene in the church, transposing the 
symbols of power and oppression—the syncretic power structure of the church and soldiers 
exchanged for the syncretism of voodoo. While the viewer recognizes this predominant 
Christian symbol and reflexively identifies with it, he is nevertheless distanced from it, 
closed off from this temple by the very thing that grants him access to the other world. Here, 
the reflexive gaze is confronted by the reciprocity of the other world that imposes its view on 
us, limiting our access to other worlds through the power and knowledge structures 
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constructed to understand it. 
Just as moving beyond the advertising wall does not shed the remnants of colonial 
knowledge, passing through the walls of the temple carries with it the traces of the limits 
placed upon the viewer by the reciprocal gaze of the other world. Mau’s photographs of 
voodoo ceremonies and rituals display the reciprocal gaze that is aware that it is being 
observed and thereby turns this observation around on the viewer creating tension between 
that which we are allowed to see and want to see and that which is denied to the viewer. The 
first photographs are wide shots that, in contrast to those that begin the Haiti series, 
presumably expand the view and open up the space concealed by the wall (see figure 8, X1, 
84-85 and figure 9, X1, 88-89).  
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
The expansiveness of the images, however, betrays their limits. In the first photograph the 
viewer’s gaze is framed and enclosed by the wooden structure that rests on the border of the 
photograph. In this way, both the viewer and Mau are cut off and distanced from the scene 
taking place inside. In the second, the situation is the same. While the photograph attempts to 
capture the grandiosity of the ritual, from the waterfall to the mass of people, the viewer is 
nevertheless confronted with his position outside of the scene— with Mau, he views this 
from the position of the interloper to whom backs are turned excluding them from the 
intimacy of the ceremony. Both photographs function reflexively and reciprocally. On the 
one hand, they expose the viewer and Mau as outsiders, the status of which alone grants them 
access to this other world. On the other hand, it is reciprocal in that this is the limit that the 
other world imposes on us. Aware of our presence and possible intrusion, it frames us out at 
the same time the photograph seeks to capture all. 
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 Mau’s shots capture individual subjects in medium and medium close-ups. Narrowing 
the frame and sharpening the focus erases the distance and space the previous wide shots 
create. In one medium close-up, a man in a trance with his eyes closed and his arms and 
hands outstretched fill nearly the entire frame (see figure 10, X1, 90-91).  
 
Figure 10 
The medium close-up creates at once a sense of intimacy, closing off the space surrounding it 
and bringing the viewer face-to-face with a voodoo ritual, and simultaneously a sense of 
being cut off. While the viewer is granted a look into this other world divulging its secrets 
and mysteries, he reflexively encounters as well the limit of this understanding—the 
boundary produced by the photographic frame. The photograph attempts to contain the image 
which threatens to break the frame—the top of the man’s head extends slightly beyond the 
boundary of the photograph and his fingertips rest precariously on the edge. However, it not 
only verges on exploding the frame and with it the boundary placed around it, it is that which 
holds it together imposing its own limits. This is echoed in two subsequent medium shots of 
a Voodoo ceremonies and rituals. The first shows a smiling man looking to his left (the right 
of the viewer) as a man dressed as Baron Samedi (the god of the dead in Haitian voodoo) 
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faces the camera with his hand stretched out beyond the frame (see figure 11, X1, 104-105). 
In the second and last photograph in the Haiti series, a man with sunglasses pours milk over 
the head of another, whose arm similarly breaks the frame while he looks on smiling (see 
figure 12, X1, 110-111).  
 
Figure 11 
 
132 
 
Figure 12 
In contrast to the photograph of the entranced man, the border of both photographs is 
completely broken. In figure 9, the gaze of the smiling man is cast past the lens of the camera 
to something outside the frame while in figure 10 two-thirds of the man’s arm extend beyond 
the border of the photograph. Even as these close-up shots attempt to limit the focus, 
constricting the space accorded to the viewer’s gaze in order to contain and frame the scenes 
contained therein, the images resist this enclosure and simultaneously enforce it. The limit 
the photograph attempts to impose on the other world turns against it becoming the limit of 
that which we are allowed to know and to see. Although we are brought into the world of 
voodoo, the enclosure of the image exposes the limits placed upon it by the intrusion of the 
viewer and photographer. At the same time, however, this is also the limit established by the 
reciprocal gaze of the other world that denies a view outside the frame while signaling to 
something beyond the structures of knowledge and power that seek to contain it.  
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What we are ultimately presented with is not the reality of voodoo, its essence that 
exists behind the wall we have raised, but only that which the other world reveals. The faces 
are no longer hidden and this other world no longer closed off; nevertheless, it is restricted by 
the very thing that produced it. The reflexive and reciprocal gazes in the above photographs 
reflect the limit of knowledge of other worlds not by showing faults and cracks in its 
foundation, but rather by turning these limits against themselves. In this way, Leonore Mau’s 
photographs establish a visual dialogue between the viewer and the other world through the 
interplay of visual reflexivity and reciprocity. While the reflexive gaze sets up the conditions 
of possibility for viewing the other world, the limit of the victorious colonial position through 
which the gaze is both filtered and reflected back at the viewer, the reciprocal gaze highlights 
the way the other world views us, imposing the same limits of knowledge that are established 
to understand it. Where colonial knowledge and the colonial gaze represent the limits we 
impose on ourselves, neutralizing the threat of the new and different, the reflexivity and 
reciprocity of the postcolonial gaze exposes this threat as the limit of that which we are able 
to understand. The strength of Mau’s photographs lies, as with Fichte’s text, not with their 
ability to provide an unimpeded and unburdened view of other worlds, but in the way in 
which they expose the foundations of our knowledge about them and the limits thereof. In 
doing so, they bring the viewer into dialogue with other worlds highlighting both the 
imbrication of different worlds—the structures of knowledge and power that create both—as 
well as the limits of these intersections that render them fundamentally distinct.  
 
Conclusion 
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Our knowledge of other worlds is always governed by the colonial contradiction that 
knowledge about them not only takes part in their creation but in their subjugation under the 
colonial regime of knowledge and power. Thus, we are simultaneously limited by 
Wittgenstein’s maxim that in order to avoid this, we are best advised not to speak of them at 
all. As I have demonstrated in the previous two chapters, however, there is a third way. 
Through the suspension of these two paradoxes we can arrive at a non-description—a critical 
self-reflexivity that aims to expose the contradiction that resides at the basis of our desire to 
know other worlds. In the end, neither Born’s nor Fichte and Mau’s work resolves the 
contradictions at their core, but rather rely on them as a postcolonial, utopian method of 
depicting other worlds. “Produced in the distance between contradictory elements, [utopia],” 
Louis Marin states, “is the simulacrum of the synthesis, while yet signifying the contradiction 
that produced it.”79 The “simulacrum” of synthesis arises in each work through its very 
completion, the act that defies Wittgenstein’s paradox in daring to speak of that which they 
do not and cannot know. At the same time, however, Born’s novel as well as Fichte and 
Mau’s work lay bare for the reader the contradiction upon which they are based—that the 
production and dissemination of knowledge of other worlds is complicit in their creation and 
the continuation of colonial power. Further, their critiques of the imbrication of journalism 
and ethnology in this process reflexively locate the utopia of other worlds in the text itself 
and ultimately argue for literature as the site of utopia.  
This is not to say that either work displays the best of all possible worlds, the eutopia, 
but rather the outopia, that is the no-place and the other of any place. To portray the places 
they write about and desire to know as utopia would be to strip them of the force of utopia as 
                                                 
79 Marin, Utopics, p. 11. 
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an other place and, moreover, contribute to their continued colonization. For Born, the 
reportage and photojournalism level any differences and distinctions between worlds by 
creating and disseminating knowledge and with it the other world they seek to make known 
and understand. For Fichte and Mau, the situation is the same. In attempting to inform about 
other worlds, ethnology similarly takes part in their perpetual colonization. In both cases, 
they cast a critical and reflexive gaze back via the text. Where Born’s novel emphasizes the 
power of literature over journalism to suspend the contradictions that the latter flattens, 
Fichte’s text and Mau’s photographs establish a dialogic reflexivity and reciprocity with the 
other world and the reader/viewer that uses the contradiction to initiate a conversation with 
other worlds. In refusing to synthesize the paradoxes that govern them, both works display 
their affinity to utopia as a text, as a literary mode that knows full well that it is creating other 
worlds and puts this process up for view. This is a reflexive, critical, and above all 
postcolonial literature that recognizes its colonial culpability and dismantles it through the 
very thing that created it—the contradiction of knowledge of other worlds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Capital, The Final Frontier: 
Science Fiction, Allegory, and Utopia in Alexander Kluge’s  
Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang 
 
From Other Space to Outer Space 
 
Following the collapse of the student movement in West Germany, utopia underwent 
a twofold change. For one, the desire for utopia shifted from an emphasis on revolutionary 
solidarity and identification with the so-called Third World to spaces of alterity. As I 
demonstrated in the previous two chapters, utopia was neither the good place nor the no-
place that its etymological heritage ambiguously balances, but rather an other space, 
somewhere beyond the borders of West Germany, in particular, and Europe, in general. At 
the same time, the exploration of other, outer spaces came face to face with the culpability 
for creating these spaces. In this respect, the works of Nicolas Born and Hubert Fichte mined 
the epistemological structure of other non-Western worlds, the ways in which knowledge 
about them and its representation in literature take part in their continued colonization. 
Secondly, the contradiction of the simultaneous investigation and creation of these other 
worlds coupled with the self-reflexivity endemic to these works opened up the text itself as a 
utopian space. That is, literature became a space of contradiction and contestation, a space 
where the paradox of utopian promise and deferment regained its socio-critical currency. In 
contrast to the supposed dominance of New Subjectivity or New Inwardness in the 1970s, 
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utopia survived as an other space, challenging colonialism and Eurocentrism as well as the 
primacy of private subjectivity. Indeed, it is possible to summarize that in both cases, as a 
space of alterity and a definitively literary space concerned with exteriority. Utopia after 
1968 was, in a word, an outer space. 
In this chapter, I examine Alexander Kluge’s science fiction story, Lernprozesse mit 
tödlichem Ausgang [1973], as an investigation of an other, outer space. Kluge’s work takes 
place in the 22nd century when, after a global, nuclear war has destroyed the Earth, the 
terrestrial survivors reside in the far-reaches of outer space. The story that is told, however, is 
not about the future in outer space per se, but rather the history of this future. Kluge’s four 
protagonists recount the history of the destruction of the Earth and the survival and 
continuation of capital in outer space. Similar to the previous postcolonial novels, 
Lernprozesse examines outer space as a space of alterity. The interest in postcolonial spaces 
as sites of revolution was also an attraction to these other worlds as spaces of alterity to 
capitalism, countries in which a communist revolution was taking place. Lernprozesse 
expands this search for spaces of alterity to capital into the realm of outer space and science 
fiction. As with the postcolonial texts, however, Lernprozesse reveals that this outer space is 
governed by the same thing it seeks to escape, namely capital. That is, just as the search for 
other worlds in the postcolonial novel reveals its culpability in the continuing colonization 
thereof, in Lernprozesse outer space is the space for the reproduction and continuation of 
capital in the wake of the Earth’s destruction. At the same time, however, like the 
postcolonial novels, Kluge’s investigation of outer space turns back on itself, self-reflexively 
producing the text as a space of alterity. 
Science fiction is an ideal genre for investigations of spatial alterity. In his study of 
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science fiction, Adam Roberts argues that it is “in some central way about the encounter with 
difference” that is “articulated through a ‘novum’, a conceptual […] embodiment of 
alterity.”1 Roberts’ definition is, however, largely indebted to Darko Suvin, who penned one 
of the first comprehensive analyses of the genre. Suvin defines science fiction as “the 
literature of cognitive estrangement” that, in contrast to the myth’s attempt to explain man 
and his relation to the world, “first posits them as problems and then explores where they 
lead […]. It does not ask about The Man or The World, but which man?: in which kind of 
world?: and why such a man in such a kind of world.”2 Science fiction is then a form of 
spatial thought experiment that queries what it is like on other worlds and, in turn, what these 
other worlds say about man.3 The term “cognitive estrangement” denotes, moreover, a 
dialectic of the known and the unknown, the familiar and the strange.4 Suvin further defines 
science fiction as “a developed oxymoron, a realistic irreality, with humanized nonhumans, 
this-worldy Other Worlds, and so forth. Which means that it is – potentially – the space of a 
potent estrangement, validated by the pathos and prestige of the basic cognitive norms of our 
                                                 
1 Adam Roberts, Science Fiction (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 17. 
2 Darko Suvin The Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre (New 
Haven: Yale UP, 1979), pp. 6-7. 
3 Science fiction for Suvin is understood as “[n]either prophetic futurology nor an empty game of chess,” but 
rather “an imaginative experiment” and a “cognitive model.” Suvin, “Science Fiction and Utopian Literature: 
Degrees of Kinship,” in Positions and Presuppositions in Science Fiction (Kent: Kent State UP, 1988), pp. 33-
43, p. 42.  
4 This is in following with Carl Freedman’s analysis of Suvin’s term from his work Critical Theory and Science 
Fiction [2000]. As he states: “Science fiction is determined by the dialectic between estrangement and 
cognition. The first term refers to the creation of an alternative fictional world that, by refusing to take out 
mundane environment for granted, implicitly or explicitly performs an estranging critical interrogation of the 
latter. But the critical character of the interrogation is guaranteed bu the operation of cognition, which enables 
the science-fictional text to account rationally for its imagined world and for the connections as well as the 
disconnections of the latter to our own empirical world.” Critical Theory and Science Fiction (Middeltown: 
Wesleyan UP, 2000), p. 16. 
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times.”5 Science fiction literature is the space where the dialectical tension between the 
known and the unknown, based at once in rational plausibility and fantastic hypothesis, is 
maintained and put on display. 
Moreover, this tension is mediated by what he terms, following Ernst Bloch’s Das 
Prinzip Hoffnung, the novum. “A novum of cognitive innovation,” Suvin writes, “is a 
totalizing phenomenon or relationship deviating from the author’s and the implied reader’s 
norm of reality.”6 The novum is the point around which cognition and estrangement coalesce 
and that which preserves the two: 
[…] the essential tension of SF is one between the readers, representing a certain 
number of types of Man of our times, and the encompassing and at least equipollent 
Unknown or Other introduced by the novum. […] Clearly the novum is a mediating 
category whose explicative potency springs from its rare bridging of literary and 
extraliterary, fictional and empirical, formal and ideological domains, in brief from its 
unalienable historicity.7 
The concept of the novum and its mediation of cognition and estrangement is also what ties 
utopia to science fiction. Defined by Suvin as first and foremost a literary genre, the “crucial 
element” of utopia is its existence as “an alternative location radically different in respect of 
sociopolitical conditions from the author’s historical environment.”8 As with the novum, 
utopia is dictated as well by the dialectic of the new and the known: “Utopia is an Other 
World immanent in the world of human endeavor, dominion, and hypothetic possibility.”9 
The parallels between utopia and science fiction, as a “this-worldly other world” governed by 
the dialectic of cognitive estrangement leads Suvin, in fact, to characterize utopia as a 
                                                 
5 Suvin, The Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, p. viii.  
6 Ibid., p. 64. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid., p. 41. 
9 Ibid., p. 42. 
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subgenre of science fiction.10 Thus, science fiction explores outer space as a space of alterity, 
a utopia of the radically different yet possible that at the same time, and similar to the 
postcolonial novel, is the space of tension between the known and the unknown. 
For all of Suvin’s reliance on the known world of the reader, however, science fiction 
as a literary form enacts its cognitive estrangement on its own, as a text. Simon Spiegel, in 
his essay on the term and its relation to science fiction theory, argues that this is not 
“‘cognition’ as such,” but rather within the text.11 This is, in fact, the corrective to Suvin’s 
model posed by Carl Freedman: “The crucial issue for generic discrimination is not any 
epistemological judgment external to the text itself on the rationality or irrationality of the 
latter's imaginings, but rather [...] the attitude of the text itself to the kind of estrangements 
being performed.”12 The text rather than the reader is the site of this cognitive estrangement, 
the space where the tension between this world and an other world, the new and the known, 
play out. While the empirical, cognitive referent as well as its estranged other are nonetheless 
the same, it is within the text that this distinction is established and where the dialectic of 
cognition and estrangement creates a space for its representation. The representation of this 
cognitive estrangement is the definition of science fiction provided by Seo-Young Chu in his 
recent work on the genre. 
Science fiction, for Chu, is a “representational technology” that “generate[s] mimetic 
accounts of cognitively estranging referents” or, as he restates, that “render[s] cognitively 
                                                 
10 Suvin, The Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, p. 42, 61. 
11 Simon Spiegel, “Things Made Strange: On the Concept of ‘Estrangement’ in Science Fiction Theory,” 
Science Fiction Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Nov. 2008), pp. 369-385, p. 373. 
12 Spiegel, “Things Made Strange,” p. 373. The quote is from Carl Freedman, Critical Theory and Science 
Fiction (Middeltown: Wesleyan UP, 2000), p. 18. 
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estranging referents available for representation.”13 Chu differs from Freedman, however, in 
his assertion that the dialectic of cognitive estrangement occurs not “in the formal apparatus 
of a given SF text but in the object or phenomenon that the SF text seeks accurately to 
represent.”14 Thus, science fiction attempts to represent something external to the text that is 
cognitively estranging. Contrary to Suvin’s central notion of the novum, science fiction in 
Chu’s analysis renders something existent yet cognitively estranging visible, rather than that 
which deviates from the author’s or reader’s world. In this way, science fiction “involves 
greater similitude than dissimilitude between referent and representational text.”15 One of the 
things that science fiction represents as cognitively estranging is the globalized world, which 
hovers between the known and unknown, the literal and the figurative, and thereby “resists 
simple narration.”16 To be sure, Chu does not reject the importance of the text. Rather, he 
proposes a mimetic relationship whereby, in attempting to represent the unrepresentable 
globalized world, for instance, the text takes on some of those qualities in the same way the 
postcolonial text takes on the character of paradox and contradiction in order to represent the 
paradoxical and contradictory nature of other worlds. 
Following Chu, I pose in this chapter the question: what is it that Kluge’s 
Lernprozesse renders available for representation in outer space? Outer space as a space of 
alterity is itself cognitively estranging. The outer space of Lernprozesse is populated by the 
new—from Martian outposts, distant planets and galaxies to spaceships—and at the same 
                                                 
13 Seo-Young Chu, Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep? A Science-Fictional Theory of Representation 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2010), p. 73. 
14 Ibid., p. 5. 
15 Chu, Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep?, p. 5. 
16 Ibid., pp. 85-87. 
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time the shockingly familiar—war, colonization, and the exploitation of labor and other 
worlds that are mined for their resources. In line with Chu’s argument, Lernprozesse is filled 
with objects and concepts beyond simple representation, “neither the totally knowable nor 
totally unknowable.”17 There is, however, one main driving force, a force entirely familiar to 
the present, that motivates Lernprozesse and occupies its outer space, namely capital. In the 
preface to the republished edition of his co-authored theoretical work Öffentlichkeit und 
Erfahrung (Public Sphere and Experience) [1972] from 2001 Kluge opens the text with a 
picture of outer space depicting a large satellite, numerous planets and stars, and a spaceship. 
The caption reads: “Weit draußen. Die größte Öffentlichkeit, die es gibt, ist der Kosmos, 
Outer Space: Weltöffentlichkeit. Überschießendes Rüstungskapital, das auf Erden den 
Fortschritt hemmt, kann dorthin exportiert werden” (see figure 1).18  
 
Figure 5 
                                                 
17 Chu, Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep?, p. 7. 
18 Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, Der unterschätzte Mensch, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Zweitausendeins, 
2001), p. 329. 
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In the update to the theoretical companion to Lernprozesse, outer space has become an 
intergalactic refuge for capital’s terrestrial excesses. Outer space in Lernprozesse is the space 
of excess(ive) capital. 
For the four protagonists at the center of Lernprozesse, outer space is a realm in 
which to escape history, to flee from capital’s catastrophic past and present in order to secure 
their future existence. It is also the space for the survival of capital preconditioned on 
escaping its past, on moving spatially and temporally ever forward. In this respect, time takes 
on a spatial quality in the story. This echoes Georg Lukács’ assessment of capital’s 
transformation of time into space: “Thus time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; 
it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with ‘things’ […]; in short, 
it becomes space.”19 Further, as Suvin notes, one of the main factors in the turn to future time 
in science fiction was “the strong tendency toward temporal extrapolation inherent in life 
based on a capitalist economy, with its salaries, profits, and progressive ideals always 
expected in a future clock-time.”20 In the era of high capitalism, science fiction, in Suvin’s 
words, “is neither simply spatial […] nor simply temporal […] but spatiotemporal” in the 
same way that physicists, following Einstein’s theory of relativity, speak of spacetime, 
whereby the two no longer function on diametrically opposed planes.21 
 In Lernprozesse, the time of capital has frozen in outer space. It is devoid of a past 
                                                 
19 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, Rodney Livingstone, trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press,1971 
[1923]), p. 90. 
20 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, p. 73. 
21 Ibid. p. 74. Cf. Fredric Jameson’s Archaeologies of the Future. In this work, Jameson proposes science fiction 
as a purely spatial genre. As he states: “Meanwhile the more deliberate move, which we can witness 
everywhere in the genre today […], is less a matter of the extrapolation of forms of individual destiny onto a 
collective history […] than it is of the mediation of space itself […]. We need to explore the proposition that the 
distinctiveness of SF as a genre has less to do with time (history, past, future) than with space.” Jameson, 
Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (New York: Verso, 2005), 
pp. 312-313. 
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and it can live on indefinitely in the outer reaches of the universe in what Suvin would call its 
“spatialized future.”22 Lernprozesse renders the cognitively estranged spacetime of capital, 
its familiar yet elusive quality, available for representation.23 Moreover, it does so not only as 
a work of science fiction, but as an allegory. Whereas with science fiction it is possible to 
represent the cognitively estranged spatialized future of capital, as an allegory Lernprozesse 
spatializes the past, reestablishing the history capital longs to forget. In this chapter I argue 
that, while the outer space of Lernprozesse has become the space of capital, ultimately 
colonizing other worlds, the text itself becomes a utopian outer space that displays the 
contradictions between capital’s future and its past. Kluge’s story of capital’s adventures into 
a future outer space is, then, not merely a foray into dystopian fantasy. On the contrary, it 
mounts a critique of capital’s propensity for spatial and temporal expansion. This critique is 
performed by the narrative and the formal allegorical nature of the text, its disconnected, 
fragmentary, and multimedia nature that makes Lernprozesse an allegorical ruin of capital, 
the outer space to capital’s unceasing spatial and temporal expansion.  
 
Lernprozesse as Science Fiction and Allegory: Benjamin and Kluge 
 
                                                 
22 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, p. 73. 
23 This follows many analyses of science fiction as a Marxist critique of capitalism. Mark Bould argues, for 
example, that “SF world-building is typically distinguished from other fictional world-building, whether 
fantastic or not, by the manner in which it offers, however unintentionally, a snapshot of the structures of 
capital” (my italics). Bould, “Introdution: Rough Guide to a Lonely Planet, From Nemo to Neo,” in Red 
Planets: Marxism and Science Fiction, Mark Bould and China Méville, eds. (Middeltown: Wesleyan UP, 
2009), pp. 1-28, p. 4. Further, Carl Freedman elaborates on the ways in which science fiction and critical theory 
work together: “The unprecedented ‘cunning’ that capital now displays on the global stage renders Marxism 
more urgent than ever. Indeed, the very impasse confronted by Marxist politics demands creative new 
elaborations of Marxist critique.” Science fiction is one of the “creative new elaborations” on the “motions of 
capital” that Marxism and critical theory investigate. Freedman, Critical Theory and Science Fiction, p. 10. 
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Science fiction and allegory do not make for such strange bedfellows. By defining 
science fiction as mimetic representational model, Chu definitively states that “Allegory is 
not science fiction.”24 This is not to say, however, that the two are mutually exclusive. While 
neither allegory nor science fiction can be reduced to one another such that allegory becomes 
science fiction or, conversely, science fiction becomes allegory, Chu nevertheless proposes 
the following relationship:  
Indeed, the two modes are intimately related. […] Science fiction and allegory […] 
have a reciprocal relationship. They are each other’s significant other half. Each mode 
is the other mode’s reciprocal. Each completes the other. Just as 1/x and x need to be 
multiplied by each other to equal one, allegory and science fiction need to be 
multiplied together to achieve the product of a total unity.25 
Science fiction and allegory, then, complete each other, each accomplishing what the other 
cannot. In the case of Lernprozesse, what each provides is a spatiotemporal dimension. As I 
mentioned above, whereas science fiction imparts to the work a spatialized future, allegory 
gives it a spatialized past. Lernprozesse is not merely a simple mimetic representation of the 
space of capital, which would only be one side of the coin, but the space of history as well. 
Referencing a 1846 publication by the attorney Felix Eberty entitled Die Gestirne und die 
Weltgeschichte, Kluge writes in a more recent piece of science fiction: “Insofern sei alle 
Vorgeschichte im Weltall aufbewahrt auf den Schienen des Lichts. […] Der Weltraum sei ein 
‘ewig unverwüstliches und unbestechliches Archiv der Bilder des Vergangen.’”26 Outer 
space, for Kluge, is made up of both the future space of capital as well the space of history. 
Thus, Lernprozesse is dominated by the dialectical tension between the future outer space of 
capital, on the one hand, and the space of a pre-apocalyptic past, on the other. It is this 
                                                 
24 Chu, Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep?, p. 75. 
25 Ibid., p. 80. 
26 Kluge, “Der Kosmos als Kino,” in Geschichten vom Kino (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007), p. 44. 
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tension between the dystopian future and the lessons of the past, between the temporalities of 
science fiction and allegory, that makes up the fabric of the text and bestows upon it its self-
reflexive utopian quality as the space where these spatiotemporal contradictions emerge. 
Kluge’s use of allegory is greatly indebted to Walter Benjamin. Indeed, as much as 
Adorno was Kluge’s theoretical mentor, Benjamin, it can be said, has been his guide in 
aesthetic matters.27 “Kluge is, though under very different circumstances and using different 
modes, following trails opened up by Benjamin,” Peter Labanyi contends, trails that include, 
for example, “his preference for fragments and for essayistic and paradigmatic forms” as well 
as “his use of allegory.”28 Andrew Bowie has, for example, proposed Benjamin’s “Über den 
Begriff der Geschichte” as necessary reading for a “fuller understanding of Kluge,” to which 
we should add his Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels [1928].29 It is in this work where 
Benjamin’s develops his theory of allegory. For Benjamin, the allegorical mode arises 
“immer um die sogennanten Zeiten des Verfalls.”30 Benjamin locates this moment of 
historical decay not only in the Baroque mourning play of the seventeenth century but also in 
                                                 
27 This is especially true concerning film, about which Adorno, in contrast to Benjamin, was highly suspicious. 
It is Benjamin to whom Kluge repeatedly turns in his writings on film, particularly in “Die Utopie Film” [1983]. 
As Miriam Hansen notes, however, Adorno’s views on film began to change somewhat in the 1960s, for 
instance in his 1966 essay “Filmtransparente,” where he took on a more Benjaminian tone thanks in large part 
to Kluge. Miriam Hansen, “Introduction to Adorno, ‘Transparencies on Film’ (1966),” New German Critique, 
No. 24/25 (Autumn, 1981 - Winter, 1982), pp. 186-198, pp. 192-195. On Kluge’s indebtedness to Benajamin 
see Christian Schulte, “Kairos und Aura: Spuren Benjamins im Werk Alexander Kluges,” in Schrift Bilder 
Denken: Walter Benjamin und die Künste, ed. Detlev Schöttker (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2004), pp. 220-
33. 
28 Peter Labanyi, “Surrendering to the Logic of the Flow: Reading Alexander Kluge,” After the Death of 
Literature: West German Writing of the 1970s (Oxford: Berg, 1989), ed. Keith Bullivant, pp. 263-295, p.266. 
29 Andrew Bowie, “New Histories: Aspects of the Prose of Alexander Kluge,” Journal of European Studies 12 
(1982), pp. 180-208, p. 207, footnote 10. See also Leslie A. Adelson, “Experiment Mars: Contemporary 
German Literature, Imaginative Ethnoscapes, and the New Futurism,” in Über Gegenwartsliteratur: 
Interpretationen und Interventionen, ed. Mark W. Rectanus (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2008), pp. 23-50 p. 37. 
30 Walter Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1963), p. 42. 
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the rise of expressionism after World War I.31 As Lutz Koepnick states, “Benjamin had 
argued in the Trauerspiel study that baroque allegory was the mode of perception peculiar to 
a time of social disruption and protracted war, when human suffering and material ruin were 
the stuff and substance of historical experience—hence the return of allegory in his own era 
as a response to the horrifying destructiveness of World War I.”32 Allegory is then not 
merely an indicator of this historical decay, but rather the very expression thereof. For 
Benjamin, “Die Allegorie des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts ist nicht Konvention des Ausdrucks, 
sondern Ausdruck der Konvention.”33 In moments of catastrophe, allegory arises as both an 
expression and experience of the transitory nature of history and as a bastion against what 
Bainard Cowan characterizes as “the all-too-human propensity to forget the past and in so 
doing to look away from the truth of oneself.”34 It is then no coincidence that Kluge turns to 
allegory in his work. Not only is his grounds for appropriating allegory permeated by the 
catastrophic legacy of National Socialism, but also by the “social disruption” at home in the 
1960s and 70s and the “protracted war” in Southeast Asia that signal less of a break with 
Germany’s calamitous past than its continuation.35 Furthermore, the catastrophic destruction 
of the Earth in Lernprozesse, coupled with the propensity to forget the past, makes it fertile 
                                                 
31 Benjaming, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, p. 42. See also Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Franfurt Institute (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 
p. 56. 
32 Lutz Koepnick, “The Spectacle, the ‘Trauerspiel,’ and the Politics of Resolution: Benjamin Reading the 
Baroque Reading Weimar,” Critical Inquiry 22:2 (Winter, 1996), pp. 268-291, p. 282. 
33 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, p. 194. See also p. 178. 
34 Bainard Cowan, “Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Allegory,” New German Critique 22 (Winter, 1981), pp. 109-
122, p. 110. 
35 In addition to the social upheaval in 1968 we can add the perceived continuation of Germany’s militarism and 
National Socialist legacy in minister Franz Josef Strauß’ plans to arm the German military with nuclear 
weapons in 1962, the passage of the Emergency Laws in 1968, West Germany’s support of the Vietnam War as 
well as the occupational ban (“Berufsverbot”) of 1972, which barred former activists from attaining positions in 
the government. 
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ground for allegory. 
Benjamin’s analysis of allegory is, moreover, closely related to the representation of a 
spatialized past. In Benjamin’s account of the allegory, the ruin is the dominant figure of 
historical decay and ultimately ties allegory to history. “Auf dem Antlitz der Natur,” he 
writes, “steht ‘Geschichte’ in der Zeichenschrift der Vergängnis. Die allegorische 
Physiognomie der Natur-Geschichte, die auf der Bühne durch das Trauerspiel gestellt wird, 
ist wirklich gegenwärtig als Ruine. Mit ihr hat sinnlich die Geschichte in den Schauplatz sich 
verzogen.”36 In the German mourning play, history emerges as allegory in the form of the 
ruin as both the “source of all suffering and misunderstanding, and the medium through 
which significance and, indeed, salvation are attained,” as Bainard Cowan argues.37 The ruin 
is representation of the past, an intrusion of history into the space of the work of art. Any 
chance of hope can only lie therein. That is, the ruin not only represents transience and 
suffering, but everything that did not happen that led to its becoming a ruin in the first place. 
This is illuminated in Benjamin’s “Über den Begriff der Geschichte” thusly: 
Glück, das Neid in uns erwecken könnte, gibt es nur in der Luft, die wir geatmet 
haben, mit Menschen, zu denen wir hätten reden, mit Frauen, die sich uns hätten 
geben können. Es schwingt, mit andern Worten, in der Vorstellung des Glücks 
unveräußerlich die der Erlösung mit. Mit der Vorstellung von Vergangenheit, welche 
die Geschichte zu ihrer Sache macht, verhält es sich ebenso.38 
The ruin is not a glorification of the past, but rather history’s mistakes and missteps rendered 
spatially visible. In contradistinction to the Romantic symbol, Naomi Stead argues that for 
                                                 
36 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, p. 197.  
37 Cowan, “Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Allegory,” p. 116. This emphasis on the restorative power of the past 
is echoed by Kluge: “Ich möchte […], daß in früheren Zeiten, aus denen ich stamme, Hoffnung versteckt ist. 
[…] Die Beschönigung der Zukunft macht mir angst.” Kluge, “Ein Vaterland außerhalb des Realen,” in 
Geschichten vom Kino, p. 58. 
38 Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” in Walter Benjamin: Erzählen. Schrifen zur Theorie der 
Narration und literarischen Prosa, Alexander Honold, ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007), pp. 129-140, 
p. 129. 
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Benjamin, “allegory has the discontinuous structure of a series of moments, of transitory, 
failed attempts to capture meaning.”39 Thus, the allegorical ruin as the intrusion of history 
into space is the representation of failed learning processes, precisely those catastrophic 
moments that brought the ruin into being. At the same time, the ruin enables a 
“saturnische[n] Blick” that is able to suspend the equivocalness (“Zweideutigkeit”) of 
destruction and redemption.40 
In the case of the German baroque mourning play, allegory undertakes a creation of a 
space for the past through the physical presence of the ruin on stage. In allegory, the ruin 
achieves, however, its presence in the form of thought and as image. For Benjamin, the 
existent ruin is analogous to the allegory: “Allegorien sind im Reiche der Gedanke, was 
Ruine im Reiche der Dinge [sind].”41 Allegory gains a spatial dimension in the realm of 
thought equivalent to the function of the ruin in the realm of things. “Was dauert,” Benjamin 
continues, “ist das seltsame Detail der allegorischen Verweisung: ein Gegestand des 
Wissens, der in den durchdachten Trümmerbauten nistet.”42 Allegory and ruin not only 
represent a relation to history, but to knowledge thereof as well. What is accomplished 
through the allegorical referent, what persists in it as an object of knowledge housed in the 
ruin, is not a depiction of a totality, but rather history as being full of “antagonisms and 
contradictions,” to speak with Susan Buck-Morss.43 In allegory, writes Benjamin, “[geht] 
                                                 
39 Naomi Stead, “The Value of Ruins: Allegories of Destruction in Benjamin and Speer,” Form/Work No. 6 
(October 2003), pp. 51-64, p. 55. 
40 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, p. 196-197. See also Cowan, “Walter Benjamin’s Theory of 
Allegory,” p. 111-112. 
41 Ibid., p. 197. 
42 Ibid., p. 202. 
43 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, p. 56. 
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[d]er falsche Schein der Totalität aus.”44 The knowledge gained from the allegorical ruin is 
knowledge of history as incomplete, as not having reached its end in salvation and 
reconciliation. Allegory creates this historical knowledge through the exegetical role of the 
ruin, which, in turn, transforms the work of allegory itself into a ruin; the beautiful image of 
totality collapses in allegory such that “das Werk als Runie sich behauptet.”45 In the allegory, 
thought as well as the work take on the role and function of the ruin as a spatial marker for 
history. 
The other key component for allegory’s spatial rendering of the past is the image. 
Benjamin finds in images the exact function of allegory in which “der zeitliche 
Bewegungsvorgang in einem Raumbild eingefangen und analysiert [wird].”46 Temporal 
movement, the movement of history, is captured and frozen for a moment in the allegorical 
image. Benjamin’s now renowned concept of dialectical images, indeed, has its origin in his 
work on allegory.47 As Benjamin later develops in Das Passagen-Werk: “Bild ist dasjenige, 
worin das Gewesene mit dem Jetzt blitzhaft zu einer Konstellation zusammentritt. Mit 
anderen Worten: Bild ist die Dialektik im Stillstand.”48 For Benjamin, allegorical images 
produce a momentary cessation of the dialectic of history, a space into which thought can 
intrude. “Zum Denken,” Benjamin states, “gehört ebenso die Bewegung wie das Stillstellen 
der Gedanken.”49 This “Stillstellen” of thought is again prefigured in allegory when 
                                                 
44 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, p. 195. 
45 Ibid., p. 203. 
46 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, p. 90. 
47 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, p. 102. 
48 Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, in Gesammelte Schriften Volume V/I, eds., Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main.: Suhrkamp, 1991), p. 576. 
49 Ibid., p. 595. 
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Benjamin claims that allegory belongs to the realm of thought as ruins to the realm of 
things.50 Such allegorical, dialectical images, should, however, not be understood as mere 
symbols. In her analysis of images in the work of Benjamin, Susan Buck-Morss contends that 
they are “mimetic representation[s]” that provide the “‘image’ to the concept.”51 She 
elaborates that: “The ‘visibility’ of the truth […] must be understood quite literally: the 
‘images’ were not symbols of the concepts, not poetic analogies for the social totality, but the 
real, material manifestation of both of them.”52 In the case of the allegory, the truth that is 
rendered visible is the dialectic of history. For Benjamin, the ultimate expression of this 
mimetic representation is the ruin as well as death’s head, both mainstays of allegorical 
painting: 
[...] in der Allegorie [liegt] die facies hippocratica der Geschichte als erstarrte 
Urlandschaft dem Betrachter vor Augen. Die Geschichte in allem was sie Unzeitiges, 
Leidvolles, Verfehltes von Beginn an hat, prägt sich in einem Antlitz—nein in einem 
Totenkopfe aus. 53  
In this example, the death’s head is not a symbol of the Hippocratic face of history, but also 
the concept itself, its manifestation as image. Just as the death’s head points to the past, that 
which has passed, it links this with the present as well, the human body that is always already 
undergoing its inevitable decay.54 The allegorical image thus becomes the space (the 
“Raumbild”) where the movement of history is frozen and the past and its connection to the 
present are mimetically represented.  
In line with Benjamin’s concept, allegory is the other, outer space of science fiction. 
                                                 
50 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, p. 197. 
51 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, p. 102. 
52 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, p. 102.  
53 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, pp. 182-183. 
54 Stead, “The Value of Ruins: Allegories of Destruction in Benjamin and Speer,” p. 55. 
152 
Whereas science fiction is the mimetic spatial representation of the future, the allegory carves 
out a space for past through the ruin. The emergence of history in the space of allegory 
reflects, moreover, Benjamin’s later criticism of science fiction as a desire to escape history 
altogether. In his essay, “Erfahrung und Armut,” Benjamin references two works from the 
German science fiction author Paul Scheerbart, Lesabéndio: Ein Asteroiden-Roman [1913] 
and Glasarchitektur [1914]. The poverty about which Benjamin speaks is one of experience 
as well as the desire to erase “die Spuren seinen Erdetagen,” to wipe away the traces of one’s 
history.55 In the works of Scheerbart, Benjamin notes, “legt [er] darauf den größten Wert, 
seine Leute […] in standesgemäßen Quartieren unterzubringen: in verschiebbaren 
beweglichen Glashäusern.”56 Glass, for Benjamin, is a peculiar material in that nothing 
clings to it and in this way Scheerbart dreams of and creates “Räume […], in denen es 
schwer ist, Spuren zu hinterlassen.”57 Science fiction is, however, not the sole locus of this 
desire. Rather, it is a representation of the bourgeoisie’s longing to commit the same erasure: 
Betritt einer das bürgerliche Zimmer der 80er Jahre, so ist bei aller “Gemütlichkeit,” 
die es vielleicht ausstrahlt, der Eindruck “hier hast du nichts zu suchen” der stärkste. 
Hier hast du nichts zu suchen — denn hier ist kein Fleck, auf dem nicht der 
Bewohner seine Spur schon hinterlassen hätte: auf den Gesimsen durch 
Nippessachen, auf dem Polstersessel durch Deckchen, auf den Fenstern durch 
Transparente, vor dem Kamin durch den Ofenschirm. Ein schönes Wort von Brecht 
hilft hier fort, weit fort:  
“Verwisch die Spuren!”58 
The bourgeoisie, the representative class of capital, is characterized by the wish to cover their 
tracks, to hide any stains of the past. The science fiction of Scheerbart with its futuristic glass 
                                                 
55 Benjamin, “Erfahrung und Armut,” in Gesammelte Schriften. Band II, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Scheppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 213-218, p. 217.  
56 Ibid., p. 216.  
57 Ibid. p. 217. 
58 Ibid. 
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buildings is the mimetic representation of this bourgeois, and by extension capitalist, desire 
to escape the past into a future where it is possible to completely erase its traces. The past of 
the allegory is seemingly swept away in science fiction. In its place, science fiction imagines 
the future as a space where, as with Scheerbart’s glass architecture and the bourgeois living 
room devoid of any lasting imprints, history is left behind. Moreover, this is the attitude of 
capital vis-à-vis history as well. 
While Benjamin is critical of science fiction’s desire to create spaces in which no 
historical traces remain, it renders, at the same time, this desire visible for representation. 
This is evident in what Benjamin views as the other characteristic of glass: “Das Glas ist 
überhaupt der Feind des Geheimnises. Es ist auch der Feind des Besitzes.”59 Glass is not only 
the material to which nothing clings, but that which carries no secrets and opposes 
possession. The architecture of science fiction reflects the functioning of the commodity, 
what Marx terms the “Ausgangspunkt des Kapitals:” 
Das Geheimnisvolle der Warenform besteht also einfach darin, daß sie den Menschen 
die gesellschaftlichen Charaktere ihrer eignen Arbeit als gegenständliche Charaktere 
der Arbeitsprodukte selbst […] zurückspiegelt, daher auch das gesellschaftliche 
Verhältnis der Produzenten zur Gesamtarbeit als ein außer ihnen existierendes 
gesellschaftliches Verhältnis von Gegenständen. Durch dies Quidproquo werden die 
Arbeitsprodukte Waren, sinnlich übersinnliche oder gesellschaftliche Dinge.60 
Thus, the glass buildings of Scheerbart’s science fiction expose the secret of the commodity, 
its reification of labor that results in its cognitively estranging effect as something both 
perceptible and imperceptible (“sinnlich übersinnlich”). Or, as Benjamin summarizes quoting 
André Gide: “Jedes Ding, das ich besitzen will, wird mir undurchsichtig.”61 Science fiction 
                                                 
59 Benjamin, “Erfahrung und Armut,” p. 217. 
60 Marx, Das Kapital Band I, in Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 23 (Berlin: Dietz, 1968), p. 161, 86. 
61 Benjamin, “Erfahrung und Armut,” p. 217. 
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possesses then the dual quality of representing the desire of capital to escape history as well 
as its mysterious and secretive nature, the very structure of capital that rests on making itself 
both known and unknown. 
Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang is just such a combination of allegory and 
science fiction. Kluge’s story centers on four “Experten,” Franz Zwicki, Stefan Boltzmann, 
A. Dorfmann, and von Ungern-Sternberg.62 The story opens in the year 2103 more than a 
century after the outbreak of the “Schwarze[n] Krieg” that began in 1981 (LP, 251). Light-
years away from their devastated terrestrial home, the four comrades are left with no other 
choice than to come to terms with their own history: 
[…] ohne Chance einer Rückkehr zu den übrigen Menschen und ohne hinreichenden 
Grund noch weiter vorzustoßen […], waren sie selber vor die Situation gestellt, sich 
mit ihrer Geschichte auseinanderzusetzen. Einen anderen Gegenstand der Aneignung 
hatten sie nun nicht mehr. Wir durch ein Zauberwort schienen Zukunft, Gegenwart 
wie weggeblasen. (LP, 251) 
Kluge’s text opens then with an emphasis not on the future per se, but rather with a 
retrospective look from the future backwards to the historical events that led to these future 
catastrophes. Without the prospect of a future or a present, the four comrades only have 
history at their disposal. The motivation for Kluge’s science fiction story, what drives its four 
protagonists to remember and account for their history is the ultimate catastrophe, the 
annihilation of the Earth. As Leslie A. Adelson remarks, Lernprozesse “seems to ask what 
happens to the material substance of human experience when matter as such is vastly 
transformed.”63 With the destruction of the Earth, mankind finds itself bereft of the material 
necessary for experience as well as for a materialist view of history. Benjamin’s 
                                                 
62Alexander Kluge, Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), p. 250. 
Henceforth cited parenthetically as LP.  
63 Leslie A. Adelson, “Experiment Mars,” p. 34. 
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“allegorische Betrachtung” as the “weltliche Exposition der Geschichte als 
Leidensgeschichte der Welt” realizes here the last “Stationen ihres Verfalls,” where there is 
nothing but decay and destruction.64 Lernprozesse begins as an allegory, an engagement with 
the past through an investigation of the ruins left in the wake of the Earth’s destruction. In 
Lernprozesse, the ruin left behind propels the story of the four protagonists and the 
accompanying allegorical images in the text.65 
While the text begins with the history-focused end station of the four protagonists’ 
interplanetary journey and thus commences as allegory, the astronauts’ travels through outer 
space are only possible thanks to the stuff of science fiction. The experts’ story together 
begins in the Battle of Stalingrad centuries before their seemingly hopeless orbit around a 
distant star.66 Realizing the hopelessness of the Battle of Stalingrad, the four protagonists 
depart eastward on foot (“zu Fuß”) in the direction of China and eventually end up in the 
United States where they board a spaceship in order to flee the destruction of Earth (LP, 
269). Apart from the very improbability of this feat, Kluge’s word play is worth noting here: 
“Das ist die ‘Quantenmechanik’ (Quanten=Füße) der Geschichte,” Rainer Stollmann 
contends.67 By virtue of quantum mechanics, the experts are able to escape Stalingrad. 
Although this appears as simply a cunning etymological excursion on Kluge’s part, the 
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experts’ names tie them to real people and real scientific developments. As Stollmann further 
elucidates, the name Stefan Boltzmann is an amalgamation of two renowned physicists: Josef 
Stefan and Ludwig Boltzmann.68 The post-Newtonian work of Stefan and his student 
Boltzmann resulted in the latter’s theory of entropy, which, as Stollmann states, “braucht zur 
Vorhersage der Zukunft keine Vergangenheit, sondern nur den gegenwärtigen Zustand eines 
Systems.”69 Further, Franz Zwicky is based on the astrophysicist and rocket specialist Fritz 
Zwicky who, Stollmann notes, worked in Pasadena from 1952-1968 on “Projekt für 
Mondlandeflüge.”70 Thus, the experts’ escape from their potentially perilous fate on the 
Russian front is itself an act of science fiction. At the same time, however, it is precisely the 
element of science fiction that necessitates the allegory. Entropy and rocket technology, as 
the basis of the science fictional in Lernprozesse, enable the protagonists to survive in the 
future irrespective of the past. Moreover, the present system, from which this entropy as well 
as the flight into outer space are derived, is capital. 
The future of Lernprozesse is dominated by what Suvin terms the “pseudo-novum” of 
capital.71 That is, it mirrors the incessant commodity circulation of capital that Suvin 
characterizes, referencing Benjamin, as reflecting “‘the illusion of novelty […] in the illusion 
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of infinite sameness.’”72 Thus, following Suvin, Lernprozesse exhibts a “tension between 
novum and pseudo-novum.”73 Where the pseudo-novum of capital secures the continuation 
of the new as always the same, the new interstellar capital as a repetition of the old terrestrial 
one, the true novum in this work of science fiction lies in the past that capital tries to escape, 
the past that is reconstructed through allegory and the ruins of the end of the Earth. As the 
mediating category between cognition and estrangement, the dialectic of the known and 
unknown, the novum in Lernprozesse is the very functioning of capital rendered visible, the 
revelation of its secretive nature. This is accomplished through the allegory. For Benjamin, 
allegory goes away empty handed: (“Leer aus geht die Allegorie”) insofar as “[es] bedeutet 
genau das Nichtsein dessen, was es vorstellt.”74 As Cowan aptly summarizes, allegory, in 
accordance with its etymology as “other-discourse (allegoria),” always “point[s] elsewhere 
than to [its] supposed ‘proper’ meaning[].”75 Whereas Lernprozesse as science fiction 
renders the structure of future capital in outer space capital visible, the allegory confronts it 
with its past, the other of science fiction and the space of alterity to capital (or in Chu’s terms 
it is the 1/x to capital’s x). In other words, the story that the four protagonists tell together 
using allegorical images interspersed throughout the text are not necessarily representations 
of the future, but rather the history of the future—they are the other of the outer space of 
capital. Like ruins, the allegorical narrative and concomitant images point to something 
outside themselves, outside the story of capital’s interplanetary survival. In a word, they 
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point to the catastrophic past. Lernprozesse is a hybrid comprised of both characteristics of 
allegory and its concerns rooted in the catastrophic past and the future-driven logic of capital. 
This fusion affords the text a means by which both to extrapolate capital’s future in the 
extreme and to stage its critique, the history told by the four astronauts, albeit only after it is 
too late. At the same time, however, the text survives as a document of the catastrophic 
future of capital that serves as a critique of the capital’s present.   
 
Lernprozesse as Outer Space  
 
Kluge’s Lernprozesse is by no means a simple text. It lacks a cohesive narrative 
structure, jumping as quickly through various temporalities as it does spaces. It opens in the 
22nd century, moves to a brief discussion of the outbreak of the war in 1981, then tracks the 
four protagonists’ journey from Stalingrad (January, 1943) through China (Spring, 1943) to 
the U.S.A (1949) before arriving in outer space (1981), and ends in the century in which it 
began. Moreover, the four experts are by no means the sole focus of the story. Their story 
provides a frame that envelops the larger narrative of intergalactic capital after the apparent 
destruction of Earth. Kluge’s insertion of various images, from photographs and drawings to 
collages, along with the displacement of the protagonists’ story largely into footnotes further 
interrupts up the flow of the narrative. All of this is, to be sure, intentional on Kluge’s part. 
Christian Schulte summarizes the calculated complexity of Kluge’s work thusly, 
So vermittelt z.B. organisches Erzählen—schon aufgrund seines souverän 
anmutenden Gestus—den Eindruck, die Welt lasse sich au seiner einzigen 
Perspektive als homogener Kosmos darstellen, der immer noch der Botmäßigkeit des 
Subjekts unterstehe—ein Geltungsanspruch, der sich in der Erzählweise selbst 
manifestiert, und eine Schein-Sicherheit, die darüber betrügt, daß das 
Wirklichkeitsverhältnis des Menschen längst dadurch geprägt ist, daß ihm die äußere 
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Welt eher kollisionsartig begegenet, daß es ihm die Dinge, um mit Benjamin zu 
reden, “viel zu brennend […] auf den Leib gerückt” sind, als daß er noch 
“Perspektiven und Prospekte”, souveräne Standpunkte einnehmen könnte.76 
Lernprozesse’s convoluted structure thus not only mirrors the complexity of the reality of 
capital that is passed off as simplistic and understandable through traditional narrative 
structures, but in doing so critiques it. Indeed, as Kluge states in the preface of Lernprozesse, 
“Sinnentzug. Eine gesellschaftliche Situation, in der das kollektive Lebensprogramm von 
Menschen schneller zerfällt, als die Menschen neue Lebensprogramme produzieren können” 
(LP, 5). Lernprozesse is thus, a mimetic representation of this withdrawl of both meaning and 
sensuousness, which is the foundation of capital’s suvival in outer space; in other words, it is 
predicated on severing any and all connections to its catastophic past. The emphasis on the 
lack of meaningful connections that frames Lernprozesse has a theoretical precedent in Negt 
and Kluge’s Public Sphere and Experience [1972] that appeared just one year before. As 
they state: 
Proletarisches Leben bildet keinen Zusammenhang, sondern ist durch die Blockierung 
seiner wirklichen Zusammenhänge gekennzeichnet. Die Form des gesellschaftlichen 
Erfahungshorizontes, die diesen Blockierungszusammenhang nicht aufhebt, sondern 
befestigt, ist die bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit.77 
In Negt and Kluge’s analysis, the bourgeois public sphere, as the dominant public sphere of 
capital, is based on blocking the production of connections. Kluge’s artistic and theoretical 
works might therefore be seen as attempts to put this process of dissociation endemic to the 
present on display in a dystopic future. 
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In depicting this process, rendering the withdrawal of capital from its past visible, to 
speak with Chu, Lernprozesse as a text becomes a space of contradiction between capital’s 
past and future. It both mimetically represents capital’s future in outer space and presents it 
alongside the past that it continually attempts to outrun. Thus, the text itself does not 
reestablish the connections, reconciling the past with its present future and therewith 
collapsing any contradiction. Rather, it presents them as a series of fragments that, 
allegorically, refute the false appearance of totality. As Schulte contends, Kluge’s work 
displays “den fehlenden Zusammenhang [...] statt bloß das Resultat des Prozesses 
abzubilden.”78 In this way, Lernprozesse as a text becomes an allegory, an accumulation of 
the ruins of capital’s past; it is a science fiction story about capital in outer space that self-
reflexively folds back on itself to perform a critique of what it displays, namely capital’s 
temporal split. It has often been noted that Kluge’s texts themselves, in fact, resemble ruins. 
As Hans Magnus Enzensberger remarks in his 1978 review of Kluge’s Neue Geschichten: 
“Sein Buch macht den Eindruck eines Trümmerfelds. Zum formalen Prinzip des Erzählens 
ist hier die Katastrophe gemacht worden.”79 Matthias Uecker also proposes the ruin-like 
nature of Kluge’s texts. Discussing the multimedia quality of Kluge’s works, Uecker states:  
Allerdings handelt es sich bei diesen Bauteilen nicht um homogene, beliebig 
kombinierbare Materialien, sondern um durchweg schon einmal bearbeitete und nun 
aus ihren ursprünglichen Zusammenhängen herausgerissene Materialien, die wie 
Trümmer die Spuren ihres früheren Gebrauchs noch mit sich führen.80 
Similarly, Schulte sees Kluge’s work as a secularized version of the writing on the wall that 
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appeared to King Belshazzar announcing his impending doom: “Hier sind es die Untergänge 
selbst, die Katastrophen der Geschichte, die als ‘Schriften and der Wand,’ als Vorboten 
weiterer Untergänge in der Zukunft zu entziffern sind.”81 Further, Schulte contends, the raw 
materials (“Rohstoff”), photographs, drawings, quotes etc., that comprise Kluge’s work “sind 
[selbst] zu Menetekeln avanciert, weil sie dem Menschen fremd und abstrakt 
gegenüberstehen und ihren Sinn nicht mehr herausgeben.”82 As an agglomeration of various 
raw materials, Lernprozesse parallels with its predominant juxtaposition of images and texts 
Benjamin’s case for allegorical ruins that always point at something beyond themselves, 
always refusing to forfeit their meaning.83  
 Kluge’s apposition of images and texts, Lewandowski notes, appears for the first time 
in his literary work with Lernprozesse.84 This feature of Kluge’s text not only attempts to 
mirror, as Schulte states above, the complexity of the reality of capital, but is also “eine 
multimediale Versuchsanordnung, die den klassischen Einteilungen in Genres, in Ober- und 
Unterbegriffe eine experimentelle Vielfalt entgegensetzt.”85 In this way, Kluge’s science 
fiction text about the future of capital is also a pseudo-documentary. That is, the images lend 
the story a feigned authenticity.86 It does not fantastically divorce itself from the world, but 
rather in line with the characteristics of science-fiction and utopia outlined above, 
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Lernprozesse creates a “this-worldly Other World” based on cognitive estrangement. In other 
words, the images aid in simultaneously creating a world that is fundamentally different yet 
possible, validated in a way by the faked authenticity of the various images that serve as 
documents of this future outer space. At the same time, however, the images produce a 
tension between the narrative of the extraterrestrial survival of capital and the documents of 
its future. As Uecker argues, “So haben doch die Effekte des Medientransfers und die 
Reibungen zwischen den aus unterschiedlichen Medien stammenden Rohstoffen einen 
wesentlichen Anteil an der [...] Wirkung seiner Arbeit.”87 The friction produced through the 
juxtaposition of images and texts, Uecker maintains, their simultaneous connection and 
contrast, creates the space of the text.88 This friction is, moreover, caused by the 
contradiction produced through the combination of allegory and science fiction, past and 
future. Lernprozesse’s unusual, complicated, and often confusing juxtapositions between text 
and image thus creates the outer space of capital out of contradiction and in doing so also 
produces a text that is itself this (outer)space, the site of friction between capital’s past and 
future.  
The task of establishing the meaning of Lernprozesse that purposefully refuses to 
divulge it is, undoubtedly, a complicated one. One way to do accomplish this is through an 
exploration of the various spaces of capital in the text. Outer space is by no means empty 
space for Kluge. In Lernprozesse, capital expands into outer space, conquering new spaces 
and fortifying its colonization of already existing spaces, for example planets, which become 
sites of raw materials and resources. Outer space is, in short, filled with spaces that capital 
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can take over or award with value in the service of securing its future survival. In addition to 
numerous planets, the spaces of capital in Lernprozesse are comprised of outposts and 
juridical buildings as well as roving space flotillas. With the construction of these various 
spaces, capital reestablishes itself in the wake of the destruction of Earth. Moreover, these 
spaces mirror their terrestrial predecessors. Whereas each of these spaces are manifestations 
of interstellar capital, they are, at the same time, the ruins of the Earth’s past, the remnants of 
capital hurled into outer space. Theses spaces thus contain a science fictional as well as 
allegorical component and demands to be read in two ways accordingly: as visible 
representations of capital’s future in outer space and as the visible spatial ruins of its past. 
They are therefore always the other of what they appear to be, namely the new spaces of 
capital that have divorced themselves spatially and temporally from space and time of Earth. 
Succeeding in this manner, it will be shown that capital’s construction and colonization of 
outer space in Lernprozesse, similar to exploration of postcolonial spaces, establishes the text 
itself as a utopian space of contradiction. That is, Lernprozesse manipulates the space of the 
text and thereby creates a space for the critique of capital, the past that is always the other of 
capital’s future. In an effort to survey the terrain of capital’s outer space, let us begin with the 
outposts and buildings of the new interstellar capital that dot Kluge’s narrative before 
moving on to the planets, and lastly the spaceships that ferry capital into the far reaches of 
outer space. 
 
The Outer Spaces of Capital 
 
In the direct aftermath of the “Schwarzer Krieg,” those who managed to escape find 
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themselves on Mars from where they attempt to assess the damage. On their new Martian 
outpost, the survivors send out satellite probes that send back the following information: 
Das Erdinnere tritt nach außen. Teile des Atlantikwassers verschwinden in einem 
Schlund. Wenige Stunden später zerbricht die Erde in mehrere zerklüftete Teile, von 
der gemeinsamen Schwerkraft zusammengehalten. “Das war kein Ball mehr, das 
waren zwei längliche Trümmerklumpen.” (LP, 257) 
When the “Mars-Institut” dispatches these probes to investigate the clump of ruins that now 
form a ring revolving around the remains of Earth’s gravitational field, the signal disappears 
(LP, 257). Unable to explore the terrestrial ruins, the former inhabitants of Earth are left 
without a history. Without a history, the text proffers the following question: “sind die Reste 
der Menschheit auf Planet Mars noch wirklich menschliche Wesen” (LP, 263)? Responding 
to this question, Hinnercke, the founder of space law, states: 
Der Kollege von der Urlaubsstelle des Immanuel-Kant-Instituts—alles 
Rekonvaleszenten, aber noch denkfähig—meint, daß nach Untergang der 
menschlichen Gesellschaft, wie er sich ausdrückt und ohne die 
Menschheitsgeschichte […] wir uns nicht einmal als menschliche Wesen bezeichnen 
können. […] Er meint, wir wären nicht einmal Kannibalen oder Neanderthaler, 
sondern Nichts. (LP, 263) 
Without a material history, humanity itself is reduced to nothing. How, Hinnerecke inquires, 
can something come from nothing, from the zero-point of history? Hinnercke’s interlocutor, 
Dennerlein, the head of the surgical ward as well as the transport school, answers this 
question in a footnote: 
Man kann keine Transporte durchführen, die sich auf ein ‘Wohin’ beziehen, wenn 
man nicht klar das ‘Woher’ bestimmen kann. Kommen wir von Nichts, so sehe ich 
nicht, wie wir von da wieder wegkommen wollen. Von Nichts kann man nicht starten, 
wenn ich das einmal philosophisch ausdrücken darf. (LP, 263) 
With nothing to grasp onto, no ruins of their history with which to orient themselves, the 
survivors of planetary destruction are doomed to a timeless, future, a “wohin” without a 
“woher.” In short, they are doomed to continue the expansion of capital. 
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This central problem rooted in the absence of a past is, however, precisely the 
precondition for the continuation of capital in outer space. The Martian outpost becomes a 
representation of capital’s genesis from nothing. In volume three of Das Kapital Marx 
describes the process through which capital is created seemingly out of thin air: 
Der Staat hat seinen Gläubigern jährlich ein gewisses Quantum Zins für das geborgte 
Kapital zu zahlen. Der Gläubiger kann hier nicht seinem Schuldner aufkündigen, 
sondern nur die Forderung, seinen Besitztitel darüber, verkaufen. Das Kapital selbst 
ist aufgegessen, verausgabt vom Staat. Es existiert nicht mehr. Was der 
Staatsgläubiger besitzt, ist 1. ein Schuldschein auf den Staat, sage von 100 Pfd.St.; 2. 
gibt dieser Schuldschein ihm den Anspruch auf die jährlichen Staatseinnahmen, d.h. 
das jährliche Produkt der Steuern, für einen gewissen Betrag, sage 5 Pfd.St. oder 5%; 
3. kann er diesen Schuldschein von 100 Pfd.St. beliebig an andre Personen verkaufen. 
Ist der Zinsfuß 5%, und dazu Sicherheit des Staats vorausgesetzt, so kann der Besitzer 
A den Schuldschein in der Regel zu 100 Pfd.St. an B verkaufen; denn für B ist es 
dasselbe, ob er 100 Pfd.St. zu 5% jährlich ausleiht, oder ob er durch Zahlung von 100 
Pfd.St. sich einen jährlichen Tribut vom Staat zum Betrage von 5 Pfd.St. sichert. Aber 
in allen diesen Fällen bleibt das Kapital, als dessen Abkömmling (Zins) die 
Staatszahlung betrachtet wird, illusorisch, fiktives Kapital. Nicht nur, daß die Summe, 
die dem Staat geliehen wurde, überhaupt nicht mehr existiert. Sie war überhaupt nie 
bestimmt, als Kapital verausgabt, angelegt zu werden, und nur durch ihre Anlage als 
Kapital hätte sie in einen sich erhaltenden Wert verwandelt werden können.89 
In Marx’ example of the flow of capital in financing state debt, capital is revealed as purely 
fictitious and illusory, as never having existed in the first place. The interest, or profit, that is 
gained, what could be considered value, is generated from an investment that was never 
intended to be capital, yet this is nevertheless what is produced. In this instance, capital 
emerges from nothing, or from the not-yet-existent future as speculation for future profit. 
“Die Bildung des fiktiven Kapitals,” Marx continues, “nennt man kapitalisieren.”90 The 
Martian outpost represents this quandary of fictive capital, itself cognitively estranging as 
both something and nothing, and renders the process of capitalization visible for 
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representation. Surviving the destruction of the Earth in outer space is to create something 
from nothing, to repeat the movement of fictive capital and create it for it a space in the 
future. At the same time, the creation of something from nothing is precisely the function of 
science-fiction and utopian literature. The worlds they create are both novel and new, related 
to and necessarily divorced and distanced from our own. Lernprozesse takes part as well in 
the construction of a fictitious outer space ruled by intergalactic capital. This creation is thus 
part of capital and opposed to it. Kluge’s work not only creates this fictitious outer space, but 
also its allegorical other that emerges out of the fictive realm of both capital and science 
fiction.   
The establishment of the first Martian outpost for capital’s intergalactic expansion is, 
however, just the beginning. As capital continues its expansion into and colonization of outer 
space it constructs for itself along the way more spaces of value. One of these main spaces in 
Lernprozesse is the juridical complex concentrated on the planet “Tauta Eridani” (LP, 334). 
Further, the juridical buildings and indeed the judicial system as a whole have been 
purchased by large corporations: 
Die Großen Gesellschaften hatten hier Delegationen ihrer Rechtsabteilungen jeweils 
in Sonderpalästen untergebracht. Ein Unternehmer Berlinger hatte einen Konzern 
zusammengebracht, der die Aktivitäten Wahrheitsfindung, Rechtsvertretung, 
Vertragskontrolle und Rechtsanfertigung umfaßte. […] Die Großen Gesellschaften, 
die besondere Rechtsvertretungsbüros besaßen, so daß man von ihnen auch Recht 
kaufen konnte, gingen von der Berechnung aus, daß alle Richter des Justizplaneten 
überlastet waren. (LP, 335) 
As with the Martian outpost, the juridical complex on the planet Tauta Eridani is a science 
fictional rendering of capital, here the wholesale purchase of the law. Relocated to a far-off 
planet, future capital appears at once familiar and strange. The images that accompany this 
section underscore the novelty of interstellar capital while simultaneously serving an 
allegorical function. The first shows a single classical rotunda set back against a desolate 
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landscape almost enveloped by the immense courtyard leading up to it (figure 2, LP, 336). 
 
Figure 6 
This image of the first building established on Mars carries the traces of its terrestrial past. 
Nothing in the image reveals its extraterrestrial nature and it appears to be plucked directly 
from the Earth and relocated to a distant planet. Its very insertion into the text, however, 
redoubles its ruinous quality whereby it not only establishes the connection between the 
image and the preceding text, but between the image and its past, its assimilation of 
terrestrial capital. By displacing this building not only into outer space but also temporally 
into the future, Kluge creates a second-order ruin that reestablishes its temporality. In other 
words, it regains its temporal force by freezing the incessant forward movement of capital 
and rendering it available for representation in the text. The text, then, becomes the outer 
space of both the intergalactic future of capital as well as its past. Where capital sheds its past 
during its spatial and temporal forward march, Lernprozesse creates a space in which its 
future and past exist side by side.  
The second image in this section depicts an array of similarly styled rotundas set 
against a stellar background with the caption: “10 Jahre später: Die Justizpaläste des Sektors 
Schwan im Osten des Zentralen Justizplaneten” (figure 3, LP, 337). This progression from 
the solitary building almost engrossed by its surrounding landscape to numerous such 
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buildings seemingly piled on top of one another renders the preceding image a ruin in its own 
right, one overtaken by both the spatial compression and temporal span of the succeeding 
image. 
 
Figure 7 
One building amidst this mélange, however, stands out. Front and center is a particular 
structure that Negt and Kluge expound on in the “Kommentare” to Öffentlichkeit und 
Erfahrung, namely Étienne-Louis Boullée’s “Kenotaph für einen Krieger.”91 Negt and Kluge 
describe this work by the neoclassicist architect from the French Revolution in the following 
terms: “Ein römischer Sarkophag wird heir zu einem Riesensarg vergrößert. In diesem 
gewaltigen Bauwerk kann kein einzelner mehr liegen. Der Sargdeckel ließ sich durch 
niemand heben. Überlebensgröße, aber fast uniforme Krieger bilden den Fries.”92 What 
stands out for them in such structures (among which the Tower of Babel also counts) is the 
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way in which they “versuchen, politische Gedanken mit archtektonischen Mitteln 
auszudrücken, die Architektur soll ‘sprechen,’ ‘erzählen.’”93 That which is told or expressed 
by the cenotaph is capital’s reification of labor: 
Überall die Idee, einen neuen Lebenszyklus zu setzen, überholt von der Tendenz, das 
zur Verfügung stehende Material, das objektive Können, das die menschlichen 
Lebeninteressen hinter sich läßt, in Gang zu bringen und als ungeheure, bloß 
objektive Sammlung von Eigenschaften und Kräften zur selbstdarstellung zu 
bringen.94  
Boullée’s grand cenotaph is the architectural embodiment of this idea; what is expressed is 
not the value of the labor that went into its construction, but rather the reification thereof in 
both the assemblage of capital required to bring such monolithic structures about at all. Put 
differently, it is a manifestation of capital’s objective, material ability to produce 
monumental spaces regardless of the life interests among the laborers required to make them 
reality. It is not the characteristics and forces that have constructed this space of capital that 
are rendered available for representation, but rather the ability of capital to turn these into 
spatial representations of itself.  
 This oversized, non-functional cenotaph is the ultimate expression of the belief and 
desire of capital to be able to overcome anything, including the destruction of Earth and 
survive thereby in and through such spaces. This desire for immortality is what Negt and 
Kluge see in such structures. “Die Entwürfe,” they state, “scheinen bereits den 
Ruinencharakter, die Wiederentdeckung des Bauwerks, den Ewigkeitsaspekt, 
vorauszuplanen.”95 This ruinous characteristic coupled with the desire for eternality is, they 
add, precisely what National Socialism attempted to emulate through Albert Speer’s 
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architecture. In Lernprozesse, however, it is capital that has built this future-oriented, 
immortal ruinous character into the future in outer space. At the same time, however, this 
longing for immortality and eternity, expressed through such grandiose architecture acquires 
in Lernprozesse an altogether different, allegorical meaning. Here such structures are 
permeated by the history that brought them as ruins into outer space. This is both the history 
of the end of the Earth and the history of capital necessary for the construction of these 
edifices. In the cenotaph, which is too large to house any one person, both histories are 
embodied in one structure: the history of the future of capital converges here with the history 
of war and catastrophe that initiated its intergalactic exodus. Kluge’s collage of recognizable, 
terrestrial buildings against the backdrop of outer space fulfills the functions of science 
fiction by representing the future of capital as well as those of allegory by reestablishing the 
its history through the countervailing characteristics of the ruin. In these buildings, the spaces 
of capital are overlapped and countered by their allegorical other. Moreover, this image 
accomplishes in miniature what the text does as a whole. That is, as with the collage, 
Lernprozesse is a space in which the outer space of capital confronts and exists 
contradictorily alongside the past that it longs to escape. 
 The construction of new spaces of capital in outer space, from the first Martian 
outpost to the juridical buildings, is essentially a form of terraforming. The planets 
themselves become the new habitats for capital in the wake of the terrestrial catastrophe. The 
issue of terraforming is a central concern for Chu in his analysis of science fiction. Referring 
to Kim Stanley Robinsons’ Mars trilogy, Chu argues that “the science fiction of terraforming 
[…] open[s] up a narrative space in which globalization is made available for concrete 
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representation.”96 Central to science fiction’s representation of terraforming, Chu adds, is the 
“logic of simile” whereby the new terraformed planet is explicitly compared to and is a 
representation of Earth.97 Through the simile, the spatial and temporal dimensions of new 
planets in outer space are tied to the spaces and temporality on Earth. Just as Chu finds in 
Robinson’s work the representation of a new internationalism on terraformed Mars that 
mirrors the globalization of Earth, so too does Lernprozesse render capital’s continued 
expansion and exploitation of other worlds available for easy recognition. 
Globalized capital and its exploitative terraforming extend from the Martian outpost 
and the juridical planet Tauta Eridani to other planets and other celestial bodies that are 
mined for their natural resources. Prime examples of terraforming are the three planets in the 
system “Dogkart” (LP, 338). This planetary system was originally colonized (“besiedelt”) 
following an expedition from the already terraformed Mars outpost (LP, 338). One of the 
three planets, Pinzgau, is already under the control of capital, the Suez-Canal Corporation. 
The other two, however, are inhabited by members of a commune: 
Diese Kommune besiedelte Planet II, indem sie einen Stahlglaspavillion auf einem 
der Kontinente errichtete, die sich aus der gallertartigen Masse aus Öl, Wasserstoff 
und Metallspuren, die auf diesem Planeten als “Meere” aufzufassen war, 
heraushoben. Sie hatten zeitlebens Schwierigkeiten, ihre Besitzergreifung gegenüber 
den Großen Gesellschaften aufrechtzuerhalten. […] Die Gesellschaften strengten in 
Abständen Prozesse an, um durch den Beweis der Besitzaufgabe die Löschung der 
Eintragung zu erreichen. Hielt sich das Kollektiv der Peickerts, das gern 
zusammenbleiben wollte, auf Planet I auf, so wurde der Besitz von Planet II 
bezweifelt. (LP, 338)  
Through the logic of simile, the planets in the system of Dogkart are representations of both 
globalized capital’s colonization and exploitation of other planets, as well as its mirror image 
                                                 
96 Chu, Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep?, p. 102. Robinson’s Mar’s trilogy consists of Red Mars [1993], 
Green Mars [1994], and Blue Mars [1996]. 
97 Ibid., p. 102 
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on Earth. The planets have continents and oceans, two terms that are respectively italicized or 
quoted emphasizing both their similarity to and difference from their former terrestrial 
counterparts. More importantly, however, are the planets’ terrestrially similar resources, 
namely oil, metal, and hydrogen that large corporations wish to extract.  
The problem is that the commune has already secured at least one of the planets for 
themselves for precisely those same reasons. In order to maintain their rights to the planets 
and their resources, the commune devises a plan to connect the planets through a series of 
pipelines, thus establishing a “physisch-dingliche Verbindung zwischen beiden 
Himmelkörpern, die sie im juristischen Sinne zu einem einzigen untrennbaren Körper 
vereinigte” (LP, 338, see figure 4, LP, 339).  
 
Figure 4 
This image, which originates from Grandville’s illustrated work Un Autre Monde [1843/44], 
is discussed by Benjamin in his Arcades Project (Das Passagen-Werk) [1928-29/1934-1940]. 
For Benjamin, Granville’s sketches of imaginary worlds reflect the commodity fetish of 
capital extended into outer space. “Die Mode,” Benjamin writes, “schreibt das Ritual vor, 
nach dem der Fetisch Ware verehrt sein will. Grandville dehnt ihren Anspruch auf die 
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Gegenstände des alltäglichen Gebrauchs so gut wie auf den Kosmos aus.”98 Echoing 
Benjamin, the extraterrestrial planets in Lernprozesse are little more than valued 
commodities. Further, just as Benjamin detects an antagonism (“Zwiespalt”) between the 
utopian and cynical character of Grandville’s work, for the commune as well it is both their 
utopian planet outside and the very site of capital.99 The commune must, then, surrender to 
the ritual of commodity fetishism in order to safeguard their planet. That is, the solution to 
the juridico-capital control of the corporations itself necessitates a form of globalized 
reification, creating a “physisch-dingliche Verbindung” thereby collapsing the time and 
space between the two remaining planets in Dogkart (LP, 338). As with the global war that 
destroyed the Earth and the continuation thereof by globalized capital, however, this plan is 
destined to fail. 
 The problem with the commune’s idea is also the same as the time-space compression 
of capital that causes time and space to collapse in on itself.100 In short, the root of the 
problem is interplanetary terraforming. While they are able to construct the pipelines, the 
interplanetary bridges between the two planets, the orbits and the gravity of the different 
planets make this feat impossible. This is demonstrated in the accompanying image (figure 4, 
LP, 339). As the caption to this image makes clear, such a bridging of planets is hopeless: 
“Selbstverständlich ist diese Brücke bei der Bewegungsmechanik wirklicher Planeten nicht 
herstellbar, da die Himmeskörper sich auf Umlaufbahnen bewegen und zu keinem Zeitpunkt 
                                                 
98 Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, p. 51. 
99 Ibid. 
100 See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), p. 230. 
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‘stillehalten’” (LP, 339). Since actual planets never remain still, but are subject to the 
movements of space and time (their spatial orbits correspond to particular temporal 
durations), such a bridge is impossible. The globalized terraforming connecting the planets in 
Dogkart is slated a priori for catastrophe. The problem of the bridge is, however, “eher zu 
meistern als eine juristische Auseinandersetzung mit den Rechtsabteilungen der Großen 
Gesellschaften” (LP, 339). As with its assimilation of the law, what capital is able to 
accomplish as capital (here globalization) is inaccessible to others. Capital is successful in 
interstellar terraforming due to its appropriation of the law that is itself the result of 
terraforming, the construction of the juridical spaces on the planet Tauta Eridani. What is 
rendered here available for representation (both as narrative and image) is precisely the 
collapse of time and space endemic to capital that ultimately results in catastrophe. The 
image of the interplanetary bridge, however, freezes the moment in time and space before 
everything breaks apart, accomplishing the spatiotemporal standstill that is necessary for the 
bridge to function. This can only last an instant as the planetary stasis already has its collapse 
built into it, it is already a ruin. In this allegorical image, capital is presented with its other, its 
past, before its immanent collapse in the future. In this way the tension between allegory and 
science fiction produced by the text succeeds in pulling apart the time-space compression of 
capital, if only for a moment, in order to demonstrate how just such a collapse of time and 
space resides at its core. 
  The creation of spaces of capital in outer space, from the original Martian outpost 
and the juridical buildings to the terraforming and exploitation of other planets, would, to be 
sure, be impossible without spaceships. Just as ships were imperative to imperial, colonial 
expansion in the search for new resources and spaces of capital, the new intergalactic 
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vehicles in Lernprozesse enable the continued pursuit and extension of capital in outer space. 
Indeed, such technical advancements in transportation are the precondition for capital’s 
acceleration and attenuated time-space compression.101 In Lernprozesse these mobile spaces 
of capital become the driving force of its interplanetary proliferation and moreover, visible 
representations of capital’s time-space compression in the service of extracting resources and 
thereby exploiting other worlds. What Chu terms “Spaceship Earth” becomes in 
Lernprozesse Spaceship Capital.102 “Spaceship Earth,” Chu argues, “literalizes time-space 
compression by framing the globalized world as part of a much vaster whole.”103 Chu, 
however, sees this much more optimistically. For him, Spaceship Earth and its crews “often 
function as microcosmic representations or the global community” which “forces humans to 
unite” and to “see themselves as a single species.”104 In Lernprozesse, spaceships are 
mimetic representations of the temporal and spatial movements of capital. 
Space travel enables capital to continually stay ahead of its catastrophic past. Indeed, 
the entire story of the four protagonists as the story of the movement of capital is an attempt 
to outrun history. The four experts’ journey from Earth into outer space is predicated on an 
extreme time-space compression (surviving not only hundreds of years into the future, but 
traversing large expanses of space seemingly effortlessly) that enables an escape from their 
past: 
ZWICKY: Unsere Geschichte lag doch hinter uns. Weder waren wir “Bürgerknechte”, 
noch “Lakaien der Bourgeoisie”, noch “infame Bürger”, noch “bürgerliche 
Speichellecker”. […] 
                                                 
101 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 232. 
102 Chu, Do Metaphors Dream of Literal Sleep, p. 104. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid., p. 105, 106.  
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DORFMANN: Als wir 1933, elf Jahre alt, “zu denken anfingen”, waren wir keine 
Bürger, sondern Nationalsozialisten. 
ZWICKY: Und diese Eigenschaft haben wir in Stalingrad zurückgelassen. Es war 
ungerecht, uns diese geschichtliche Einordnung anzuhängen, wenn wir hier weit weg 
von der Geschichte, in der wir groß geworden sind, in China hocken. (LP, 275) 
Aboard Spaceship Capital, the four experts are not only out to escape their National Socialist 
past they left behind in Stalingrad, but also the entire catastrophic past of capital’s various 
crises, or as Dorfmann states “Schneller gefahren, als die Krise folgen kann” (LP, 365). In 
doing so, outer space becomes a space in which the protagonists as well as capital can 
continue to exist regardless of the crises of their past. Relying on advancements in 
transportation, from the quantum mechanics that propelled them across Russia into China to 
the rocket propulsion that shot them into outer space, the four protagonists continually surf 
atop the wave of time-space compression of capital to their advantage. 
 Spaceships in Lernprozesse not only serve to escape the crises of capital’s past but to 
destroy this history altogether. This is the function of the “86. Raum-Gleitflotte.” Under the 
leadership of H. Dirksen, the 86th space flotilla is guided by his principle that the past poses 
the greatest threat to capital: 
Die abgestorbenen Zonen der Industrie, als eine hinter uns liegende “ungeheure 
Sammlung” von Sternen- und Kriegsverbrechen, zertrümmerten Rohstoffen und 
daran anhängenden Rest-Lebewesen, würden, wenn sie aus diesen Zonen ausbrächen 
und in die Gegenwart vordringen, die gesamte Produktion, so wie wir sie nun einmal 
eingerichtet haben, zerstören. Wir müssen diese Zonen der Vegangenheit 
hermetisch absperren. Wir müssen uns von unserer Geschichte trennen, auch wenn 
das manchem leid tun mag. (LP, 346) 
The modus operandi of this particular flotilla is then to traverse the outer reaches of space to 
hermetically seal off remnants of history, to cordon off this past that could destroy it were it 
to ever encroach on the present spaces capital. This turns out, however, to be no simple 
matter. The ruins of extinct zones of capital are rigged with traps that prove to be extremely 
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dangerous for the troops of the 86th space flotilla (LP, 346). In order to avoid damage by 
booby-trapped ruins, which here become quite literally stand-ins for the potential danger of 
history to capital, the flotilla prefers to annihilate these planets from afar, earning them the 
nickname “die Geschichtstöter:” “Deshalb landete keiner dieser Vergangenheitsschützer auf 
einzelnen Himmelskörpern, sondern sie zerstörten aus der Planetenumlaufbahn die Stätten, 
an denen Wärmeausstrahlung auf Lebewesen schließen ließ” (LP, 346). The spaceship of the 
history killers literalizes capital’s desire to erase its own past, ridding itself of this history to 
survive in the timeless future of outer space. 
Paradoxically, however, the “Geschichtstöter” serve an allegorical function, too, 
insofar as they become guardians of the past by destroying it. In his reading of Lernprozesse, 
Stollmann asserts: “Es findet Geschichtsproduktion statt durch das Abtöten von 
Geschichte.”105 That is, in destroying the zones of the past they create at the same time the 
very ruins that pose a threat to the future of capital. This also makes them a threat to capital 
in as much as their production of history and ruins condemns every other space of present 
and future capital to a catastrophic end. Accordingly, measures are taken to secure capital 
against the threat of the “Geschichtstöter:” 
Grundlage dieser Arbeitsweise war eine vollständige Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber den 
Werten, Rohstoffen, die hierbei zerstört wurden. Um eine Übertragung dieses 
besonderen Raubbau-Verfahrens auf die Industriezonen der Gegenwart 
auszuschließen, wurde die 116. Flotte ausgerüstet, die die produktive Gegenwart 
durch einen mächtigen, aber starren Sperriegel gegen eine mögliche Rückkehr der 86. 
Flotte schützte. (LP, 346) 
The eventual return of the “Geschichtstöter” of the 86th flotilla is, however, almost 
guaranteed. As soon as the present zones of industry reach the inevitable stage of the extinct 
ones, they too are subject to the same fate (figure 5, LP, 342). 
                                                 
105 Stollmann, “Schwarzer Krieg, Endlos,” p. 358. 
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Figure 5 
The above image of one of the industrialized zones in outer space is already an image of its 
past. It is a ruin of itself in that it will soon belong to one of the extinct industrialized zones 
that will find itself in the crosshairs of the 86th flotilla. Accordingly, capital must be secured 
against the history it creates, its crises and its own production of instant obsolescence. The 
86th flotilla thus creates capital’s space of alterity. Its very existence threatens the current 
spaces of capital, necessitating the deployment of the 116th flotilla. As with the terraforming 
of other planets, roving spaceships are a representation of both capital’s time-space 
compression (here literally through their destruction) as well as an allegorical representation 
of their decompression, reestablishing a time and space outside of capital. 
The benefits of this interstellar travel further allow capital to exploit not only the 
temporal side of the time-space compression, to elude the crises it initiates as a result thereof, 
but its spatial dimension as well. In short, the spaceships are arbiters of mobile capital, 
traversing the expanse of outer space in search of new resources as on Tauta Eridani. 
Boltzmann, for example, is in command of an expeditionary fleet on its way to survey other 
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planets when he exclaims: “Anschließend umkurvten die Schiffe den Planeten Pluto—einen 
Metallklumpen aus Gold, Osram und Platin in Planetengröße—sowie die rohstoffreichen 
Planeten III Alpha Zentauri, IV des Sirius. Diese Rohstoffe warteten, bewacht von der Flotte 
auf, ihre Verwertung” (LP, 304). Paradoxically, however, the spaceships’ incessant quest for 
resources results not necessarily in anything material, but rather in speculation and fictive 
capital. In the section titled “Eines Tages ist die Industrie ganz fort,” a manger describes how 
the planets become profitable without the industrial extraction of the raw materials: 
Zuletzt fuhren die Prospektoren, Ingenieure und Managing-Direktoren nur noch an 
den Planeten vorbei und produzieren bzw. verwerteten die Naturschätze im reinen 
Gedanken. Es ist die Konkurrenz der anderen, ebenfalls an den Planeten bzw. anderen 
Planeten vorbeireisenden Gesellschaften, die uns treibt Diese Verwertungsform bringt 
höhere Profite als der tatsächliche Abbau. Ich möchte es einmal so sagen: ein von 
Vertretern der Suezkanal-Gesellschaft bloß angeblickter Rohstoffplanet steigt in 
seinem Marktwert bereits derart ins Uferlose. (LP, 359) 
In this way, the very act of considering a planet profitable—its valuation—engenders capital 
before and, indeed, without the exploitation of its resources. Spaceship Capital is a mobile 
generator of capital merely by roaming outer space and surveying other planets (figure 6, LP, 
305). 
 
Figure 6 
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This above image—a screen capture of a video game transposed over a satellite photo—is 
appropriated to illustrate Boltzmann’s flotilla surveying a sun as an energy source. 
Boltzmann’s fly by (“Vorbeiflug”) has essentially created capital simply by being there and 
assessing this sun’s potential. The capital created by roving spaceships is the product of its 
time-space compression that allows it to collapse temporal and spatial barriers and, in doing 
so, glean more profit.  
The incessant temporal and spatial expansion of capital into the far reaches of outer 
space moves from the initial outposts on Mars, to the terraforming and colonization of other 
planets, and lastly to the spaceships that nomadically roam outer space in search of and 
creating capital. Each space demonstrates, moreover, that as capital progresses, it creates its 
own ruins from which it must constantly flee, until, in the end, the space of capital becomes a 
spaceship hurtling forward through time and space. As with the other spaces, the spaceships, 
from Boltzmann’s expeditionary force above to the history killers of the 86th flotilla, 
consume and exploit outer space leaving it essentially a used-up hull, tossed aside as a ruin of 
its past. As one section heading at the end of Lernprozesse reads: “Eines Tages ist die 
Industrie ganz fort” (LP, 358). Accordingly yet another expeditionary force is launched into 
the zone of the now-disappeared industry. Finding no traces of remaining capital, 
“Sternenzähler” Eduard Körner focuses his telescopes at the “Zonen der Vergangenheit” 
and the ruins of the planet Earth (LP, 360). He discovers that the planet in the wake of the 
catastrophe has not only developed an atmosphere but that there are “Terrassen, Gärten, 
Kanälen und Landstrichen […], die von den chinesischen Genossen nach der Katastrophe 
von 1981 wieder aufgebaut worden waren” (LP, 360). Before he can inform others of this 
incredible discovery, Körner is killed. No one ever learns that the ruins of Earth, the past that 
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capital abandoned, continue to exist. Körner’s death and with him the death of the knowledge 
about the terrestrial zone of the past dooms capital to a perpetual future, hopelessly in search 
of more raw materials and continually creating and jettisoning a catastrophic past in its wake. 
 
Conclusion: Back to the Future 
 
 This is the fate of the four protagonists who tell the story of the end of the world and 
the survival of capital in outer space. They too are fated to remain in outer space, without a 
chance of returning to the Earth. “Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang,” Stollmann writes, 
“kehrt die Robinsonade um – diese beginnt mit der Fiktion eines geschichtslosen 
Individuums, Lernprozesse endet dort.”106 At the end of the story, when it is no longer 
possible for the experts, in particular, and capital, in general, to continue moving forward and 
to find more raw materials they develop one final plan: 
Auf dem sechsten Planeten “ihrer” Riesensonne finden sie wälderbedeckte 
Kontinente. Mit den chemischen Waffen eines ihrer Rettungsboote “ritzten” sie das 
Abbild der Hymne des Sektors Morgenröte in die Wälder. […] Dieses Zeichen 
intelligenten Lebens mußte vorbeifahrenden Intelligenzwesen auffallen und sie zur 
Landung verlocken. (LP, 365) 
The last ditch effort of the four protagonists is thus to lure more capital and more willing 
labor that can be exploited to this planet by literally marking it as a space of capital.107 The 
final image in the text is a reproduction of the hymn of sector twilight, the score to to 
L’Aurore, or Twilight (figure 7, LP, 367).108  
                                                 
106 Rainer Stollmann, “Schwarzer Krieg, Endlos,” p. 362.  
107 As the footnote to this passage explains: “Vielleicht gelingt es auf diese Weise, doch noch Arbeitskräfte 
anzulocken, die sich als ‘Parnter’ auspressen lassen” (LP, 365).  
108 This from Victor Hugo’s poem of the same name set to music by Gabriel Fauré. 
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Figure 7 
The four protagonists literally carve the future, the continual dawn (“Morgenröte”) of capital 
into the landscapes of outer space. With this the spirit of capital seeks to carry on even deeper 
into outer space and into the future. As they state, however, should this plan fail, “bleiben sie 
als Geschichtsschreiber tätig” (LP, 365, footnote 4). Their decision to finally tell their story, 
the history of catastrophe and intergalactic capital, is only from the point when it is too late to 
change anything. Thus, unable to go back to Earth, to the zone of the past, the four 
protagonists must go back to the future of capital, carving a ruin into the plant so that capital 
can continue to temporally and spatially expand. 
In this way, Lernprozesse not only inverts the Robinsonade, but utopia as well. The 
four interstellar travelers remain in this dystopian outer space, trapped in the spatialized 
future of capital. At the same time, however, the text is able to accomplish that which eludes 
the four experts. Lernprozesse establishes a connection to their terrestrial home through the 
accumulated visual and narrative ruins of capital’s past, allegorical markers of the earthly 
183 
heritage of capital. That is, just as outer space is a realm of excessive future capital, it is also 
a resilient spatial archive of its past. As a work of science fiction and allegory it creates a 
space for the contradictory tension between the future and the past of capital. By mimetically 
displaying the functioning of capital, the necessity to outrun the catastrophic past it creates, 
and refusing to stitch together the historical connections that it severs, Lernprozesse performs 
a critique of present capital before it is too late, unlike the four astronauts. It is the space 
where the past and future of capital exist side by side, not collapsed into one another. 
Lernprozesse is then a utopian space of contradiction and contestation, the allegorical other 
of capital that confronts it with its own visual and narrative ruins. “Kritik,” Benjamin states 
of allegory, “ist Mortifikation der Werke” and it is this mortification performed by critique 
through which “das Werk als Ruine sich behauptet.”109 In this way, the text does not become, 
like the planet into which the experts carve their Siren’s song, another affirmation of capital, 
but rather a space of alterity to it. Inverting the postcolonial texts previously discussed, 
Lernprozesse begins with the alterity of outer space as a means to stage a critique of the 
spaces and temporalities of capital. The critique performed by the text renders at once the 
work itself an allegorical ruin of capital, a textual space of utopian alterity. In a similar 
fashion, P.M.’s Weltgeist Superstar [1980], to which we presently turn, also begins with the 
utopia of science fiction as a means to critique. At the same time, however, this work tests 
the limits and possibilities of a sustained critique of capital. Whereas Lernprozesse ends with 
critique, P.M.’s work pushes the boundaries thereof and arrives back at literature as the 
principle arbiter and medium of the idea of utopia after sixty-eight.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Marxism in Outer Space: 
The Future of Utopia in P.M.’s Weltgeist Superstar 
 
 
Introduction: Marxism is Dead, Long Live Literature 
 
What became of Marxism and its promises after 1968?  This question of the fate of 
theory and Marxism’s future after 1968 is played out in the pages of author P.M.’s science-
fiction novel Weltgeist Superstar [1980].1 While researching Marx’s Das Kapital for an 
essay titled “Zur Formation des Begriffs des variablen Kapitals unter dem Einfluß von 
Hegels Rechtsphilosophie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Physiokraten in den ersten 
Skizzen zum ‘Kapital’” in the “Friedrich-Noske Institut” in Bielefeld, fictional protagonist 
P.M. stumbles upon an original draft to the Grundrisse, in the margins of which he notices 
strange writing (WG, 27).  As it turns out, these odd symbols are an alien language. Able to 
decode a few words with the help of his knowledge of Sanskrit, P.M. finds himself at the 
center of a conspiracy that begins an adventure that leads him around the world, from 
Germany to Russia, Afghanistan, the United States, and eventually into outer space.  The 
                                                 
1 P.M., Weltgeist Superstar (München: DTV, 1983). This was the first work by the anonymous Swiss author 
P.M. who writes solely under this pseudonym. It was originally published by Stroemfeld/Roter Stern, a 
publishing house in Frankfurt am Main that was initially dedicated to publishing political tracts by the student 
movement; it first appeared in 1980. His most well-known work is the anarcho-utopian novel Bolo’bolo [1983]. 
While some critical secondary material exists for this work, there is currently none on Weltgeist Superstar. All 
references to this work will hereon be cited parenthetically as “WG.” 
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discovery of alien language in the margins of Marx’s Grundrisse eventually reveals that 
Marx is alive. An alien race, known as Xagas, aided Marx in staging his death in 1883 and 
provided him with a spacecraft, aboard which he cannot die. In turn, Marx composes some of 
his most famous economic tracts for the Xagas, who use the emotional energy resulting from 
revolutions on Earth as a power source, effectively mining Earth for affective capital.2 On the 
one hand, Marx survives, as the opening pages of the text reveal, “um die Weltrevolution zu 
befördern” (WG, 1). On the other, the revolutionary predictions that Marx provides the Xagas 
serve to ensure the continuation of capital. In Weltgeist Superstar, Marx survives as a tool of 
intergalactic capital; he has become a commodity, theorizing revolutions that are exploited 
and gleaned as a raw material for an alien race of capitalists.   
 P.M.’s Weltgeist Superstar brings together the two main threads that have guided this 
project, namely postcolonial and outer spaces. Like Kluge’s Lernprozesse, Weltgeist 
Superstar is a science fiction novel that explores the spaces and temporalities of outer space 
as the realm of the continued accumulation and exploitation of capital. And like Born and 
Fichte, P.M.’s novel is also decidedly postcolonial. P.M.’s discovery of Marx’s secret 
writings leads him behind the Iron Curtain and into Afghanistan, initiates first contact with 
an “alien” race, and ultimately results in the exploration of other worlds, namely the planet 
Tara which is inhabited by a humanoid race. In addition to the concerns of postcolonialism 
and science fiction, however, P.M.’s text traverses a host of different literary genres. For one, 
Weltgeist Superstar is a clear allusion to the passion play and its popular rendering in 
                                                 
2 For a detailed analysis of capitalism and its commodification of desires, emotions, and intensities, see: Gernot 
Böhme, “Contribution to the Critique of the Aesthetic Economy,” Thesis Eleven 73 (2003), pp. 71-83.  
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Andrew Lloyd Webber’s 1971 rock opera Jesus Christ Superstar.3 Both P.M. and Marx go 
through the phases of trial, suffering, and staged death before transcending into immortal 
aliens/gods.4 The passion play is at once the visual representation of Christ’s past, a 
remembrance of and emotional, spiritual attachment to his tribulations and his ultimate 
sacrifice for man, and the story of his betrayal by Judas as well as the Jewish Pharisees, who 
are often displayed as adversarial at best.5 Weltgeist Superstar is, however, a secularization 
of these themes. It is Marx who has heretically betrayed his theoretical doctrines for capital 
(replacing and representing Judas’ forty pieces of silver) and P.M. must go through the 
aforementioned stages in an attempt to save Marxism, a process that entails, as I will 
demonstrate, Marx’s death and sacrifice in order to save Marxism.  
Weltgeist Superstar is, however, more than a secularized passion play. It also equal 
parts epistolary novel, hard-boiled detective story, and ultimately utopian fiction. As an 
epistolary it aims to secure communication, acting at once as a “homing beacon” while also 
destabilizing temporal and spatial positions.6 This communication is not only between the 
text and the readers, conveying P.M.’s discoveries and travels, but between the readers and 
possible future encounters with the alien Xagas as evidenced by the accompanying guide to 
the Xaga language. In this way, as with the postcolonial novel, the epistolary travelogue 
transmits not only images of otherness but self-reflexively deals “with the movements of the 
                                                 
3 Jesus Christ Superstar first appeared as a rock album in 1970 before being produced by Andrew Lloyd Weber 
as a Broadway musical in 1971.  
4 On the stages of the passion play and its differentiation from other religious plays see Ursula Schulze, 
Geistliche Spiele im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit: Von der liturgischen Feier zum Schauspiel (Berlin: 
Schmidt, 2012), p. 78.  
5 Ibid., pp. 200, 213ff.  
6 See Sunka Simon, Mail-Orders: The Fiction of Letters in Postmodern Culture (New York: SUNY Press, 
2002), pp. ix, 136.  
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self and its knowledge between the poles of writing and reading,” to speak with Sunka 
Simon.7 Further, P.M.’s search for the hidden truth behind Marx’s secret writings ties 
Weltgeist Superstar to the hard-boiled detective story that envelops the protagonist in an 
interplanetary conspiracy, essentially entangling him in the very narrative he is out to 
unravel.8 P.M.’s quest for truth, knowledge, and indeed enlightenment contained in the very 
essay he is researching on Marx’s Hegelian heritage, leaves him on the run from the forces of 
anti-enlightenment out to secure the status quo. This quest for truth is, as many scholars have 
noted, a secularized pursuit in a time of crisis and chaos, in a world that God has abandoned.9 
In the case of Weltgeist Superstar, it is not God that has deserted the world, but rather Marx 
himself and the gospel of Marxism that is now in service of intergalactic capital. Lastly, 
Weltgeist Superstar is a piece of classical utopian fiction along the lines of Sir Thomas 
More’s Utopia [1516] and Samuel Butler’s Erewhon [1872]. It follows the standard 
trajectory of both works in that another world is discovered—an island beyond the horizon or 
an unknown civilization nestled behind an impending mountain range respectively—from 
which the traveler returns in order to tell of it and in so doing (re)creating literature as the 
space of utopia.10  
The title of P.M.’s work elicits not only an investigation of the multitude of literary 
genres through which it moves, but an exploration of philosophy and aesthetic theory. As 
                                                 
7 Simon, Mail-Orders, p. 123. 
8 See for example George Grella, “The Hard-Boiled Detective Novel,” in Detective Fiction: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. Robin W. Winks (Woodstock: Foul Play, 1988), pp. 103-120, p. 104. 
9 See Willy Haas, “Die Theologie im Kriminalroman,” in Der Kriminalroman, ed. Jochen Vogt (München: 
Fink, 1971), pp. 116-122, p. 122. See also Siegfried Kracauer, Der Detektiv-Roman: Ein philosophisher Traktat 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), pp. 53-54. 
10 For an overview of traditional utopian literature see Frank E. and Fritze P. Maunel, Utopian Thought in the 
Western World (Cambridge: Belknap, 1979) and Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 
1990).  
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with the previous chapters, Weltgeist Superstar traffics in an interrogation of intellectual 
history, here Hegel, Marx, and the Frankfurt School’s brand of Western Marxism represented 
predominantly by Theodor Adorno. As the first part of the title makes clear, the text deals 
with Hegel’s philosophy of history and the “Weltgeist.” On the one hand, Weltgeist 
Superstar is a literary representation of Hegel’s philosophy, whose stages and movements 
especially concerning world-historical individuals and the World Spirit, moreover, closely 
parallel those of the passion play. On the other, it turns Marx’s critique of Hegel on its head. 
Marx’s critique of Hegel centers primarily on the revelation of Hegel’s secret positivism that 
ultimately upholds the status quo turning the “Weltgeist” into a commodity of capital.11 In 
Weltgeist Superstar, however, Marx is revealed as a Hegelian, subject to the same positivism 
and similarly serving the interests of capital. Weltgeist Superstar pits Marx against Hegel and 
the winner is Hegel.  
The second half of the title, however, leads us in a different direction, namely to the 
concept of the superstar, to the culture industry, the dialectic of enlightenment, and Adorno. 
The Enlightenment, which “wollte die Mythen auflösen und Einbildung durch Wissen 
stürzen,” in Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis, reveals itself as its dialectical other, as the 
myth’s continued control and oppression couched in knowledge, reason, and the 
emancipation of the subject.12 One of the principle arbiters of enlightenment’s domination is 
the culture industry, from Hollywood movies to popular music and literature. Through the 
culture industry “[wirkt] [d]ie Gewalt der Industriegesellschaft in den Menschen ein für 
allemal ” ensuring “daß der Prozeß der einfachen Reproduktion des Geistes ja nicht in die 
                                                 
11 Marx, Ökonomish-philosophische Manuskripte (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), p. 142. 
12 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialektik der Aufklärung (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1969), p. 9.  
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erweiterte hineinführe.”13 In Weltgeist Superstar, Marx is enveloped in the culture industry 
becoming a superstar and thus participating in the perpetual domination through appeasement 
that characterizes capitalism. Thus, in addition to pitting Marx against Hegel and vice versa, 
Weltgeist Superstar elucidates the dialectical thought of Western Marxism that is indebted to 
Hegel.14 That is, it is an exercise in Adorno’s negative dialectics, his attempt to rescue 
Hegel’s dialectic, as well as a confirmation his aesthetic theory. 
 In his polemic against committed literature, Adorno turns to the works of Samuel 
Beckett to argue for a literature of negativity: “The spell they cast, which also binds them, is 
lifted by being reflected in them. However, the minimal promise of happiness they contain, 
which refuses to be traded for comfort, cannot be had for a price less than total dislocation, to 
the point of worldlessness.”15 For Adorno the negativity of literature resides in its self-
reflexivity that points back to the very conditions of its production, its unfreedom, which it 
cannot escape.  In Weltgeist Superstar, Marx has achieved such happiness, evading death and 
with it the very narrative of his own life, and resides literally dislocated and worldless in 
outer space. In its indictment of Marxism as a commodity of the culture industry traded for 
happiness Weltgeist Superstar proposes literature as the space of negativity; it returns Marx 
to the self-reflexivity and negativity of literature and offers him up for critique. In so doing, it 
is the text that stands opposed to the dialectic of enlightenment. Weltgeist Superstar is then, 
                                                 
13 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialektik der Aufklärung, p. 135. 
14 Martin Jay in fact defines Western Marxism as decidedly Hegelian: “Western Marxism […] has often been 
equated with Hegelian Marxism. The recovery of Marx’ss early writings in the late 1920s and the subsequent 
publication of the Grundrisse a generation later helped strengthen this equation, as they demonstrated for many 
that Marx had indeed been what Lukács and the others had said he was: a radical Hegelian. […] Western 
Marxism, therefore, meant a Marxism that was far more dialectical than materialist, at least as those terms were 
traditionally understood.” Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to 
Habermas (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), p. 3. 
15 Adorno, “Commitment,” in Aesthetics and Politics (New York: Verso, 1977), pp. 177-195, pp. 190-191.  
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to speak with Judith Ryan, an example of literature that not only “knows about” theory but 
responds to it.16 
In traversing these various geographic, literary, and theoretical spaces, Weltgeist 
Superstar weaves together each of the other works and discourses previously discussed in 
this dissertation. The epistolary emphasis on communication with the reader and other worlds 
combined with the detective novel’s quest for knowledge echo Born’s and Ficthe’s concerns 
with the epistemological construction of other worlds. The passion play and the survival of 
capital via a science-fictional deus ex machina together with science-fiction’s representations 
of the spaces and temporalities of immortal capital further link this work to Kluge’s own 
spatial concerns in Lernprozesse mit tödlichem Ausgang. In common with all of them is the 
emphasis on literature as a utopian space of alterity, which is part of what I claim to be a 
larger exploration of the currency of intellectual history and aesthetic theory after the West 
German student revolts. Weltgeist Superstar, I argue, decidedly demonstrates that the fate of 
Marxism and the idea of utopia after 1968, and indeed all of the desires for alterity contained 
therein, lies neither in the other worlds explored nor in a return to theory but in the return to 
prominence of literature as a utopian space. That is, it is not merely a response to and an 
exercise in theory, but moreover a self-aware and self-reflexive work that bridges literary 
genres thereby asserting literature both as the other space of theory and the provenance of 
utopia. In Weltgeist Superstar, literature rather than theory has the proverbial last laugh. In a 
word: Marxism is dead, long live literature! 
 
                                                 
16 In her recent work, Judith Ryan argues: “In the last third of the twentieth century […], an entire array of 
novels had appeared that might be said to ‘know about’ literary and cultural theory.” Ryan, The Novel After 
Theory (New York: Columbia UP, 2012), p. 1. While Ryan explicitly omits the Frankfurt School to focus of 
French Theory, Weltgeist Superstar is a clear-cut example of literature after the Frankfurt School. 
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The Death of Marxism: Epistolary, Detective Novel, and Science Fiction 
 
Weltgeist Superstar begins with a disclaimer informing the readers of the grave 
ramifications of the book in their hands: 
 Das Buch, 
das Sie in Händen halten, enthält bisher geheime Informationen über Kontakt mit 
Außerirdischen, teilt uns P.M., der aus Sicherheitsgründen anonym bleibende 
Verfasser dieser brisanten Dokumentation, mit.  Es ist daher mit 
Beschlagnahmungsversuchen oder Repressionsakten von Seiten verschiedenster 
Geheimdienste zu rechnen (WG, 1). 
The text then opens as a dangerous message in a bottle whose contents carry the threat of 
confiscation or repressive silencing at the hands of intelligence services that wish to suppress 
any revelation of both extraterrestrial contact and Marx’s survival. In this introduction 
Marxism is posed as the perpetual public enemy number one. Strikingly, this warning 
parallels the appearance of two incendiary publications 1970s, Michael “Bommi” Baumann’s 
autobiography Wie es alles anfing (How It All Began) [1975] and the Bubak obituary [1977]. 
Baumann’s autobiographical account of his terrorist activities in West Germany resulted in 
the storming of the Trikont publishing house in Munich and its confiscation by authorities as 
well as a backlash against state censorship by the likes of Heinrich Böll and Daniel Cohn-
Bendit.17 The Buback obituary, which was, like Weltgeist, published anonymously, professed 
sympathy with the RAF’s (Rote Armee Faktion) abduction and murder of attorney general 
Siegfried Buback and faced similar censorship and resulted in the arrest of many of those 
responsible for its publication.18 In both instances, any criticism of the state from the Left 
                                                 
17 See Michael Baumann, How It All Began (Vancouver: Pulp, 1977). 
18 See Peter Brückner, Die Mescalero-Affäre: ein Lehrstück für Aufklärung und politische Kultur (Hannover: 
Internationalismus Buchladen und Verlagsgesellschaft, 1977). 
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was met with severe restrictions to the freedom of the press and of opinion. The message that 
Weltgeist promulgates—the fact that public enemy number one, namely Karl Marx, 
continues to lives in the conservative eighties—similarly faces such threats.  
Weltgeist thus begins with the dangers of knowledge, communication, and ultimately 
literature that is subject to the agents of anti-enlightenment seeking to suppress the 
dissemination of information counter to the dominant narrative. It does so, moreover, as an 
epistolary whose main purpose is, as Simon states, “to secure all channels, to make the 
process of communication and its content fail-safe.”19 Not only is it addressed to and 
establishes contact with the readers, but it also directs them as to how to contact both the 
Xagas and Marx. The readers are told that they can purchase identification cards from the 
author, through the publishing house as arbiter, which will identify them as friendlies to the 
alien race and Marx alike. It establishes then a network of correspondence and 
communication through letters through which the readers can find out the truth that the 
powers that be deem a threat. At the same time, however, the “secure channels” of the 
message, of the epistolary, are far from safe. As with the Buback obituary and Baumann’s 
autobiography, it is less than certain as to whether this information will be received and the 
promised communication and contact established. The forces of the dialectic of 
enlightenment are constantly on the lookout for potentially hazardous material. Thus, rather 
than a fixed, constant position from which the messages are sent and received, the 
permanence assured by the address must be destabilized. P.M. is neither allowed to remain 
stationary nor directly divulge his address. In this way, the novel verges on a postmodern 
epistolary that Simon defines as characterized by spatial and temporal “displacements” and 
                                                 
19 Simon, Mail-Orders, p. ix.  
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“dislocations.”20 In order to stay ahead of the agents of anti-enlightenment, P.M. must remain 
on the run and this very displacement, in turn, renders the revelation of the dialectic of 
enlightenment a tenuous prospect at best. 
At worst, the dialectic of enlightenment is already heralded in the text. The 
information as well as the identification cards Weltgeist offers come at a price, 5,000 Franks 
to be exact or the reduced amount of 4,850 for orders in excess of ten (WG, 6). The 
introduction also instructs readers to inquire about a “Weltgeist-Klub” in their town or region 
and for 50 Franks the reader will be mailed a list of them. Moreover, stuffed animals of the 
various alien species discussed in the book as well as board games are available for purchase 
at the “Boutique Semantha, Steigrübelweg 74, 8011 Zürich” (WG, 7). In short, everything in 
Weltgeist Superstar is up for sale, including, but not limited to, enlightenment itself, the 
dangerous knowledge that the work conveys. P.M.’s novel thus admittedly places itself in the 
camp of the culture industry and the dialectic of enlightenment that is capable of absorbing 
even its most serious affronts and converting them into commodity. Enlightenment and 
indeed the revolution against its dialectic, from Buback and Baumann to Marx himself, are 
all swept up and sold off by the culture industry in the service of continued control and 
domination. The text is essentially enveloped by the same thing it professes to dispel. This is, 
moreover, carved into the very structure of the work. The spatial and temporal displacements 
of its epistolary form that keep the information and its author safe are re-stabilized by the 
culture industry; send your money to the address above and you will be provided with your 
own stuffed Xaga or Marx doll all for the low cost of enlightenment and its continued 
dialectic. Enlightenment cannot then be predicated on uncovering the dialectic of 
                                                 
20 Simon, Mail-Orders, p. ix.  
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enlightenment, which is always already prefigured. 
The duplicity of the dialectic of enlightenment as well its discovery and transmission 
is also the subject of the detective novel. Siegfried Kracauer defines the genre as depicting a 
condition of society “in dem der bindungslose Intellekt seiner Endsieg erfochten hat, ein nur 
äußeres Bei- und Durcheinander der Figuren und Sachen, das fahl und verwirrend anmutet, 
weil es die künstlich ausgeschaltete Wirklichkeit zur Fratze stellt.”21 In short, the world that 
the detective novel displays is one of both enlightenment and its dialectic, the reality that lies 
behind the final victory of the intellect as one that lies in tatters. Moreover, the detective 
emerges as the personification of reason (“ratio”), himself an enlightenment figure, who, 
especially in the private eye of the hard-boiled variation, “works outside the established 
social code, preferring his own instinctive justice to the often tarnished justice of 
civilization.”22 The crime is, as Willy Haas states, “der Fluch gegen die irdische 
Organisation” and it is the hard-boiled private eye’s job to expose the corrupt forces of the 
dialectic of enlightenment and in so doing bring a criminal to justice thereby reestablishing 
the order of enlightenment in both instances.23 Most importantly, however, is the 
detective/private eye’s envelopment in the very case, the narrative, he is out to solve. Two 
classic examples will serve to illuminate this point, John Huston’s The Maltese Falcon 
[1941] based on Dashielle Hammet’s 1931 novel and Roman Polanski’s Chinatown [1974]. 
In The Maltese Falcon, private investigator Sam Spade is hired to search for a client’s 
missing sister that first results in a murder and finally a plot to attain the priceless Maltese 
                                                 
21 Kracauer, Der Detektiv-Roman, p. 10. 
22 Ibid., p. 51. Grella, “The Hard-Boiled Detective Novel,” p. 106. Grella’s point is echoed by Kracauer who 
argues that the illegal act not only emanates from the legal system itself, but that the latter uses such illegalities 
in its very procedures. See Kracauer, p. 78.  
23 Haas, “Die Theologie im Kriminalroman,” p. 121. 
195 
Falcon. In Chinatown, private eye and former detective J.J. Gittes is similarly caught up in a 
murder/conspiracy involving one land magnate’s attempts to monopolize southern 
California’s water. In both cases, the private eyes are not merely objective outsiders 
rationalizing and solving the crimes from a distance, but are sucked up into the whirlwind of 
plots and conspiracies. While the outcomes are, to be sure, different, the basic structure is the 
same—corruption at the highest level, inept and incompetent police, and the envelopment of 
the two private eyes in the quest for the truth.   
These classic hard-boiled detective tropes are mirrored almost exactly in Weltgeist 
Superstar. P.M. is an intellectual detective searching for enlightenment in Marx’s work. His 
quest for the truth, his research on the influence of Hegel in Marx’s Das Kapital, inserts him 
into the very narrative he is writing about, sending him on the run from the forces of the 
dialectic of enlightenment that wish to keep this information hidden. What drives the 
narrative, however, is not only P.M.’s own research, but written language. It is writing that: 
1) draws him into his own narrative; 2) is the source of the conspiracy and ensuing mortal 
danger in which P.M. finds himself; and 3) creates a wormhole into another world. 
Moreover, it is marginalia, Marx’s scribble (“Gekritzel,” “Kritzeleien”) rather than the body 
of the text itself that initiates P.M.’s global and interplanetary flight (WG, 31-32). P.M. 
initially attributes the curious symbols either to Marx changing and testing out a new feather 
pen or to him haphazardly going off into the margins as his wife Jenny calls him to dinner 
(WG, 31). Marx’s scribbles in Weltgeist Superstar are, to be sure, more than accidental. In his 
work on scientific texts and marginalia, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger summarizes their importance 
thusly:  
Hier befinden wir uns an dem Ort, wo das Einfache noch als das Vereinfachte 
erfahren wird, wo es noch die Spur seiner Degeneration aus dem Komplexen an sich 
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hat. […] Aber was tut das experimentelle, also noch ersichtlich graphematische 
Denken anderes als Spuren in einen Repräsentationsraum zu legen, die genau das 
freigeben, was es zu experimentieren gibt? Die Erzeugung von Spuren im materiellen 
Repräsentationsraum einer Wissenschaft ist nichts anderes als ein Schreibspiel.24 
For Rheinberger, marginalia is at once the simplification of an idea as well as the traces, or 
tracks, of thought that have manifested in the representational space of the text. It is, in short, 
a type of writing game played while attempting to solve a complex problem. Thus, before 
P.M. knows what these strange markings in the margin connote, they become clues for the 
intellectual detective to unravel, the traces of something larger and more complex and in this 
way parallel Bertolt Brecht’s characterization of the detective novel as resembling a 
crossword puzzle.25 Marx’s strange marginalia is, moreover, what Rheinberger calls a 
“Xenotext.”26 Referencing Brian Rotman, Rheinberger states: “Das kann man als 
‘Fremdschrift’, kurioser, als ‘Andertext’ übersetzen. ‘Was er bezeichnet, ist nichts anderes 
als seine Fähigkeit, weiter zu bezeichnen. Sein Wert ist bestimmt durch seine Fähigkeit, 
Lesarten seiner selbst ins Leben zu rufen.’”27 The writing in the margin of Marx’s 
manuscript is then both what initiates P.M.’s quest as well as what inscribes him into the 
story, the “Fremdschrift” that brings the text to life pointing to something beyond the border 
of the manuscript. What at first appears as mere scribble is what puts the detective on the trail 
to put together the written clues and thus solve the case.  
P.M. is at first unaware of the gravity of the information that awaits him in the 
                                                 
24 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, “‘Alles, was überhaupt zu einer Inskription führen kann:’ Experiment, Differenz, 
Schrift,” in Im Zug der Schrift, Norbert Haas, Rainer Nägele, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, eds. (München: Fink, 
1994), pp. 295-312, p. 301.  
25 Bertolt Brecht, “Über die Popularität des Kriminalromans,” in Der Kriminalroman, Vol. 2, Jochen Vogt, ed. 
(München: Fink, 1971), pp. 315-321, p. 315. 
26 Rheinberger, “‘Alles, was überhaupt zu einer Inskription führen kann:’ Experiment, Differenz, Schrift,” p. 
303. 
27 Ibid. Rheinberger quotes from Brian Rotman’s Signifying Nothing (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987), p. 102. 
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curious symbols in Marx’s Grundrisse. As the archive closes for the evening, P.M. jots down 
some of the writing to take home. After falling asleep, the key to decoding the symbols 
comes to P.M. in a dream: 
Ich hatte einen Traum von jener klaren Sorte, wo man plötzlich Dinge 
zusammenbringt und durchschaut, die im wachen Zustand völlig getrennt und dunkel 
bleiben.  Es begab sich nun, daß ich zu jener Zeit meine Sanskritstudien wider 
aufgenommen hatte, erstens im allgemeinen Orient-Magie-Trend, zweitens aus purer 
linguistischer Neugier […].  In jenem denkwürdigen Traum sah ich einen wilden 
Tanz von Devangari-Schleifschen, -Häckschen, -Schnörkelchen […] die sich 
allmählich mit den Kringeln, Punkten, Schleifen, Stricheleien der Marxmanuskripte 
vermischten. (WG, 32-3)  
Counter to the detective as the personification of reason (“ratio”) proposed by Kracauer, 
P.M.’s revelation comes not through cold, calculating, deductive reason but rather in a 
suspension thereof, in a dream. This calls to mind André Breton’s advocacy of the dream 
another realm of enlightenment. “Under the pretense of civilization and progress,” Breton 
writes in the Manifesto of Surrealism, “we have managed to banish from the mind everything 
that may rightly or wrongly be termed superstition or fancy.”28 For Breton, the dream is not a 
form of irrationalism but a different type of thought and enlightenment that “show[s] signs of 
organization.” 29 Breton thus queries: “When will we have sleeping logicians, sleeping 
philosophers? Can’t the dream also be used in solving the fundamental questions of life?”30 
In Weltgeist Superstar, P.M. is just such a sleeping philosopher-detective.  Rather than 
relying on “ratio” (Kracauer) or logical thinking (Brecht), the detective’s uncovering of the 
dialectic of enlightenment necessitates going beyond a firm adherence to enlightenment 
                                                 
28 Breton, Manifesto of Surrealism, trans. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1972), p. 10. This is from the first 1924 version of the manifesto. 
29 Ibid., p. 11. Unlike Adorno who viewed superstition, fantasy, and myth as part of the dialectic of 
enlightenment, Benjamin initially embraced surrealism, at least in its first instantiation, in particular the dream 
aspect. See Walter Benjamin, “Der Surrealismus” [1929], in Walter Benjamin: Passagen. Schriften zur 
französichen Literatur, ed. Gérard Raulet (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007), pp. 145-159. 
30 Ibid., p. 12 
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reason.31 In this case, it is through the language of the dream that enlightenment unfolds. The 
dream divines the truth of the scribbles and thereby plays an essential role in the detective’s 
work to decipher the clues. 
 In Weltgeist Superstar, the Sanskrit-like characters (along with the importance of the 
dream as path to truth that puts P.M. on the trail of solving the case of Marx’s mysterious 
marginalia in the Grundrisse) mirror and augment a new dimension to the publication history 
of many of Marx’s early writings. Along with his Ökonomish-philosophische Manuskripte 
[1844], the Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie [1857-58] was discovered and 
published decades after Marx first put pen to paper. The former were found in the SPD 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) archive in 1920 and subsequently published in 
Russian in 1927 before appearing in German in 1932.32 Following a similar history, the 
complete Grundrisse was first made public in Russian in 1939, although Karl Kautsky 
published the introduction already in 1902. Both works provide a crucial link between these, 
Marx’s early anthropological works, and his later more “mature” works on political 
economy, namely Das Kapital.33 Further, the Ökonomish-philosophische Manuskripte as 
well as the Grundrisse were well received during the 1960s on account of their new insights 
into the breadth of Marx’s work. The former, for instance, became the foundation for the 
dimension of sensuality and sensuousness in Marxism that would influence later thinkers 
                                                 
31 See Brecht, “Bertolt Brecht, “Über die Popularität des Kriminalromans,” p. 315, 318. 
32 See Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 66. 
33 Ibid., p. 221.  
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from Marcuse to Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge.34 The Grundrisse, by contrast, not only 
bridges the early Marx with the Marx of Das Kapital, but brings to light his reliance on if not 
return to Hegel.  “The truth is,” Alfred Schimdt notes in 1968, “that the methodological 
structure of his work is based on a second study of Hegel’s Logic” that already manifests 
itself in the Grundrisse and in Das Kapital reaches its pinnacle in that “it goes back, in the 
Hegelian sense, from being to essence.”35 It is, then, no mere coincidence that in Weltgeist 
Superstar the discovery of yet another aspect of Marxism should reveal itself in the 
Grundrisse nearly a century after Marx’s death. P.M.’s research both plays into the 
intellectual history of Marx’s work and inscribes him into this narrative. At the same time, 
however, the hard-boiled detective elements lend this narrative an added dimension of 
mystery and adventure. Further, the Sanskrit and the dream provide, like the sensuousness 
and sensuality of his economic-philosophical manuscripts, a different approach to reading 
Marx, namely a romantic one imbued with cryptic hieroglyphs and a surrealist one 
emphasizing the unconscious rationality of the dream.36 
                                                 
34 In these manuscripts, Marx links the human senses and sensuality to the process of world history: “Die 
Bildung der 5 Sinne ist eine Arbiet der ganzen Weltgeschichte. […] Die Sinnlichkeit (siehe Feuerbach) muß die 
Basis aller Wissenschaft sein. Nur, wenn sie von ihr, in der doppelten Gestalt, sowohl des sinnlichen 
Bewußtseins als des sinnlichen Bedürfnisses ausgeht […] ist sie wirklich Wissenschaft.” Ökonomish-
philosophische Manuskripte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2009), pp. 123-125. The emphasis on the senses and 
sensuality is predominant in Marcuse’s work from Eros and Civilization [1955] to his Essay on Liberation 
[1969]. For Kluge, these concepts become key to his theory on realism in the early 1970s in Gelegenheitsarbeit 
einer Sklavin. Zur realistischen Methode [1975]. Sensuousness is already a key term in Public Sphere and 
Experience. 
35 Alfred Schmidt, “On the Concept of Knowledge in the Criticism of Political Economy,” in Karl Marx: 
1818/1968 (Bad Godesberg: Inter Nationes, 1968), pp. 95, 98. Žižek as well notes the necessity of Hegel for 
Marx’s later works primarily in “the mid-1850s, when, after the failure of the 1848 revolutions, he started to 
read Hegel’s Logic again).” Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (New 
York: Verso, 2012) p. 252.  
36 George Grella, for example, notes the kinship between hard-boiled detective novels and romantic fiction. 
“Although hard-boiled writers set out to write tough, contemporary mysteries in modern colloquial language, 
they ultimately wrote romantic rather than realistic fiction. Virtually every major attempt at accurate reporting 
became a literary device.” Grella, “The Hard-Boiled Detective Novel,” p. 118.  
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 For P.M., reading and writing about Marx not only requires elements of hard-boiled 
detective, linguistic, and dream work, but soon becomes a dangerous adventure in its own 
right as the epistolary frame forewarns. The kinship between Marx’s marginalia and Sanskrit 
allows P.M., who happens to know a little Sanskrit, to use this linguistic knowledge to 
decipher some of the strange marks in the manuscript. The first words he translates are quite 
innocent and even expected in a work of Marx’s, namely “historische Bedürfnisse” and 
“Arbeitstag” (WG, 34). Before he can get much further with his translations he hears 
footsteps approaching his door and a key being inserted into the lock. P.M. turns out the light 
and hides just as a tall man in a trench coat enters the apartment, shoves some of P.M.’s notes 
into his coat pocket, and fires three shots into his “aufgebäumte Daunendecke” (WG, 35). 
Without the rest of the untranslated material P.M. flees and clearly the subject of a deadly 
cover-up, landing first in Göttingen and then Moscow all the while trailed by suspicious men 
in dark trench coats. Thus begins P.M.’s detective adventure. The trail down which Marx’s 
marginalia, his secret message, has led him, uproots P.M. from his life as the intellectual 
detective, as well as his stable positionality, and thrusts him into the detective narrative 
himself, on the run from those who seek to keep Marx’s mysterious writing a secret. His 
quest for the truth has, in essence, made him a criminal in the court of the dialectic of 
enlightenment. “In den Kriminal- und Abenteuerfilmen,” write Adorno and Horkheimer, 
“wird dem Zuschauer heute nicht mehr gegönnt, dem Gang der Aufklärung beizuwohnen.”37 
This inability to assist in the enlightenment process is almost accomplished in Weltgeist 
Superstar with P.M.’s attempted assassination. Without even knowing everything, he already 
knows too much and thus poses a threat to the dialectic of enlightenment’s status quo.  The 
                                                 
37 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialektik der Aufklärung, p. 146. 
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promise of possible enlightenment hidden in Marx’s scribbles cannot be allowed. As with the 
epistolary, however, it is soon revealed that P.M.’s quest for enlightenment is itself entangled 
in the very dialectic that it seeks to escape. 
 Managing to survive the attempt on his life in his apartment and flee West Germany, 
P.M. arrives in Moscow under a fake name and passport. He quickly finds himself involved 
with a group of dissidents who entrust him with a certain microfilm “der die Welt erschüttern 
wird” (WG, 57). The contents of the microfilm are, of course, “unbekannte Marxmanuskripte 
aus dem Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus,” incidentally the same institute that first 
published the full version of the Grundrisse (WG, 57). From Russia, P.M. is smuggled into 
Afghanistan where he finds himself among a tribe of “Amudis,” which is currently engaged 
in a liberation struggle (“Befreiungskampf”) against the Afghani government (WG, 77). 
When he shows the manuscripts to a young man, Adschal, he informs P.M. that they closely 
resemble their old, religious “Maschu-Texte” and brings P.M. to “der Weise Bagwan 
Dadurna” (WG, 79). The sage presents him with an old poem, whose writing resembles 
Marx’s manuscript, but not enough for P.M. to fully connect the characters in the one with 
those in the other. After showing Bagwan his list of partially transcribed symbols, the wise 
man provides P.M. with the missing phonetic information (“Lautwerte”) necessary for a full 
translation of both the poem and Marx’s text (WG, 80). Before setting to work completing his 
translation of the manuscript, he reads from the poem: 
Es war die Geschichte eines alt-indischen Yogi, der dank Unterstützung des Gottes 
Vischnu langwierige Abenteuer bestand. […] Der Höhepunkt war eine lange Fahrt im 
goldenen Wagen Vischnus durch den Himmel und ins Zentrum der Welt. Der Yogi – 
er hieß Pamandro Maumirdschi – kam ins Land der weisen Drachen, den Göttern des 
Handwerks und der Wissenschaft. Dann zeigte ihm Vischnu die beiden Urprinzipien 
Atya und Itya (das Dauernde und das Wechselnde) in ihrem unendlichen Ringen. 
Schließlich durfte der Yogi zur Belohnung eine Zeitlang im Land der Glückseligen – 
Kamtara – wohnen, wo er jedoch hochmütig wurde und zur Reinigung in die Hölle 
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der schleichenden Geister – Gulapa – gehen mußte. (WG, 80-81)  
The Amudi legend that P.M. reads is, in fact, his own. The yogi Pamandro Maumirdschi is 
P.M. and the trip described therein soon mirrors P.M.’s voyage into outer space. Strikingly, 
this is told in the form of a myth. P.M.’s quest for the truth as the hard-boiled detective on the 
lam from the agents of the dialectic of enlightenment is turned on its head. P.M.’s story is not 
that of the enlightenment figure at odds to break the stranglehold of the culture industry, but 
rather the embodiment of the dialectic of enlightenment.  
The narrative that P.M. becomes a part of is ultimately the myth couched as an 
intellectual’s quest for the enlightenment. At the same time, however, this myth as told by the 
Amudi poem, fulfilling in a way a predestined role, is itself the outcome of his enlightenment 
quest. “Aber die Mythen, die der Aufklärung zum Opfer fallen,” Adorno and Horkheimer 
explain, “waren selbst schon deren eigenes Produkt.”38 In Weltgeist Superstar, P.M.’s 
engagement with Marxism leads him not to enlightenment, but to its dialectic. In this way, 
the result of reading Marx, beginning with P.M.’s thesis on Marx and Hegel and continuing 
with his discovery of the strange characters and the ensuing detective work, is to become part 
of a myth. P.M.’s quest leads him right into the heart of the dialectic of enlightenment where 
it reveals itself as myth. Moreover, the story into which P.M. has written himself ultimately 
echoes Adorno and Horkheimer’s diagnosis of the lack of resolution in detective and 
adventure stories. All of the detective work P.M. has done that leads him from the archive in 
Bielefeld, to Moscow, and lastly to a tribe in Afghanistan ends in myth where it is revealed 
that he is simply following a course of predefined actions. To speak with Adorno and 
Horkheimer, P.M. is subject to “die automatisierte Abfolge genormter Verrichtungen” 
                                                 
38 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialektik der Aufklärung, p. 14. 
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prescribed by the culture industry and inscribed into detective and adventure works in which 
every situation is only perfunctorily connected.39 Thus, the detective story as well as the 
myth that P.M. becomes a part of prefigure his every move. Above all, what drives the 
intertwined narratives forward is Marx and Marxism.  
Thanks to the help of the Amudi sage, P.M. successfully translates the rest of Marx’s 
manuscript. As he discovers, Marx was abducted by aliens. While on a trip to the seaside 
town of Ramsgate outside London with his wife Jenny, Marx walks alone on the coast when 
he notices what he thinks to be a star before it comes nearer. What he then describes as a 
“Suppenschüssel” emits a beam of light that draws him onboard the spacecraft (WG, 83). The 
beings, called Xaga, that inhabit the ship communicate primarily via monitors on their chests 
displaying various images and colors but quickly learn the German language. They inform 
Marx that they are interested in the Earth as “ein ‘sehr’ intensive[r] Planet” that consists of a 
“bestehende[n] Quantum an Gefühlen, positive und negative” which they use as a form of 
energy “zum Bau und Antrieb der Fahrzeuge, zum Unterhalt ihrer Körper, zur Abwehr 
störender Einflüsse” (WG, 86-87).40 The Xagas are principally interested in proletarian 
revolutions, “die viel Gefühl, vorallem Haß absonderten,” as a source of energy but “hatten 
Angst vor der Beseitigung der Ursachen dieser Revolutionen, also der Klassen und des 
Kapitals” (WG, 88). In order to aid the Xagas and assure them their energy source Marx 
speeds up his work on the “Kritik der politischen Ökonomie” and states further that he 
originally wrote Das Kapital for the Xagas in order to educate them on the economic and 
                                                 
39 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialektik der Aufklärung, p. 145-146. 
40 This mirrors Gernot Böhme’s analysis of the “aesthetic economy:” “At a certain stage of development in 
which the material needs of society are generally satisfied, capitalism must bet upon another type of needs, 
which calls for the appropriate term desires. The third fundamental category of the aesthetic economy is thereby 
named. Desires are those needs which, far from being allayed by their satisfaction, are only intensified.” 
Böhme, “Contribution to the Critique of the Aesthetic Economy,” Thesis Eleven 73 (2003), pp. 71-83, p. 73 
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political situation on Earth (WG, 88). While the Xagas wish to profit from terrestrial 
revolutions, they are, however, wary of intervening too much: “Vorallem wollten sie es nicht 
riskieren, durch ihr Eingreifen spätere, noch größere Revolutionen zu vereiteln” (WG, 89). 
For the Xagas it is most important to secure a continued, permanent revolution whereby they 
can consistently expropriate emotional energy from the Earth. 
As Weltgeist Superstar suggests, Marx wrote some of his pivotal works in order to 
help a race of extraterrestrials exploit proletarian revolutions on Earth as a source of affective 
capital. What the Xagas ultimately fear is both the abolition of classes and capital as well as 
the revolutions that would bring this about. In short, they fear the utopian outcomes 
anticipated by Marx the theoretician of communism and revolution. It is then revealed that a 
retarded Marx and Marxism was from the outset a tool for the interests of interstellar 
capitalism. With the help of Marx, an alien race of capitalists were given a theory of the 
political economy with which to efficiently predict where and when revolutions would 
transpire and thus easily glean terrestrial capital. The permanent revolutions the Xaga require 
correspond quite closely to Marx and Engels’ speech to the Central Committee of the 
Communist League in 1850, shortly after the failure of the 1848 revolutions:  
Während die demokratischen Kleinbürger die Revolution möglichst rasch und unter 
Durchführung höchstens der obigen Ansprüche zum Abschlusse bringen wollen, ist es unser 
Interesse und unsere Aufgabe, die Revolution permanent zu machen, so lange, bis alle mehr 
oder weniger besitzenden Klassen von der Herrschaft verdrängt sind.41 
The idea of permanent revolution developed by Marx and Engels after 1850 acquires in 
Weltgeist Superstar a decidedly affirmative character. Rather than advancing the dissolution 
                                                 
41 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Ansprache der Zentralbehörde an den Bund vom März,” in Marx-Engels 
Werke, Vol. 7 (Berlin: Dietz, 1973), pp. 244-254, p. 248. 
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of the domination by the propertied classes, permanent revolutions secured a source of 
continued capital accumulation for the Xagas. Moreover, written particularly under the 
renewed influence of Hegel’s thought, this speech signals Marx’s indebtedness to Hegel’s 
concept of history as gradual and rational progress.42 Under the influence of extraterrestrials 
and Hegel’s positivism, Marxism in Weltgeist Superstar becomes a commodity of a higher 
form of intergalactic capital. Just as Marx rebuked Hegel as affirmative vis-à-vis the status 
quo, the return of Hegel in Marx’s later works turns Marxism into a tool of the culture 
industry. Marxism becomes thereby an integral part of the dialectic of enlightenment. While 
it promises an end to capitalism, Marxism itself becomes a source of capital, continued 
domination, and control packaged and sold as revolutionary thought. It is the Hegelian super 
spirit of the culture industry and intergalactic capital. 
A crucial part of Marx’s manuscript is not only the revelation of his abduction by 
alien capitalists for whom he wrote his works, but also the establishment of meeting points 
and dates for further contact with the Xagas. In this way, Marx’s manuscript, as with 
Weltgeist itself, is a type of message, a homing beacon for contact with aliens and other 
worlds. The locations of future meetings with the extraterrestrials would change every year 
beginning in 1864 and “schien Marxens Einschätzung der Entwicklung der Klassenkonflikte 
zu entsprechen,” (WG, 90). In addition to the contact points, the Xagas instruct Marx “diese 
Liste einem [ihm] geeignet erscheinenden, beschränkten Personenkreis zukommen zu lassen” 
(WG, 90). Similar to the epistolary frame of the novel, Marx’s manuscript secures stable sites 
of present and future capital, addresses where it can be found, and passes this message off to 
its readers in order that they, too, might take part in the Xagas plans. Indeed, Marx’s 
                                                 
42 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 32 
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manuscript is not only a form of communique, but a chain-letter passed on from person to 
person containing a specific date, time, and place for a possible future meeting with alien 
capitalists. While Simon attributes an interactive element to postmodern epistolary chain mail 
whereby the reader is challenged to “play with its links,” this is not the case in Weltgeist 
Superstar.43 As with P.M.’s adventure thus far, he is less the subject and arbiter of his own 
deeds and movements than an avatar moving along a predefined narrative pattern disguised 
as the logical work of a detective. Although Marx’s original message, the marginalia in the 
Grundrisse, drives P.M.’s spatial displacement, his chain mail re-stabilizes them in the 
service of capital. P.M.’s encounter with the Amudi and the translation of the manuscript is 
then anything but chance or the result of playing with the links in the chain. Rather it was 
already encoded into Marx’s manuscript as the epistolary transmission that led to his 
subsequent detective work and eventually to his own myth. In short, the message was meant 
for P.M. 
The next meeting between the Xagas and an unlikely earthling is scheduled according 
to Marx’s marginalia to take place in the year 1978 in Springfield, Missouri. Accordingly, 
P.M. is smuggled out of Afghanistan and into the United States in order to be at the right 
place at the right time. On April 17, the protagonist P.M. is taken aboard a spacecraft in the 
very same manner by which Marx was first abducted a century before. Once onboard, he is 
greeted by none other than Marx himself who welcomes him with a token of bourgeois 
decadence, a bottle of “Château Rothschild 1876” (WG, 114). Marx explains that despite 
Engels’s premonitions about distributing the list, which he says did not fit into his 
“rationalistisches Schema,” he was able to smuggle it past him (WG, 116). Ultimately, 
                                                 
43 Simon, Mail-Orders, p. 63. 
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however, Marx comes to an agreement with the Xagas that seemingly renders the list 
unnecessary. He tells P.M. that 
[…] es ihm gelungen sei, mit den Xagas ein Abkommen zu treffen. Er sollte für sie 
politische Analysen machen, sie versprachen ihm, ihn bei seinem Tod aufzunehmen 
und in ein Raumschiff zu setzen, wo er unsterblich wäre und seine Arbeit würde 
fortführen können. Als Bedingung hätte er sich allerdings verpflichten müssen, nichts 
Geschriebenes über die Kontakte mit den Xagas zu hinterlassen und nicht direkt auf 
irdische Ereignisse einzuwirken. (WG, 117) 
The list that was meant to ensure the continued parasitistic relationship between earthlings 
and the Xagas is exchanged for Marx’s immortality. It is not only Marx’s work, a tool of 
capital, that has become alien but also Marx himself. As Marx admits: “Ich gehöre nicht 
mehr ganz zur Menschheit” (WG, 127). His immortality is guaranteed by his continued 
support of the Xagas, through which he becomes a deus ex machine, the invisible hand and 
unseen god, of extraterrestrial capital. Marx circles the Earth like the Xagas, theorizing from 
above though not directly interceding in terrestrial affairs. Ultimately, he has betrayed his 
own dictum that the point of philosophy is not to merely interpret the world but to change it 
in exchange for eternal life.44 In order to live Marx and Marxism must become alien, the 
arbiter of capital. 
While forbidden to directly intervene Marx was, of course, able to leave behind the 
hidden manuscripts, which, he states, accounts for the Amudis’ knowledge of the Xagas. 
P.M., however, notices a slight inconsistency with this story. “Ich errinerte mich,” P.M. 
thinks to himself, “daß es in Afghanistan keinen Treffpunkt gab. Der nächste lag im Indus-
Tal, in der Nähe von Sukkr. Dort sollen sich die Amudis […] um 800 nach Christus befunden 
haben” (WG, 117). If the meeting point was not in Afghanistan where the Amudis currently 
                                                 
44 See Marx, “Thesen über Feuerbach,” in Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 3 (Berlin: Dietz, 1969), p. 5ff, thesis 11. 
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live, but near where they originated as a tribe in 800 B.C.E., then how and why was it that 
Marx bequeathed them the myth? The originator of this paradox is indeed Marx. He wrote 
the myth of the yogi Pamandro Maumirdschi—our protagonist, the intellectual historian 
P.M.—being taken aboard Vishnu’s golden carriage, i.e., Marx’s spacecraft, and left it with 
Amudi knowing all the while that P.M., who just so happens to know Sanskrit, could decode 
the secret message leading him to precisely that place at that particular time. Just as myth is 
exposed as enlightenment, as is the case with P.M.’s initial quest for truth, enlightenment in 
turn is inscribed into an underlying myth.  
P.M. is, in fact, not the first visitor aboard Marx’s spaceship. In the past, 
representatives from both sides of the Iron Curtain, the CIA and the KGB, were taken aboard. 
While the former attempted to bring him over to the side of Western capitalism, the latter 
hoped to acquire his assistance in the spread of communism. Marx was interested, however, 
in neither. He has transcended both ideologies in the name of eternal life and the perpetuation 
of intergalactic capital, which knows no such divisions and for which the entire globe is a site 
of potential capital. As an alien, capitalist Marx poses a threat to both established world-
views and political economies. He is a heretic in the eyes of the Soviet Union and remains a 
threat to American capitalism, both of which are founded on an animosity of the another. 
Marxism as capitalism thus divests each side of an oppositional standpoint, collapsing both 
into one hegemonic system beyond the control of either world power. Without their opposite, 
neither can be said to truly exist. Both sides are aware that an alien race of capitalists steered 
by Marx could render them at any time impotent and that “nicht einmal der ‘Marxismus’ 
konnte sie davor retten,” as P.M. remarks. Marxism is no longer antithetical to capitalism, 
but to communism as well. Marxism is only revolutionary insofar as it provides an 
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alternative to both political economies in the sublation of them into an all-encompassing 
intergalactic capitalism fed on revolutionary emotion. 
In order to sustain both systems, Marx must die.  He tells P.M. how in 1951 he took a 
KGB agent aboard who attempted to assassinate him (WG, 119). A decade later, unable to 
lure Marx into the service of the United States, a CIA operative threatened him with a 
“Marx-ist-tot-Kampagne” and then similarly tried to poison him (WG, 121). Ironically, in 
order to maintain their systems, both sides come together in order to neutralize the threat. As 
Marx explains: “nur durch die Zusammenarbeit mit den USA konnte verhindert werden, daß 
oppositionelle Bewegungen in Kontakt mit mir oder den Xagas kommen konnten. Sie 
wußten nun beide, wer ich war and daß für sie nichts drin lag” (WG, 120). To quell the 
potential uprisings in the name of a new world order of intergalactic capital, in which neither 
side has any power, they begin to spread UFO propaganda and produce “Science-Fiction-
Filmen und Literatur, um die Leute abzustumpfen” and to create a fear of extraterrestrials “zu 
denen,” Marx states, “ich nun ja auch gehöre” (WG, 120). Incapable of physically 
eliminating Marx, they turn to the culture industry, namely science fiction, in order to numb 
the masses and instill within them the horror of Marxist capitalism. 
Paradoxically, however, Weltgeist Superstar accomplishes the very same thing. Just 
as Marx writes himself and P.M. into myth, the novel subsequently produces a science-
fiction text in which Marx and Marxism as traditionally conceived of is dead. By taking P.M. 
aboard, Marx creates the conditions of possibility for his death through the culture industry, 
fulfilling the dialectic of enlightenment prefigured in his manuscript, predestined in his myth, 
and completed in the science fiction novel. Weltgeist Superstar imagines driving the final 
nail in the coffin of Marxism. Marx’s theory dies in literature. From its epistolary beginnings 
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and through the twists of the detective story, the logic of the narrative is structured around 
the dialectic of enlightenment whereby Marxism is revealed as an affirmative theory of 
capital accumulation. 
By producing the conditions for his own science-fiction story, Marx traps himself 
within the spatialized future of capitalism. Similar to Kluge’s Lernprozesse mit tödlichem 
Ausgang, Weltgeist Superstar creates an outer space governed not only by the timeless spatial 
futurity of capital, but by a non-revolutionary, affirmative Marxism. Over the last decade 
Marx has observed how concepts such as “proletarische Revolution” and “Kommunismus” 
have become “Ausdrücke, die heute keiner mehr versteht oder die Abscheu auslösen, weil 
einige Industrialisierungsfetischisten, Äquatorialbonapartischen, Schlipsverkäufercliquen 
[…] in die Zukunft hinein[fallen] wie in ein leeres Treppenhaus hinab” (WG, 126). The 
eternal rush into the future has become little more than a haphazard stumbling guided by the 
drive of capital. Rather than creating a future, however, this incessant falling forward has 
produced and procured a perpetual present: 
Das Kapital hat alles ausgebucht bis ins Jahr 10,000. Wenn man die radioaktiven 
Abfälle berücksichtigt, bis ins Jahr 500,000. Unsere Bedürfnisse liegen in der 
Zukunft, im “Kommunismus”: daraus bestehen die Profite des Kapitals, daraus 
wurden die MG’s der Sonderpolizeitruppen geschmiedet. Das Kapital hat zugleich 
keine Zukunft mehr, weil es diese schon auf tausende von Jahren hinaus ausgebeutet 
hat: die Erde ist ausgepumpt, die Menschen kaput. Das Kapital ist in die Gegenwart 
zurückgekehrt, macht statt Zukunft ewige Gegenwart. Beton, Überwachung, 
Militarisierung. Es gibt keine Gewalt, aber jedes Abweichen von vorgeschreibenen 
Bewegungen kann tödlich sein. (WG, 132) 
In Marx’s analysis of the present, capital has successfully conquered the future such that it 
returns to itself creating an “ewige Gegenwart.” At the same time, however, capitalism 
manages to turn the very dreams of a future, of qualitatively different “Bedürfnisse,” and of 
“Kommunisimus” into the source of its profit and its control. Thus, Marx’s assertion that 
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“Das Leben in der Zukunft: das ist Macht” takes on a decidedly different character (WG, 
132). The life in the future is controlled by a brand of capitalism that enacts its control not 
through brute force per se, but rather by ensuring allegiance to the hegemony of its 
inescapable contemporaneity. In the outer space of Weltgeist Superstar, Walter Benjamin’s 
messianic “Jetztzeit” becomes the time and space of a future capitalism, a spatio-temporal 
stratum that also ensures Marx’s perpetuity.45  
If Marx’s eternal life brings with it the death of Marxism as a revolutionary theory, 
then in order for Marxism to regain its utopian potential he will have to die himself. That is, 
Marxism will have to undergo a second death in order to escape the eternal, atemporality of 
capital. As with the science-fiction works produced by the cooperation of the United States 
and the Soviet Union, however, what Marxism once was, a revolutionary theory to be feared, 
can only survive because of its negation in literature. In short, these works not only created a 
fear of extraterrestrials and by extension Marx, but they preserved a Marxism that was still 
revolutionary and tied directly to terrestrial matters, not subject to the prohibition of the 
Xagas. In this way, Weltgeist Superstar attempts a negation of the negation of Marxism. 
Marxism’s commodification, its transformation into a Hegelian superstar of a new cosmic 
culture industry fed on emotion, must then take its cue from Marx himself and let the dead 
bury their dead.46 This does not, however, transpire within a theory that is already 
compromised, but within literature which is able to negate what Marxism could not, namely 
Marx himself. Weltgeist Superstar attempts this feat through a restaging of the passion play 
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46 Karl Marx, “Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte,” in Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 8 (Berlin: Dietz, 
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that, while not fulfilling the last stage, the death of Marx, nevertheless creates the 
preconditions for literature as utopia. 
 
The Passion and Utopia of Weltgeist Superstar 
Aboard the spaceship, Marx takes the abducted P.M. to visit three different planets. 
The first is called “Ma-Apu,” a humid, swampy planet with a landscape composed of moss 
and various mushrooms, or “Apus,” and inhabited by a race of caterpillar-like beings, 
“Bobas” (WG, 140-143). The second planet, devoid of both life and a name, is inhabited by a 
robot race of Ats and Its. P.M. begins to reflect on what he has witnessed on these two 
planets and what exactly Marx intends for him to learn from them: “Was hatte er mir mit 
dem Besuch bei den Bobas und den Ats und Its beibringen wollen? Eine gewisse Logik 
steckte schon darin: Selbstveränderung bei den weichen Bobas, revolutionäres Umkippen bei 
den harten Ats. Lektionen in Dialektik” (WG, 158). Although he believes that he is being 
instructed in revolutionary dialectics, exactly the opposite is the case. “Irgendwie kamen mir 
die beiden Planeten bekannt vor,” P.M. states, “und sie hatten bei mir kein großes Erstaunen 
ausgelöst” (WG, 158). The reason for his lack of amazement from what Marx has shown him 
is that he has heard all of this before: “Das Lied von Dschanu Atwajana; die Reise des Yogi 
Pamandro Maumirdschi – P.M. – im goldenen Himmelswagen; das Land der weisen Drachen 
– der Bobas – der Kampf der Itya und Atya…und dann? Der 3. Planet. Alles fiel mir wider 
ein” (WG, 159).  These two planets correspond precisely to the myth composed by Marx and 
left for P.M. in Afghanistan. The last piece of this paradoxical puzzle lies in the third planet 
“Kamtara” that is mentioned in the Amudi legend and involves his trip “zur Reinigung in die 
Hölle der schleichenden Geister – Gulapa” (WG, 81). Marx tells P.M. that something has 
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gone awry on the planet “Tara” and it is up to P.M. to figure out precisely what that is (WG, 
160). Marx gives P.M. a small gadget resembling a headphone that teaches him the language 
on Tara. P.M. quickly realizes that the language is very similar to Sanskrit. Max replies: 
Gut beobachtet. Darum ist eben Deine Aufgabe so wichtig. Denn in der Tat stimmt da 
etwas nicht. Indoeuropäische Sprachen haben in dieser Gegend nichts zu suchen. 
Auch stark vereinfachte nicht. Und genau das sollst Du herausfinden: es muß ein 
Fremdköper in diese Zivilization geraten sein. Und dieser Fremdkörper muß 
herausoperiert werden, ihn mußt Du suchen und hierher zurückbringen. (WG, 161) 
It is, thus, P.M.’s mission to find out the source of this time-space paradox that has infected 
the planet Tara. 
Tara is a tropical planet whose vegetation consists primarily of jungle. It is, as Marx 
describes, “sehr erdähnlich […].  Für Menschen gibt’s keine besonderen Probleme und man 
braucht keinen Raumanzug” (WG, 160). Tara’s similarity to the Earth recalls the traditions of 
science fiction as well as colonial and utopian literature that depict a “this-worldly Other 
World,” to speak with Darko Suvin.47 P.M. arrives on this jungle planet clothed in nothing 
but a leopard-skin loin cloth and armed with a command of the indigenous language. P.M.’s 
arrival on the planet Tara mirrors contact of European explorers with the new world, a jungle 
paradise at the edge of the known world inhabited by a primitive peoples. More 
astonishingly, however, are parallels with traditional utopian literature, especially More’s 
Utopia [1516], written only a decade after the discovery of the Americas. P.M. emerges from 
the jungle to find himself in front of a large “etwa 10 Meter hoher, aus dicken Baumstämmen 
zusammengefügter Palisadenzaun” (WG, 164). This echoes, in fact, Raphael’s description of 
the city Utopia that “is surrounded by a thick, high wall, with towers and blockhouses at 
                                                 
47 Darko Suvin The Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre (New 
Haven: Yale UP, 1979), p. viii. 
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frequent intervals.”48 P.M. shouts for someone to let him in and a guard appears at the top of 
the wall. While initially skeptical of P.M., particularly his skin color that does not match their 
own brownish-green hue, the Tarani are quickly won over by his command of the language, 
attribute his idiosyncrasies to memory loss, and allow him entrance to the city of Igaha, the 
capital of Tara. As with his knowledge of Sanskrit that opened up the other world of 
Marxism and extraterrestrials, it is again language which grants him access to the other world 
of Tara. While being shown around by a Tarani named Dedakxar, P.M. remarks: 
[…] [ich] tippte mit dem Finger hier an eine Säule, dort an eine Mauer, griff nach 
aufgehängten Wäschestücken, streichelte zum Lüften herausgelegte Teppiche: das 
nannte man nun also eine Utopie, diese verdächtige Ansammlung von Phantasie, 
Vernunft, Schönheit, Vielfalt, Faulheit, Genüßlichkeit, Freundlichkeit, Intelligenz 
usw. Eine gute Utopie, sagte ich zu mir, mit einem leichten Touch von 
Widersprüchlichkeit, nicht überorganisiert, entwicklungsfähig, aber ohne Aussichten. 
(WG, 205) 
Tara contains all the tropes common to Utopia from beauty and pleasure, to reason and 
intelligence as well as sharing its urban rather than solely rural nature.49 All of this comes 
across to P.M. as a dream, a “verdächtige Ansammlung,” and he constantly has to touch 
everything to remind himself that it is, indeed, real. The dream which initially motivated his 
search ultimately leads him to a utopian world. It is, however, not only in these traditional 
conceptions of utopia, but in its organization of labor and its connection to nature, that Tara 
mirrors Utopia. Concerning labor on Tara, P.M. states:  
Nach jahrzehntelangen Erfahrungen hatte man das System der zwei 
Pflichtarbeitsstunden pro Tag eingeführt. Diese kurze Arbeitszeit war möglich dank 
einer ausgeklügelten Landwirtschaft, einer absolut abfallfreien Wirtschaft, eines 
Gleichgewichts von Produktivität und Natur. […] Die notwendigen Arbeiten wurden 
                                                 
48 Sir Thomas More, Utopia (New York: Penguin, 2003), p. 53. 
49 See Frank E. and Fritzie P. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1979), 
p. 123ff. 
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von Volksversammlungen festgesetzt. […] (Geld gabs natürlich nicht, d.h. die Tarani 
wissen nicht einmal, daß es nicht gibt, weil sie kein Wort dafür haben). (WG, 209-
211) 
Tara resembles not just any utopia, but the proto-Marxist one written by More, in which 
agricultural labor is divided up and money is worthless, because it does not exist.50 In 
Weltgeist Superstar, however, the question is how all of this came to be. 
 Upon his arrival, P.M., who goes by the Tarani name Nixdur, is subjected to 
numerous interrogations and examinations. The Tarani determine that he possibly hails from 
the planet from which the Tara originated, Cantara translated “Irgendland,” a play on the 
etymology of the utopian “outopia,” or nowhere (WG, 203). In order to jog his memory, the 
Tarani present P.M. with a box containing a wristwatch. This is the exact same watch that 
P.M. wears including an identical scratch on the watch face. The importance of the watch is 
yet another classical utopian theme originating in Samuel Butler’s Erewhon [1872], whose 
title is a transposition of “nowhere.” In this work, Butler discovers a hidden civilization 
behind a secluded mountain range who has outlawed technology. His possession of a watch 
sets him apart from the inhabitants of Erewhon and leads to his imprisonment.51 In contrast 
to this work, P.M.’s watch is what links him to the Tarani and indeed the origin of the planet. 
The Tarani explain that the watch “gehörte dem Urvater Naryan, der im Jahr 27, dem 
unheilvollen starb” (WG, 175). Naryan’s watch as well as his mannerisms and physical 
appearance resemble P.M. Confronted with this puzzle, P.M. states: 
                                                 
50 Ibid., p. 124. See also More, Utopia, pp. 55-57. This echoes as well Marx’s notion of communism á la Marx: 
“Der Communismus als positive Aufhebung des Privateigenthums, als menschlicher Selbstentfremdung und 
darum als wirkliche Aneignung des menschlichen Wesens durch und für den Menschen; darum als vollständige, 
bewußt und innerhalb des ganzen Reichthums der bisherigen Entwicklung gewordene Rückkehr des Menschen 
für sich als eines gesellschaftlichen, d.h. menschlichen Menschen. Dieser Communismus […] ist die wahrhafte 
Auflösung des Widerstreits des Menschen mit der Natur und mit dem Menschen. […] Er ist das aufgelöste 
Räthsel der Geschichte und weiß sich als diese Lösung.” Marx, Ökonomish-philosophische Manuskripte, p. 116. 
51 Butler, Erewhon or Over the Range (Forgotten Books, 2008), p. 46ff.  
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Ich dachte, daß es sich wohl um einen Scherz von Marx handeln mußte: ich war 
eindeutig dieser Naryan und meine Uhr war der Beweis. Darum konnten sie sie auch 
nicht sehen. Sie konnte für sie nicht existieren. Ich existiere aber offensichtlich 
gedoppelt, einmal vor vierhundert Jahren und einmal jetzt, also konnt ich beide Uhren 
sehen. Mit der Zeit stimmte überhaupt nichts mehr. (WG, 175) 
As the Amudi legend P.M. read in Afghanistan proves, P.M.’s has indeed been pushed along 
the inevitable logic of the narrative which enveloped him beginning with Marx’s manuscript. 
Everything in his past and present leads up to this future for which P.M. is predestined, from 
his knowledge of Sanskrit, his discovery and translation of the marginalia and his journey to 
Afghanistan to his interplanetary voyage. As he surmises: “Offenbar gab es hier eine 
Vergangenheit, die in meiner Zukunft lag. Und Cantara konnte nichts anderes sein als die 
Erde” (WG, 175). On Tara, P.M. finds himself inscribed into a past narrative that is 
predicated on his future, a future that has been realized because of Marx. 
 This paradoxical history does not go unnoticed by those on Tara, namely by Tagar 
and Nairi. Tagar, who is suspicious from the beginning, tells P.M. forthrightly: 
Du bist Naryan und 385 Jahre Fortschritt beißen sich damit in den Schwanz. Alles 
beginnt von vorn, d.h. es hat gar nie begonnen. Wir haben wieder die Wahl zwischen 
Überleben und Angst oder Lust am Untergang. Auch die andern haben das begriffen 
darum wollen sie nichts über Dich wissen. Du sollst ein Rätsel bleiben. […] Dein 
Gedächtnis ist unser Untergang. Cantara hat dich gesandt, um uns mitzuteilen, daß 
unsere Zeit um ist, daß wir erlöst werden. (WG, 195) 
In order for Tara to exist, P.M. must remain a puzzle like the Sanskrit characters that initiated 
his entire journey and in so doing become literary. P.M.’s literarization is the precondition 
for this utopia, another key element in the history and tradition of utopian literature and 
criticism. In More and Butler, the traveler must return to their homeland in order to write the 
account thereby giving rise to utopias as fundamentally literary practices.52 Accordingly, 
                                                 
52 See particularly Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1979), p. 39 as well as 
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P.M.’s return to Tara qua utopia is cause for alarm. His reappearance short circuits this 
utopian literarization through a different literary figure. While the other Tarani view him as 
merely a paradox, a puzzle that must not be solved, for Tagar he is a doppelgänger. 
P.M.’s return as doppelgänger is not the return of the repressed as Freud famously 
outlines in “Das Unheimliche,” but rather something more messianic as indicated by Tagar’s 
assertion that he has come to save them. This is the second coming of a Christ-figure sent by 
Marx, the narrative’s deus ex machina, to redeem the inhabitants of Tara. Returning to the 
etymology of Tara, as land, and Cantara as the other land, however, this redemption is the 
inversion of utopia. The ambiguity of More’s original Utopia—as both the no place, 
“outopia” and the good place “eutopia”—attains its critical force only in its referentiality and 
self-reflexivity.53 Only through Raphael’s telling of the story of Utopia does it transform 
from a nowhere into a somewhere, a first-hand description of an existent island, as well as 
the good place in contrast to the England of the 16th century of his audience. For Tagar, then, 
Earth is the utopian “Irgendland” not Tara. Thus, Tagar’s desired salvation is a desire for the 
utopia of Earth. As with the inversion of utopia, however, P.M.’s messianic return is another 
instance of Marx’s reversal of Benjamin’s messianic “Jetztzeit” that has become the time of 
capital. On Tara, P.M.’s past, present, and future are folded into a Benjaminian “Jetztzeit” 
that subsequently signals the salvation of the Tarani and the end of their profane history; for 
Tagar, the appearance of P.M. as a messianic doppelgänger indicates “daß unsere Zeit um 
                                                                                                                                                       
Louis Marin, Utopics: The Semiological Place of Textual Spaces (New York: Humanity, 1984), p. 65. As 
Manuel and Manuel also note, once Raphael begins to recount his travels in Utopia he writes himself back into 
his story: “The whole world of the Utopians is seen only through the eyes of the fierce Hythloday, who is so 
carried away by his depiction of their calm felicity that in the telling he becomes as mild and gentle as they are. 
Manuel and Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World, p. 122. 
53 See Manuel and Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World, p. 1 as well as Marin, Utopics, pp. xv-xvi. 
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ist.”54 Counter to Benjamin’s conception, however, this end of history is not the end of the 
time of capital, but rather its reestablishment. While Tara is a utopia for P.M., Tagar’s utopia 
lies in the insertion into the time and space of capital.  
P.M. as a doppelgänger of Naryan is, however, not simply a messianic moment. It is a 
an interruptive force that initiates a self-reflexivity in which, like with the other literary 
tropes discussed thus far, both the text and P.M. becomes aware of themselves as literature 
and their imbrication in theory. In his analysis of various doppelgängers throughout literature 
and philosophy, Dimitri Vardoulakis poses the doppelgänger as an “operative presence” that 
unfolds on the fault lines of literature, criticism, and philosophy. The doppelgänger 
arises at the points where each inquiry reaches a limit, transforming itself into 
something else. […] Thus, the doppelgänger becomes a medium of reading the work, 
and hence constitutive of writing. This process of the mutual limiting and interacting 
between […] literature, criticism, and philosophy is, then, an initial feature of the 
reflection proper to the doppelgänger.55 
Each instantiation of the doppelgänger in Weltgeist Superstar, beginning indeed with P.M.’s 
reading of his own myth in the Amudi legend, is a moment of literary and philosophical 
transformation and reflection. Being confronted with the myth in which he is the central 
character breaks the detective story in search of enlightenment and confronts it with the 
dialectic of enlightenment. Similarly, his appearance to Tagar as a doppelgänger is a moment 
of interruption in which the myth gains a quasi-religious, messianic significance that again 
inverts Benjamin’s “Jetztzeit.” In his subsequent meeting with Nairi, the imbrication of 
literature and philosophy as reflected by the doppelgänger, reaches another limit 
transforming the story once again. 
                                                 
54 See Walter Benjamin, “Theologico-Political Fragment,” in Reflections, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Peter 
Demetz (New York: Schocken, 1978), p. 312. 
55 Dimitri Vardoulakis, The Doppelgänger: Literature’s Philosophy (New York: Fordham UP, 2010), p. 5. 
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  It is, however not only Tagar who recognizes the significance of P.M.’s return, but 
Nairi. After Tagar informs her of the results of P.M.’s examinations, revealing that 
everything about P.M. corresponds to the “Urvater” Naryan, from his blood type to his 
identical wounds, she invites P.M. to visit her abode. Once there, she admits to P.M. that his 
reappearance on Tara “ist paradox” and she knows “wer dahinter steckt” (WG, 213), namely 
Marx. Nairi then tells P.M. the story of how Tara came to be inhabited: 
Mein Name war damals Dana – wieder einmal. Lokaman war betrunken gewesen und 
hatte nicht aufgepaßt – wir benützten die Gelegenheit. […] Darum kann ich es dir 
erzählen, den du hast keine Zukunft.  […] 
 
Lokamann hatte nicht aufgepaßt und 40 Leute schlüpften durch die Maschen der Zeit. 
20 Frauen und 20 Männer. Es war kein Zufall, daß ich, also, Dana, unter den Frauen 
war. Lokaman kontrolliert zwar die Zeit, aber ich gebiete über das Leben. Zeit ohne 
Leben ist leer, Leben ohne Zeit ist Tod. Lokaman ist der Rhythmus, wir sind die 
Form. (WG, 213) 
While Lokaman, the god of time, slept, the goddess of life, Dana, and thirty-nine others were 
able to slip through the strands of time to populate Tara. Among this original group was 
P.M., the “Urvater” Naryan. This, to be sure, comes as a shock to P.M. who desperately tries 
to make sense of everything: “Das kleine Männchen namens ‘ich’ hüpfte im Dreivierteltakt 
im Gehirnbunker herum. Lokaman? ‘Loka’ heißt ‘Welt’, ‘Universum’, ‘Wissen’; ‘man’ heißt 
‘Geist’, ‘Seele’, aber auch ‘Mann’. Weltgeist?  Allseele? Mister Universum” (WG, 215)? As 
Nairi’s story elucidates, it is not only Marx, but the “Weltgeist” who is responsible for the 
paradoxical existence of Tara as well as P.M.’s return to the planet. Along with the original 
thirty-nine settlers of Tara, P.M. managed to escape the time Marx, Weltgeist, created the 
utopian Tara outside of the eternal contemporaneity of capital, and must therefore perpetually 
leave the planet and return to it in order to ensure its continued paradoxical existence. Tara 
exists as a utopia in so far as it is outside of the temporal and spatial dominion of capital that 
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is governed by an affirmative, capitalistic Marxism under the sway of the positivistic logic of 
Hegel’s philosophy of history. P.M.’s return as a doppelgänger thus folds the narrative of the 
passion play into Hegel’s philosophy of world history. It is a narrative representation of 
Hegel’s famous doppelgänger, the reappearing world-historical figures critiqued by Marx as 
always appearing twice, “das eine Mal als Tragödie, das andere Mal als Farce.”56 At this 
interruptive juncture created by Nairi’s revelation, Weltgeist again becomes a self-aware and 
self-reflective textual imbrication of literature and theory. The passion play Jesus Christ 
Superstar alluded to in the title becomes the passion play of Hegel’s conception of history, 
Weltgeist Superstar. 
Hegel lays out his formidable philosophy of history in his posthumously published 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte [1832-1845]. For Hegel, the movement of 
world history is not only rational, but necessary, following the dictate of what he terms the 
world spirit, or “Weltgeist.” As he states in the opening to his lectures: 
Es hat sich also erst aus der Betrachtung der Weltgeschichte selbst zu ergeben, daß es 
vernünftig in ihr zugegangen sei, daß sie der vernünftige, notwendige Gang des 
Weltgeistes gewesen, des Gesites, dessen Natur zwar immer eine und dieselbe ist, der 
aber in dem Weltdasein diese seine eine Natur expliziert.57 
Thus, for Hegel history is guided by his contention that reason rules both the world and the 
movement of world history as embodied by the “Weltgeist.” The worldly manifestations of 
reason in the service of the “Weltgeist” are “die welthistorischen Individuen.” 58 While acting 
in accordance with the progression of world history, they do so as unknowingly, following 
                                                 
56 Karl Marx, “Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte,” in Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 8 (Berlin: Dietz, 
1972), pp. 115-207, p. 115.  
57 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 22. 
58 Ibid., p. 45. 
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what Hegel terms “die List der Vernunft” couched as fate and instinct59 As Hegel states, they 
are “[die] produzierende Idee” as well as “[die] nach sich strebenden und treibenden 
Wahrheit,” in short the very “vorteilhaft, wesentlich und notwendig” tools of history.60 
Moreover, such figures are characterized by passion (“Leidenschaft”) as well as suffering 
and death. Hegel admits, for instance, that “[d]ie Weltgeschichte nicht der Boden des Glücks 
[ist]” and that world-historical figures, among them Caesar, Alexander the Great, and 
Napoleon Bonaparte, all either die young, are murdered, or exiled, tossed aside as “leere[] 
Hülsen des Kernes” once their deed is accomplished.61 While Hegel’s philosophy of history 
is arguably less a theodicy, than a philosophical treatise on thought and its historical coming 
into being and its struggle for self-comprehension, the religious connotations and parallels to 
the passion of Christ cannot be wholly overlooked.62 Indeed this is the line taken in Weltgeist 
Superstar both in its overdetermined title and in the narrative. P.M. becomes just such a 
world-historical figure, subject to a predestined fate, the narrative reason and logic of history 
and the “Weltgeist.” 
In his subsequent conversations with the inhabitants of Tara, P.M. discovers that all 
of their stories parallel his own. They all found out about the Xagas through secretly 
circulated texts, made their way to the contact points, and eventually to Tara. Further, like 
                                                 
59 Ibid., p. 49. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 42, 47. 
62 This is, in fact, the line taken in most studies of Hegel. G.H.R Parkinson argues, for instance, that rather than 
a “metaphysical fantasy […] to talk of the world-spirit is to talk of what human beings think and do.” G.H.R. 
Parkinson, “Hegel, Marx and the Cunning of Reason,” in Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 2 (July, 1989), pp. 287-302, 
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to comprehend itself. As far as its occurrence in world history is concerned, the concept of spirit exclusively 
refers to the mode of thought that underlies the efforts of successive civilizations both to organize themselves in 
a rational way and to comprehend the principle of this self-organization.” Karin de Boer, On Hegel: The Sway 
of the Negative (New York: Palgrave, 2010), p. 182. 
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P.M., they all had plans “zurückzukehren und gewisse Dinge zu tun. Doch gefiel es ihnen auf 
Tara so gut, daß sie blieben” (WG, 216). In this way, most of the Tarani have shrugged off 
the burden of world history as well as the dictates of the utopian explorer who must return in 
order to reside on Tara. P.M. ultimately ascertains that the “Einwohner Taras […] 
Abtrünnige der Geschichte [waren]” and that the planet is little more than “ein einziges 
Alterheim der Gestrandeten der Geschichte” (WG, 216). Accordingly, P.M too decides to go 
against his past, present, and future and stay in Tara. While announcing his decision with a 
declarative “Marx [könne] in seiner Suppenschüssel schwarz werden,” Marx suddenly 
appears beside him. The others at the table enjoy a round of laughter before Odur, one of the 
Tarani, draws P.M.’s attention to the seat next to him: 
Da saß ein Zwerg mit der geröteter Glatze, großer Kolbennase, ausgefächertem, 
weißem Bart, in einem schmutzigen, blau gestreiften Pyjama. Er schwankte 
betrunken, hatte unkontrolierte Lachausbrüche und stellte sich vor mit: ‘Weltgeist’. 
‘Ein alter Freund von mir,’ ergänzte Marx mit leicht geniertem Grinsen. (WG, 217) 
Here personified as a drunken, bald dwarf, it is Weltgeist, the force behind Hegel’s 
affirmative philosophy of history, that has been guiding Marx’s hand and thus moving P.M. 
into his role as a world-historical doppelgänger, the redeemer of Tara and thus the guardian 
of the time and space of capital.  
That Weltgeist is described as an ugly dwarf controlling everything seemingly unseen 
is again an instantiation of the doppelgänger as an interaction between literature and 
philosophy that arises as the narrative reaches another limit transforming itself into a version 
of Hegel. The combination of Marx, the historical materialist, and Hegel’s “Weltgeist” as a 
theological philosophy of history conspicuously inverts Benjamin. His famous first thesis in 
“Über den Begriff der Geschichte” outlines the imbrication of historical materialism and 
theology: 
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Bekanntlich soll es einen Automaten gegeben haben, der so konstruiert gewesen sei, 
daß er jeden Zug eines Schachspielers mit einem Gegenzuge erwidert habe, der ihm 
den Gewinn der Partie sicherte. Eine Puppe in türkischer Tracht, eine Wasserpfeife 
im Munde, saß vor dem Brett, das auf einem geräumigen Tisch aufruhte. Durch ein 
System von Spiegeln wurde die Illusion erweckt, dieser Tisch sei von allen Seiten 
durchsichtig. In Wahrheit saß ein buckliger Zwerg darin, der ein Meister im 
Schachspiel war und die Hand der Puppe an Schnüren lenkte. Zu dieser Apparatur 
kann man sich ein Gegenstück in der Philosophie vorstellen. Gewinnen soll immer 
die Puppe, die man historischen Materialismus nennt. Sie kann es ohne weiteres mit 
jedem aufnehmen, wenn sie die Theologie in ihren Dienst nimmt, die heute 
bekanntlich klein und häßlich ist und sich ohnehin nicht darf blicken lassen.63 
In Benjamin’s example the small, ugly dwarf of theology controls the puppet of historical 
materialism such that he wins his game of chess every time. Further, as Vardoulakis argues, 
the cooperation of historical materialism and theology in Benjamin’s anecdote does not 
propose a unity of the two, but rather, like a doppelgänger, holds both in suspension.64 In 
contradistinction to Benjamin’s thesis, in Weltgeist Superstar the theology of Weltgeist and 
Marx’s historical materialism collapse into one another. It is the dwarf Weltgeist that 
invisibly, at least for a time, conducts Marx such that it is the time of capital that always 
wins. In this metaphor cum literary reality, Weltgeist and Marx control P.M. in their game of 
intergalactic capital; he is a mere world-historical pawn, moving across the chess board of 
their prefigured narrative, the cunning of reason and the world history of capital. 
Thus, P.M.’s true task was not to return to discover the paradoxical origin of Tara as 
Marx led him to believe. Marx knew from the beginning that it was P.M./Naryan and Dana 
who crept past the sleeping Weltgeist, which explains the similarity of the Tarani language to 
Sanskrit. As they explain to him: “meine Aufgabe bestünde eben darin, diese unnütze Zierde 
der Schöpfung zu warnen, die Absichten Danas zu durchkreuzen, das Ewig-Männliche, den 
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Weltgeist zu retten.  Ich müsse den Zauber Danas durchbrechen, indem ich den 
Verlockungen Taras entsage” (WG, 219). P.M. is to break the spell of Dana, her control of 
Tara, by renouncing the temptation to stay, paralleling in a way Christ’s renunciation of 
Satan’s temptation control of the profane world, and thus restore the patriarchal order of 
history and capital. 
With Marx and Weltgeist now on the planet Tara, P.M.’s story, his world-historical 
narrative is almost complete. According to the last part of the Amudi legend: “Schließlich 
durfte der Yogi zur Belohnung eine Zeitlang im Land der Glückseligen – Kamtara – wohnen, 
wo er jedoch hochmütig wurde und zur Reinigung in die Hölle der schleichenden Geister – 
Gulapa – gehen mußte” (WG, 81). Having lived on Tara, the land of the happy, P.M. must 
now traverse the hell inhabited by the “Gulapa.” Rather than a “Hölle,” however, this is the 
“Höhlensystem” erected by the “Gyului,” the original dwarf-like inhabitants of Tara (WG, 
220). The Gyului represent the only threat to the utopia of Tara and have been engaged in 
battle with the Tarani especially over the Tarani’s development of motors that to the Gyului 
are “gefährliche[] Störungen” (WG, 223). Moreover, the Gyului have become addicted to a 
substance called “Tarama” that “bestand aus der Gehirnmasse toter, erwachsener Tarani” and 
“beruht auf der Angst und dem Haß gegenüber den Gyului” similar to the Xagas’ extraction 
of emotional energy from Earth (WG, 222-223). As Marx and Weltgeist lead him through the 
Gyului tunnel system, they come across a circle of men sitting with the Gyului, among whom 
sit Rudolf Bahro, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Toni Negri, Mao, Lenin, and Pestalozzi in addition to 
Candide, “der junge Werther,” and Orestes (WG, 221). The caves of Gyului are the literal 
underground of the representatives of Marxism after Marx, themselves serving Marx and 
Weltgeist’s affirmative theory of capital. At the same time, gathered in this underground are 
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the figures of P.M.’s literary genealogy: Voltaire’s Candide as a parody of Leibniz’s 
monadology as creating Earth as a utopia of the best of all possible worlds, Goethe’s 
epistolary Die Leiden des jungen Werthers, and the mythical figure of Orestes, who in Robert 
Graves’s account killed his mother and ended a matriarchy.65 Thus P.M. is confronted with 
his theoretical and literary prefigurations and the overarching philosophical and narrative 
trajectories into which he has been inscribed. 
All of these great male characters of literature and philosophy are in attendance to 
hear the plan of the Gyului to finally rid themselves of the Tarani: 
In ihrer Verzweiflung hatten sich die Gyului zum “Großen Plan” entschlossen: durch 
die unterirdischen Gänge, die sie unter den Städten der Tarani gegraben hatten, 
würden sie gleichzeitig in einer Nacht in die Häsuer eindringen und alle Tarani 
umbringen. Es würde da nein letztes, großes Tarama-Fest geben. Dann würde man 
ohne die Droge leben müssen. (WG, 223). 
The Gyului plan to slaughter the Tarani in a colonial uprising against those who have 
intruded on their native soil, would restore their control of the planet and secure a victory 
over the utopian matriarchy and the allure to remain behind on the utopian Tara as well as the 
conquest of Marx, Weltgeist, history, and capital. As penance for his hubris, namely for 
wanting to betray the demands of world history capital prescribed by Marx and Weltgeist by 
remaining on Tara, P.M., like the others in attendance, becomes ensnared in the final plan of 
the Gyului. In one final appearance as doppelgänger, it appears that P.M. will fulfill his role 
as world-historical figure and the narrative of the passion play by sacrificing himself for the 
eternal life of capital. The Gyului are practitioners of psychotronics, creating out-of-body 
experiences. In the Gyului caves, P.M. confronts his doppelgänger, which, in order to allay 
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narrative confusion, he labels himself diacritically as Ich’’ and his psychotronic other Ich’ 
(WG, 222). At one point, P.M. looks on as the Gyului begin to eat him:  
Ich’ fühlte, daß sie mich’ fressen wollten und freute mich’ darauf. Die zärtlichen, 
langen Zünglein der Gyului links und rechts von mir’ tasteten schon meine’ Arme ab, 
kitzelten mich’ an den Wangen. […] Ich’’ bemerkte voller Entsetzen, daß ich’ von 
zwei Gyului umzügelt wurde, daß deren Hände schon nach mir’ griffen, ihre 
schrecklichen Rachen sich öffneten, um mir’ die Halsschlagadern zu durchbeißen. 
(WG, 224) 
The Gyului perform a virtual, fictional Eucharist with P.M.’s doppelgänger, through which 
he would have actualized his role as the savior of Tara, returning it to the Gyului and to the 
control of capital. P.M., however, cannot die in his own story. His world-historical task is to 
renounce Nairi/Dana’s temptation to remain on Tara forever, not to destroy Tara per se, as 
Tagar would have it. More importantly, however, this renunciation—leaving utopia—is the 
precondition for utopia itself. Thus the other narrative in which he is enveloped, utopia, has 
the final word. Ultimately, P.M. must secure the continued death of Marxism as a 
revolutionary theory of communism and preserve the affirmative hybrid capitalism of 
Marx/Weltgeist in order for utopia, the other place, as well as utopia, the book, to exist. The 
death of Marxist theory is the necessary condition for the survival of utopia. This is the 
passion as enacted by Weltgeist Superstar. It is the story of the betrayal and sacrifice of 
Marxism for the sake of utopia.  
During his time in the caves, however, P.M. notices that Marx, having spent too much 
time away from the life-support of his spaceship, is becoming increasingly weaker. P.M has 
to drag Marx back to the ship before he dies. They reach the ship and Marx, who has fallen 
unconscious, comes to only to level a series of insults at P.M.: “‘Idiot,’ fluchte er heiser, ‘du 
hast alles verpfuscht.’ […] Er schimpte weiter. ‘Dummkopf, Kretin, Tölpel, Strohkopf, 
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Amateur, Naiviling! All meine Anstrengungen waren vergeblich!’” (WG, 228). Unbeknownst 
to P.M., Marx had a completely different plan in mind for P.M.: 
Er hatte die Xagas übers Ohr hauen wollen. Nach seinem absichtlich herbeigeführten 
Tod hätte ich die Suppenschüssel übernehmen können und wäre nicht an ein 
Abkommen mit den Xagas gebunden gewesen.  Das heißt, ich hätte selbst auf der 
Erde intervenieren können, Leute an Bord holen können usw. Jetzt ginge das nicht 
mehr. (WG, 228) 
Marx had thus planned to escape from his own world-historical role as the puppet of the 
Weltgeist and intergalactic capital by dying and thus freeing himself from the eternal 
contemporaneity of capital. With P.M. in control of the ship and not bound to a contractual 
parasitic relationship with the Xagas, Marx’s revolutionary thought could finally come into 
being. This would have ceased the perpetual return and continuation of history, in whose 
service he has been condemned to circling the globe providing the theory for the extraction 
of terrestrial capital and reinsert him into a revolutionary time, finally letting the dead bury 
the dead, to speak with Marx. To be sure, Marx’ failed plan could never have succeeded. 
Killing Marx and thereby negating his allegiance to his affirmative theories would be the 
rebirth of a revolutionary Marx and the end of Tara as well as everything that led up to this 
point. As written into his very theory, including the Amudi legend composed for P.M., 
everything has to have happened precisely in this manner. Were P.M. to take over the ship, 
nothing that led to his terrestrial and extraterrestrial adventures would ever have transpired, 
he would never have made it aboard Marx’ spacecraft to begin with, and Tara would never 
have existed. Thus, P.M. fulfills his world-historical role by saving Marx and his contract 
with the Xagas and securing Tara as a utopian planet outside the confines of the time and 
space of capital. 
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Back aboard the ship, P.M. and Marx are visited again by the Xagas. They explain 
that although Marx’s theories have helped them expropriated a large amount of affective 
capital from the Earth, predicting the sites of revolution and thus energy have become 
unreliable (WG, 234). In order to increase the efficiency with which they are able to 
accumulate energy from the Earth, the Xagas come to an agreement with P.M. The Xagas 
“sind […] nun bereit, mit unseren mächtigen Raumschiffen in die Ereignisse einzugriefen. 
Um dies durchführen zu können, ist es allerdings notwendig, daß es auf der Erde ein Netz 
von Informanten und Gesprächspartnern gibt, das mit allen entscheidenden gesellschaftlichen 
Bewegungen und explosive Schichten verbunden ist” (WG, 235). P.M. is to serve as their 
earthly representative, establishing a network of people willing to work with the Xagas 
primarily through composing a “Bericht[], der alle Informationen über die neue 
Zusammenarbeit enthält” (WG, 235). His task is essentially to write is own epistolary. P.M. 
approves of the plan and the Xagas agree to place him where ever in the world so as to best 
carry out his work and give him a powerful ring, with which he can levitate and produce a 
defensive shield among other things, but which he can never remove. Further, to alleviate the 
stress and danger of such work, namely the threat that the KGB and CIA, as P.M. states, 
“erbarmungslose Jagd auf uns machen werden,” the Xagas establish Tara as a 
“Erholungsplanet[]” (WG, 236-237). Tara can only continue to exist as long as intergalactic 
capital remains firmly in place and this transpires through P.M.’s epistolary that creates a 
network of communication between sites of potential revolution and the Xagas. 
 As the pact between the Xagas and P.M. is concluded, Weltgeist exclaims: “Wir 
haben sie reingelegt! Hurrah!” (WG, 239). Who exactly have they managed to outsmart and 
in what way? The ambivalence of the pronoun “sie,” corresponds to both the Xagas as well 
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as Dana and Nairi. On the one hand, they have maneuvered the Xagas into finally taking 
action on Earth. At the same time, however, they have secured the continued creation of Tara 
as a utopian “Erholungsplanet” for the members of P.M.’s terrestrial network. In this way, 
they have accomplished little more than the perpetuation of the past, present, and future and 
the confirmation of Weltgeist’s cunning reason. Indeed, his enthusiasm mirrors Marx’ 
exactly when he states that he, too, was able to outsmart the Xagas by secretly distributing 
the instructions for how to contact him thus motivating the entire story: “‘Aber ich habe sie 
hie und da hereingelegt, ich hab einige Manuskripte versteckt’” (WG, 117). On the other 
hand, in “fooling” the Xagas into creating Tara, they have also broken Dana/Nairi’s hold 
over the planet. Part of the Xaga’s plan, and Weltgeist’s as well, is to set the Gyului upon the 
inhabitants of Tara “um die Attraktivität dieses Planet so stark zu vermindern, daß die 
Kontaktpersonen nicht allzu zahlreich auswandern würden und so dem Aufbau des 
Kontaktnetzes entzogen würden” (WG, 246). On two fronts, the cunning of reason and 
Weltgeist have again succeeded in safeguarding history and the “Ewig-Männliche.” This 
twofold victory is, moreover, the production of utopia as a literary space. Both instances 
create the conditions of possibility for the existence of Tara, namely by ensuring that P.M. 
writes his report, Weltgeist Superstar, and does not, indeed cannot, remain in utopia. 
 P.M. returns to Earth, choosing to reside in a rural commune in Switzerland. When he 
arrives at the secluded house in a Swiss forest, occupied by different men and women who 
share in the necessary daily work, P.M. is again confronted with a paradox. Introducing 
himself as Bruno to the occupants of the commune, P.M. confirms his intention to fully 
participate in all of the daily chores and even to invest 10,000 Franks to the communal coffer. 
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All of his promises come as quite a shock to the other communards because they have heard 
all of this before: 
Alle blickten mich verwundert an. “Was ist los?” fragte ich, weil mich ihr Schweigen 
zu lang dünkte. “Nun,” sagte Hanspeter zögernd, “Du bist schon der Vierte, der mit 
den gleichen Vorstellungen hier ankommt. Sie waren alle sehr ähnlich, in Deinem 
Alter, allein, fleißig, freundlich, kamen von irgendwoher, kannten alle Leute und die 
Situation, wollten etwas schreiben. Sie wußten nicht, wohin sie wollten, waren sehr 
aufgeschlossen, nahmen an unseren Unternehmungen teil. (WG, 262)     
P.M. has again returned to the site from where everything will begin again, leading to all the 
events that have transpired thusfar in the story. He too is taken aback by all of this and asks 
himself: “War es ein Zufall? Ein allgemeiner Trend von herumirrenden Existenzen aus den 
sechziger Jahren” (WG, 262)? P.M. is, however, not just any aimlessly wandering ghost of 
the sixties. He is this very spirit, or better, its world-historical, messianic doppelgänger which 
must sacrifice and betray its faith in revolutionary theory, in general, and Marxism, in 
particular, thereby safeguarding the utopia of literature as a space of alterity. What is then 
quite heretical to the spirit of the 1960s, the death of Marxism, is the only thing that can save 
it. 
The members of the commune present P.M. with letters written to himself as the 
“Urvater” Naryan from two of his revolutionary agents and Xaga contacts informing them of 
their whereabouts, one in Paris, the other in Brooklyn, thus confirming P.M.’s identity and 
his previous visit to the commune (WG, 263). The climax of this revelation occurs, however, 
when P.M. is presented with a package addressed to Bruno containing a book titled 
“Weltgeist Superstar,” the word for word account of P.M.’s travels and experiences that 
corresponds to the page numbers of Weltgeist Superstar (WG, 269). Thus the narrative 
completes its own arc and returns to the epistolary. It is P.M.’s letters and communication 
with the other exiles of history as well as his report, “Weltgeist Superstar,” that is responsible 
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for the creation and survival of the utopian Tara, but also that which links Tara to Earth. In 
this way, his epistolary both “marks and defies the borders” that it traverses, as Simon 
argues.66 Thus, the utopian planet Tara is distinguished from Earth, bordered off from it 
much as More’s Utopia is separated by a vast ocean and Butler’s Erewhon by a mountain 
range, and at the same time connected to it through the communicative link established by 
the epistolary qua utopian literature. Just as Butler’s and More’s works create other worlds 
that lie both in and beyond the known world, Weltgeist Superstar as utopian, epistolary 
fiction creates a science-fiction planet out of this same mold. 
Astonished to receive a package from himself containing the book documenting his 
travels, P.M. turns to the entry from that day. He reads how Dana, who lives at the commune 
under the name Trudi, attempts to free P.M. of his Xaga ring, which binds him to the Xaga 
and to his role as a world-historical doppelgänger. In the book, Dana is successful and now 
wears the ring herself and it appears that she has indeed outsmarted everyone, Marx, 
Weltgeist, and the Xaga and finally broken the cycle. As with Marx’ attempt to free himself 
from the shackles of the Xaga and ultimately Weltgeist, this plan can only fail. P.M. 
continues to read from the “Nachbemerkung des Verlags” which states that he disappeared 
on this evening from the commune and that neither the house nor the author, P.M., can be 
found (WG, 271). While all of this happens in the book that was mailed to P.M., it is clear 
that this is not the case. The disclaimer at the beginning that states that the author prefers to 
remain anonymous as well as the “interview” that takes place at the very beginning with 
P.M., “dem Autor von WELTGEIST SUPERSTAR,” are testament to the fact that the book 
does not, indeed, end as it does (WG, 9). Rather, the final lines of Weltgeist Superstar state: 
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“Dann schloß ich das Buch. Niemand hatte zugehört” (WG, 272). The fact that no one was 
listening as P.M. read aloud from his own account is again the necessary determinant both 
for the planet of Tara as well as the book itself. Were it to transpire in the manner dictated by 
the already-written “Weltgeist Superstar,” then nothing would have come to pass. P.M.’s 
return is the prerequisite for the utopia of Tara that is made possible through literature – the 
return of the utopian traveler to write his story. 
 
Conclusion: Literature as Utopia, Utopia as Paradox 
 
It is no mystery that one of the main theoretical red threads running through the West 
German student movement – like every other student movement of the day – was a Western 
variant of Marxism. On the centrality of this particular theory in the political events of the 
day, Jan-Werner Müller recently contended that “the students […] clearly held to the belief 
that their actions were inseparable from political theory.”67 In 1968, it had indeed appeared 
as if the time had come for revolution, that all the key elements were in place with the 
students at the forefront, and that the situation in Europe combined with movements abroad 
(in the U.S., in Latin America, and in Vietnam) signaled a turning point and the inevitable 
end to the continued repression and imperialism wrought by capitalism. As Jeffery Herf 
states in a recent essay: 
“1968,” like “1917” and “1945,” was one of the three key Hegelian moments in the 
history of twentieth-century Communism not only in Europe but around the world. 
That is, it was a moment in which parts of the international communist movement 
became convinced that the actual course of events was conforming to their 
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understanding of a historical teleology pointing toward the fulfillment of 
revolutionary aspirations.68 
P.M.’s Weltgeist Superstar takes these two strands, Marxist theory and the historical, 
revolutionary Hegelian moment, as the starting point for its query of the fate of theory and 
utopia after 1968 and the answer is nothing less than heretical. Marxism has cashed in its 
critical, revolutionary currency for eternal life in the time and space of capital and his co-
pilot in this affirmative, positivistic world is none other than Hegel’s “Weltgeist.” 
 P.M.’s novel is, however, more than just an exploration of theory and the death 
thereof in the wake of the student movement, and exercise in literary production and utopia. 
As with the other works in this project, it is a highly self-aware and self-reflexive text that is 
not only theoretically smart and savvy, responding to and critiquing Marx and Hegel, but it is 
also aware of itself as literature and places itself into this history as well. Its theoretical 
agility is matched only by its literary prowess that negotiates the realms of epistolary fiction, 
hard-boiled detective stories, myth, the passion play, science fiction, and utopian literatures 
and in doing so makes an argument for literature over theory as the inheritor and arbiter of a 
critical negativity. The various literary genealogies that are intertextually conjoined in 
Weltgeist Superstar are not a sign of a pretentious, hollow knowledge of literature. Rather 
they show that the novel is not only part of a bankrupt theoretical heritage, but a 
compromised aesthetic legacy in the service of the culture industry. Weltgeist Superstar does 
not, however, hide this fact. It wears it on its sleeve, in the title of the work itself as well as 
the opening disclaimer that offers itself for sale. In doing so, P.M.’s novel does not become 
the literary affirmative counterpart to Marxism’s commodification, but its negation. That is, 
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it is a mimetic representation of the conditions of its production. The novel accomplishes 
what Marx in this spaceship cannot, namely create a critical and negative distance from itself. 
In Weltgeist Superstar, the fate of utopia and its relation to theory come face to face with 
their own dialectic, with paradox and contradiction, that rather than being sublated into a 
false reconciliation, a utopia in the here and now, exist in and through their very tension. The 
preservation of both theory and utopia can only be accomplished through their continual 
negation in literature. 
This dialectic is what Marx has exchanged for immortality and what survives in 
Weltgeist Superstar as the literary utopian space of contradiction and paradox. Utopia, as 
both P.M.’s and More’s work demonstrates, is always the place where one is never allowed 
the stay. In order for it to exist, it must constantly negate itself, its story must be told, and in 
doing so it becomes its own chimera. This is the inherent paradox of utopia—its existence is 
created by its fictionalization, its becoming an unbelievable account either of the ship-
wrecked sailor on an immaculate island or the outer space traveler discovering a pristine 
planet. Utopia is the text that is aware of its necessity as a text. This paradoxical self-
reflexivity is the crux of Louis Marin’s argument concerning the utopia’s play with textual 
spaces, itself the child of the 1960s: “[…] utopia is the book in which the book has been 
deconstructed by showing the processes that constituted it. It is, in a manner of speaking, the 
book of the book where the act of reading encounters its accomplishment and end.”69 Indeed, 
it is through P.M.’s act of reading his own work at the end of Weltgeist Superstar that the text 
reaches its end, securing itself as a text and with it utopia by confronting it with its own 
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paradox. Utopia in P.M.’s text demonstrates its dialectic, its simultaneous preservation and 
negation through which alone it is able to exist as a paradox and a contradiction. When 
Marxism and theory have become affirmative as was seemingly the case in central Europe by 
the late seventies, it is only in literature that utopia maintains its socio-critical force as a 
space of dialectical negativity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Looking Backward, Looking Forward: 
From Other Worlds to Simulations of Alterity  
 
 
 
Utopia Reconstructed 
 
West Germany after sixty-eight was a period of unprecedented literary and theoretical 
production. On the one hand, New Subjectivity represented a much desired return to 
literature that gave speech back to what David Roberts calls the “literarisch sprachlose 
Generation” of sixty-eight.1 On the other, new literary theories from the likes of Hans Robert 
Jauß, Wolfgang Iser, Karl Heinz Bohrer, Nicolas Born, and others challenged the role of 
literature as either a purely political, documentary endeavor (Enzensberger) or a negative one 
ultimately unable to communicate its critical intent to a mass audience (Adorno). Further, 
literature during this period was shown to know about and engage with other emerging 
cultural, political, and aesthetic theories outside of Germany. These ranged from 
postcolonialism (Said), ethnological reevaluations (Geertz), and spatial issues (Lefebvre) to 
photography (Sontag) and even prefigured others in interesting ways (Bhabha, Baudrillard). 
Literature as Utopia inserted itself into this cultural, literary, and intellectual history in order 
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to expose another side to the return to literature and the reevaluation of literary theory after 
the watershed of sixty-eight. Rather than posing a clean break between the two decades, this 
project challenged such caesuras that are quick to proffer large-scale changes and in doing so 
ignore other burgeoning trends. As I have argued throughout the course of this work, 
literature after sixty-eight was not solely invested in a “new” politics of the self and 
subjectivity, but interceded in investigations of other, alterior spaces. In short, the idea of 
utopia continued to exist in the wake of the student movement.  
The texts chosen for this work illuminated the function of utopia as a literary space of 
contradiction and paradox related to knowledge and space. They also displayed the myriad 
ways in which literature not only began to know about and respond to new literary, political, 
and cultural theories, but also do theory. This was achieved by querying relative outliers to 
the post-68 literary landscape, namely postcolonial and science-fiction literature. The 
emergence of “good” science fiction and the beginnings of postcolonial literature signaled a 
renewed interest in other worlds that, along with new theoretical models, began to interrogate 
literature’s role in the creation and promulgation of knowledge about these spaces. In each 
case, Literature as Utopia demonstrated how the failed politicization of utopia as in the 
sixities gave way to the aestheticization thereof after sixty-eight. Particularly in the medium 
of literature, utopia reemerged as a mode of critical self-reflection and self-reflexivity 
concerning the representation of spaces of alterity. Rather than succumbing to an all-
encompassing malaise, the aestheticization of utopia in literature after sixty-eight secured the 
survival of its fundamental idea—the contradiction and paradox of knowing and creating 
other worlds—even while the term utopia seemed to have lost its social, cultural, and 
political currency in the new emphasis on subjectivity.  
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Reconstructing the idea of utopia after sixty-eight necessitated a dialectical 
investigation of the epistemologies and representations of other worlds. On the one hand, 
postcolonial literature engaged in a critical, empirical epistemology that traced the limits of 
knowledge about other worlds and, on the other, science fiction probed the speculative 
epistemologies surrounding imaginary worlds. In the first section, it was shown how 
postcolonial literature began with a critique of the colonial underpinnings of knowledge and 
its promulgation through supposedly objective means and culminated in the idea of utopia as 
a space of contradiction and paradox anchored in and by the medium of literature. Nicolas 
Born detailed the imbrication journalism’s and photojournalism’s supposed benevolent 
neutrality in the continuing colonization of other, postcolonial worlds and proposed literature 
as a space in which the desire for other worlds confronts its own colonial shadow. Hubert 
Fichte and Leonore Mau’s joint work traverses similar visual and literary terrain, though the 
perpetrator is ethnology and ethnographies. Their work demonstrated the possibility of 
literature and photography to create a space in which the reader/viewer confronts this 
colonial culpability and at the same time defuses it through the reflexivity and reciprocity 
produced by the work.  
The following section detailed how science-fiction’s utopian premises populated 
outer space with “this-worldly Other Worlds” in order to stage a critique of capital’s 
exploitation and appropriation of these worlds.2 Kluge’s science-fiction text embarked on a 
voyage into the outer space of capital, in which its economic imperialism survives the 
catastrophic demise of Earth. At the same time, this work juxtaposed the future of 
extraterrestrial capital with its allegorical other, the terrestrial, spatial ruins of its past in order 
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to perform a critique of the present spaces of capital. Lastly, P.M.’s novel brought these 
various trajectories and discourses together in an investigation of the fate and future of 
Marxism as a revolutionary philosophy. P.M. heretically shredded the potential of Marxist 
theory after 1968 by exploring myriad literary topographies on its way to espousing literature 
as the inheritor of utopia based on the paradox that the author, like the traditional utopian 
traveler, must always abandon the utopia of other worlds so that they may continue to exist. 
By staging its examination of literature’s other worlds in such a dialectical manner, 
Literature as Utopia created a more complete picture of the intricacy and complexity of the 
idea of utopa after sixty-eight that neither science ficton nor postcolonialsim alone could 
accomplish. Accordingly, the two chapters in each section further developed this picture in 
that the interplay between the two works spoke both with and against each other thereby 
elucidating the contradictory and paradoxical nature of the idea of utopia as it emerges and is 
exemplified in literature. In each case, it was shown that these texts are exemplars of a self-
aware utopian literature that recognizes and constantly critiques its very premises, namely 
that to write about is to take part in the creation of other worlds. Rather than resolving this 
fundamental problem, each work lays its cards on the table simultaneously displaying and 
maintaining the paradoxical paradigm that drives it. 
  
Beyond the Seventies: Postmodernism, Simulation, and Utopian Skepticism 
 
The more pressing question at this juncture is, however, not so much where we have 
been but what the future holds for postcolonialism, science fiction, and, moreover, the idea 
utopia after the seventies. The postcolonial and science-fiction literature discussed in 
240 
Literature as Utopia established a pivotal connection and reassessment of the sixties and 
seventies. These works not only underscored the utopias of the student movement but were 
springboards into a critical reexamination thereof that enabled us to reevaluate commonly-
held presuppositions about the seventies. In short, just as an analysis of these texts shed light 
on the sixties from the vantage point of the following decade, it also opened up a different 
view of the seventies. In such a way, it is also possible to look forward into the next decade 
through the lens of these selfsame genres so as to query and similarly challenge what was 
“new” about the 1980s; looking forward by looking backward and vice versa. With the help 
of the idea of utopia established in this project we can potentially think the rise of 
postmodernism in the eighties and the accompanying utopian skepticism differently.  
While New Subjectivity beginning in 1973 purportedly announced the official end of 
the spirit of the 1960s, accentuated by the passage of the Radicals Ordinance a year before, 
the 1970s are said to end in postmodernism, in general, and simulation, in particular. As Paul 
Michael Lützeler argues, the postmodern literature of the 1980s turned its back on the grand 
utopian projects of modernity:  
Abschied genommen wurde auch von einem Engagement-Konzept unmittelbarer 
gesellschaftlicher Wirkungssuche, wie es die 68er Generation mit ihrer 
dokumentarischen Literatur eine Weile vertrat, dann aber selbst als unpraktikabel 
aufgab, um sich enttäuscht von der – schließlich für tot erklärten – Literatur 
vorübergehend abzuwenden. Auch die einseitige Konzentration auf Ich- und 
Selbsterfahrung, wie sie für die auf Authentizitäit pochende Literatur der Neuen 
Subjektivität in den siebziger Jahren kennzeichnend war, ist (inclusive ihrer 
dialogischen Variante, dem anheimelnden Sich-Verständigen mittels poetischem 
Text) inzwischen als zu schmale Basis für eine zeitgenössische Ästhetik erkannt 
worden.3 
In Lützeler’s account, the literary aesthetic of the 1960s as well as the 1970s is no longer 
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viable for describing the postmodern literary turn of the 1980s that is, Lützeler continues: 
“weniger angestrengt und ambitiös, weniger totalitäitssüchtig und mythosorientiert, weniger 
utopieversessen und manifesthaft, weniger einheitsfreudig und eurozentristisch, […] weniger 
referentiell und repräsentativ, weniger stilrein und hochkulturell zugeht als in der Literatur 
der Moderne.”4 One of the principle presuppositions concerning the new postmodern 
literature of the eighties is the appearance of simulation that Jean Baudrillard defined at the 
beginning of the decade as “having no relation to any reality whatsoever” and “no longer of 
the order of appearance,” in essence a copy without an original.5  
Herman Schlösser locates the breakthrough of postmodern simulation in West 
Germany in 1983 with the publication of Bodo Morshäuser’s Die Berliner Simulation.6 
Schlösser summarizes:  
Bodo Morshäuser’s Erzählung […] erzählt eine merkwürdige verschobene, 
unsexuelle Liebesgeschichte, in der ein deutscher Schriftsteller und ein englisches 
Mädchen sich treffen, zusammenleben und auf den Straßen tanzen. Aber alles, was 
sie erleben ist “Simulation.” Glück, Unglück, Liebe, Haß und politische Aktion sind 
nur noch als Zitate vergangener Glücks-, Liebes-, Aktivitätserfahrungen möglich.7 
Schlösser’s diagnosis of the shift to literature as a space of purely simulated experiences in 
Morshäuser’s story is echoed as well by Ulla Biernat in her analysis of West German 
literature’s encounters and representations of the foreign in the eighties. “Simulierte 
Authentizität und die paradoxe Verschränkung von Versthen und nicht-Verstehen des 
Fremden,” Biernat explains, “sind die wesentlichen Kennzeichen des Reisediskurses in den 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 351. 
5 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), p. 6 
6 Schlösser, “Literaturgeschichte und Theorie,” in Gegenwartsliteratur seit 1968, eds. Klaus Briegleb and Sigrid 
Weigel (München: DTV, 1992), pp. 385-403, p. 401ff.  
7 Ibid., p. 401. 
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achtziger Jahren.”8 In Biernat’s analysis the desire for alterity in the seventies is replaced by 
simulated authenticity and alterity in the following decade that no longer has any basis in the 
reality of other worlds.9 If this is indeed the case, then we can push Schlösser’s date father 
back to 1981 with the publication of Peter Schneider’s essay Die Botschaft des Pferdekopfs. 
In this work, Schneider details his trip to and return from Latin America. Paul Michael 
Lützeler characterizes this work as a document of postmodern globalization, democratization, 
and utopian skepticism stating that 
[Schneider hält] die Beobachtung fest, daß der Mythos von der westlichen 
Zivilisation von der Phantasie der Massen in den armen Ländern Besitz ergriffen 
habe. […] Wir können, fährt Schneider fort, von den “armen” Völkern nur lernen, 
indem wir hören, was sie von uns lernen wollen.10     
In Schneider’s account, then, any sense of the alterity of other worlds has evaporated under 
the sway of simulation. Accordingly, the alterity accorded to utopia as an other world 
disappears as well.  
A pivotal piece of this process was the rise of new media in the 1980s. Biernat notes, 
for instance, the increased influence of especially television and computers in the simulated 
authenticity and alterity endemic of the decade: 
Die 80er Jahre sind darüber hinaus das Jahrzehnt, in dem sich das Fernsehen und der 
Computer auf rasante Weise quantitativ und qualitativ differenzieren, neue Formen 
der medialen Rezeption und Kommunikation hervorbringen. Im Zuge der 
Neudefinition des Verhältnisses von Realität und Fiktion erhält auch die Frage nach 
dem Verstehen dieser Medien-Wirklichkeiten eine andere Dimension, nicht zuletzt in 
bezug auf den Kontakt zwischen den Kulturen.11   
                                                 
8 Ulla Biernat, Ich bin nicht der erste Fremde hier: Zur deutschsprachigen Reiseliteratur nach 1945 (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2004), p. 135. 
9 Ibid. 138. 
10 Lützeler, “Multikulturelles, Postkoloniales und Europäisches in der Postmoderne: Zur Internationalität der 
deutschsprachigen Gegenwartsliteratur,” in Kulturelle Grenzziehungen im Spiegel der Literaturen: 
Nationalismus, Regionalismus, Fundamentalismus, eds. Horst Turk, Brigitte Schultze, and Roberto Simanowski 
(Göttingen: Wallenstein, 1998), pp. 104-121, p. 110, 116. 
11 Ulla Biernat, Ich bin nicht der erste Fremde hier, p. 138. 
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In Schneider’s essay the role of these new media, television in particular, plays an integral 
part in the collapse of other worlds into simulated spaces. The central figure of his essay, the 
eponymous horse’s head, signals for Schneider the ultimate demise of alterity. Welcoming 
him from a television advertisement, the message the horse’s head delivers is one of the 
commercialization and commodification of other worlds, but also their simulation.12 That is, 
other worlds have embraced the cultural products and new methods of cultural production 
and transmission of the First World to such an extent that they begin themselves to simulate 
the authenticity and alterity ascribed to them. The contact between cultures and worlds that 
Biernat mentions, becomes, then, one of mutual simulation: the First World creates 
simulations of the Third World while the Third, in turn, simulates itself through adopting this 
condition from the First. This process of simulation produces a situation in which other 
worlds are no longer alterior, but only re-presentations and recreations of the simulated 
authenticity and alterity produced about them. When simulation collapses the distinction 
between reality and appearance into the latter, other worlds cease to exist as such, becoming 
a referent without a foundation in reality.   
 
Beyond Literature: Postcolonial and Science-Fiction Film after Sixty-Eight  
 
Regardless of when one dates the shift to simulation in the eighties, the issue of 
simulation is not altogether new to the decade. Both postcolonialism and science fiction in 
the seventies foreshadow and tackle the idea and aesthetic of simulation and its 
consequences. In Chapter 1, for instance, I revealed how Nicolas Born’s Die Fälschung 
                                                 
12 Schneider, Die Botschaft des Pferdekopfs und andere Essais aus dem friedlichen Jahrzehnt (Darmstadt: 
Luchterhand, 1981), p. 21.  
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already wrestled with the idea of simulation and its neocolonial effects in the image world of 
photography while demonstrating that literature had not yet succumb to this fate. While this 
dissertation explored literature as a medium of the aestheticization of utopia after sixty-eight, 
the aesthetic and medial specifity of utopia was by no means limited to this realm. In the 
1970s, for instance, it was not literature, but rather film that became a crucial medium for 
interrogating and exploring the possibilities of simulation in the two genres not as a collapse 
of reality into mere appearance, but as upholding the two in its creation of other worlds. A 
case in point is Herbert Achternbusch’s 1979 film Der Komantsche. Der Komantsche tells 
the story of its eponymous protagonist, a Comanche, who, after being shot by his wife, lies in 
a coma in a Bavarian sanitarium in which he is the sole patient. While unconscious, his 
dreams are taped and displayed on a monitor in his room and are subsequently sold to 
television by his wife. In one set of dreams the Comanche finds himself in Sri Lanka rousing 
a sleeping Buddha to query, “wo [er] eine Frau finde[t], die [er] lieben kann.”13  The 
subsequent dream that forms the large part of the film follows the Comanche as he attempts 
to locate his tribesmen. With Achternbusch’s clever play on words, the Comanche in a coma 
does not find the tribe (Stammbrüder) to which he belongs, but rather the camaraderie of 
drinking companions (Stammtischbrüder), who he attempts to band together as fellow 
Comanche. At the close of the film, the Comanche awakens and, as Gerd Gemünden 
summarizes, “paddles his canoe on the streets of Munich, as all water has turned into 
pavement.”14 Achternbusch’s Comanche thus seeks to transfer the simulated other worlds of 
his televised fantasies into the real world, ultimately preferring the former over the latter.   
                                                 
13 Herbert Achternbusch, Der Komantsche.  Quoted from the reprinted screenplay in the volume Es ist ein 
leichtes beim gehen den Boden zu berühren, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), pp. 43-71, p. 52. 
14 Gemünden, “The Indianerphantasien of Herbert Achternbusch,” The Germanic Review, 73:1 (Winter 1998), 
pp. 32-50, p. 35.   
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Subtending Achternbusch’s film is an emphasis on the simulation and 
commercialization of other spaces. On the one hand, the other worlds in Der Komantsche 
have been reduced to televised and commodified images of his fantasies. Instead of 
stereotypical Native American feathers, the protagonist of the film wears antennas “to 
indicate,” Gemünden argues, “that his mind is being exploited by the culture industry.”15  On 
the other hand, the other worlds of Sri Lanka and the American West, the myth of the Wild 
West embodied by the Comanche, are mere simulations. They are little more than images in 
the mind reproduced on the television screens in the sanitarium. At the same time, however, 
Achternbusch plays with the ideas of alterity and the authenticity thereof by subverting the 
notion of primitivism through simulation. While his Comanche certainly “fit[s] into the long 
list of stereotypes established by modern Western tradition,” Achternbusch foregrounds the 
“artificiality of their performance and the constructedness of their subjects” forfeiting any 
claim to authentic or illusory representations of alterity.16 Thus, the simulated or feigned 
authenticity of otherness becomes a method of both antirealism and anticolonialism.17 
Simulation in the realm of film and television is, then, not unlike the postcolonial critiques 
made by both Born and Fichte.  As I demonstrated, neither of these works aims to 
authentically represent other worlds, but, like Achternbusch’s film, divulge the 
constructedness of representations of other worlds. Further, as with these two chapters that 
make up the postcolonial section of Literature as Utopia, Achternbusch’s work beings with a 
critique of simulation and simulated authenticity regarding the knowledges and spaces of 
other worlds and arrives at the aestheticization of idea of utopia in the medium of film. 
                                                 
15 Gemünden, “The Indianerphantasien of Herbert Achternbusch,” p. 35. 
16 Ibid., p. 34. 
17 Ibid., p. 37. 
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Simulation here performs a post- and anticolonial critique that reveals the very artificiality of 
Western notions of alterity thereby making an argument for film as a site of utopian alterity. 
That is, just as Born’s and Fichte’s revelation of literature’s culpability in the creation and 
control of other worlds also opens up contradictory textual spaces of alterity, Achternbusch’s 
Der Komantsche holds the colonial construction of other worlds up for view and 
simultaneously subverts it through the film’s assertion and exposure of its own artificiality 
and simulation. 
The same holds true for science fiction films in the seventies. Six years before 
Achternbusch’s film toyed with the idea of simulated and televised other worlds, Rainer 
Werner Fassbinder’s Welt am Draht [1973] traversed similar terrain in the realm of science 
fiction. Based on the American science-fiction writer Daniel F. Galouye’s novel Simulacron-
3 [1964], Fassbinder’s Welt am Draht is a two part mini-series first aired on the German 
television station ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland). The story centers on Fred Stiller (played by Klaus 
Löwitsch) as the new director of the “Institut für Kybernetik und Zukunftsforschung,” or the 
“IKZ.”  The “IKZ” has created a simulated computer world that is not only constantly 
displayed and observed through a system of television screens, but also into which the 
programmers can travel by means of a helmet-like contraption that plugs them to this 
computer world and interestingly emulates. While this simulated world is initially intended 
as a social experiment controlled by the state, it is revealed that private corporations have a 
particular interest in this simulation as potential a predictor of future’s markets. After the 
mysterious death and disappearance of the former director of the institute, Professor Vollmer, 
Stiller begins to slowly discover that his world is, like the computer generated one, merely 
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the simulation, or simulacrum, of another world. Vollmer leaves behind one clue for Stiller, 
namely a drawing of Zeno’s paradox. This philosophical conundrum that demonstrates the 
illusion of change and motion through the metaphor of a footrace between Achilles and a 
tortoise, acquires a different meaning in Fassbinder’s work, namely the illusion and paradox 
of other worlds.  
The film plays with the idea of other televisual and filmic worlds, both through its 
decidedly melodramatic performances that ooze inauthenticity, but also through its mise-en-
scène. On the one hand, it emulates Stanley Kubrick’s sci-fi aesthetic in 2001: A Space 
Odyssey [1968] not only with wide shots of brightly lit, multicolored corridors, office 
complexes, and rooms of computer servers (see figures 1 and 2), but also with its close-ups 
of Stiller in the simulator helmet (see figures 3 and 4).   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Welt am Draht  Figure 2: 2001: A Space Odyssey 
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On the other hand, Welt am Draht creates a mise-en-abyme, framing the characters through 
medium and close shots around and reflected in mirrors (see figures 5 and 6).  
 
 
Figure 10: Welt am Draht     Figure 11: Welt am Draht 
 
In these ways—melodramatic acting, the emulation of science-fiction mise-en-scène, and the 
use of mise-en-abyme—Fassbinder’s Welt am Draht is an exercise in the televisual, filmic, 
and computer creation and representation of other worlds. Similar to the two works that 
comprise the science-fiction discussion in this dissertation, Fassbinder’s film uses utopia, the 
construction of other worlds through simulation, as a means to critique. With Kluge’s 
Figure 9: 2001: A Space Odyssey Figure 8: Welt am Draht 
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Lernprozesse, it shares a concern with science fictional other worlds as spaces of 
expansionist capitalism. Moreover, it echoes the insistence on the paradoxical nature of 
utopia in P.M.’s Weltgeist. That is, each of the simulated worlds in Welt am Draht is 
predicated on the continued existence of the others. Accordingly, as the inhabitants of the 
computer worlds become cognizant of their simulated existence and attempt to leave one 
world for the other, this act of escape threatens the viability of the other worlds. The constant 
mirroring at work in Welt am Draht signals the existence of other worlds and is at once a 
reminder of their inaccessible, paradoxical nature. Like the mirror images that can only exist 
so long as there is something, or someone, to be reflected, other, utopian worlds are only 
viable so long as there is someone to return to write about, film, or even program them, in 
this case. Thus just as P.M.’s death would be the end of the planet Tara, Stiller’s death and 
his return to the “real world” in Welt am Draht begs the question of how many other 
simulated worlds there are as well as the fate of the simulated world one leaves behind. 
Similar to the other science fiction works discussed in Literature as Utopia, Fassbinder’s 
Welt am Draht probes the idea of utopia by relying of techniques of simulation to display the 
paradoxes and contradictions at work in their creation. In this way, he upholds the mediums 
of film and television as potential spaces of alterity.  
Literature as Utopia explored postcolonial and science fiction literature as a way to 
reassess the fate and legacy of the idea of utopia and to dialectically reconstruct it after sixty-
eight. By locating the continuation of utopia as it manifested itself in the medium of literature 
in the seventies through the utopias of the sixties, I demonstrated that idea of utopia survived 
sixty-eight as a critical reassessment and reevaluation of literature, theory, and the idea of 
utopia itself. This was made possible by posing a dialectical relationship between 
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engagements with the epistemologies of space in the self-reflexive empirical knowledge of 
other worlds in postcolonialism and the speculative knowledge of imaginary worlds in 
science fiction. Futher this project proposed a two-way street between the two decades such 
that the sixties shed new light on the seventies and the seventies in turn inform and reflect on 
the sixties. This path was one paved both by the idea of utopia as well as its subsequent 
aestheticization after its attempted policization in sixty-eight. The history of the idea of 
utopia as outlined throughout this dissertation and illuminated in postcolonial and science-
fiction literature of the seventies can also help us understand the shift to simulation in the 
following decade by applying it both retrospectively and prospectively. In this way, 
simulation does not necessarily entail a foreclosure of the idea of utopia in the rise of 
postmodernism. Rather, tracing its medial incarnations and contestations in literature and 
film can aid in thinking both the idea of utopia as well as its aesthetic production and 
reflection differently, so to speak. This is only possible if we are open to not only questioning 
the caesura between the sixties and seventies, which was the basis of this project, but the 
purported paradigm shift between the seventies and eighties as well, one that divides the 
decades along the lines of modernism and postmodern simulation.  
As I have shown throughout this project, other worlds as utopian spaces of alterity are 
founded on contradiction and paradox. Such attributes can also be found in the realm of 
simulation, which holds itself up as such and relishes in the paradoxes between the worlds 
and the realities that it creates. This is not to suggest that simulation in the eighties is merely 
an extension of the 1970s any more than the seventies was an uncomplicated continuation of 
the rebellious spirit of sixty-eight. Rather, the explorations of simulation in postcolonial and 
science-fiction works of the seventies challenge the notion of postmodernism as a clear-cut 
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break with the seventies that entails, moreover, a utopian skepticism rooted in the collapse of 
other worlds through simulation. By further examining these genres, particularly in film, we 
can further trace the history of the idea of utopia into the eighties, a time in which both 
postcolonialism and science fiction exploded beyond their humble, albeit groundbreaking, 
beginnings. The continued prominence of postcolonialism and science fiction necessitates an 
expanded medial framework that includes not only literare, but also film as a medium in 
which the aestheticization of the idea of utopia took firm hold after sixty-eight. 
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